Classics 158 (Greco-Roman
Politics)
Cross-listed with Philosophy
195 and Political
Science 195
Notes on Plato's Crito:
Background Material
This material is placed here for
your information. I will not cover it in class.
Dramatic
Date: The dramatic date is clear enough--it is the third day
before the sacred ship from Delos will arrive in Athens, and so the
third day from Socrates’ death.
The boat is further discussed at Phaedo 58a1ff.--the month was
Anthesterion, or Feb/March.
Absolute Date: The Crito must have been written soon
after Apology. Perhaps before
Euthyphro, because that
dialogue has things which more closely resemble the theory of forms.
Guthrie thinks 45b7 “What you said in court, that you could not
live abroad” and 52c4 “you could have been punished with exile if you
wanted in the trial” more likely refer to Plato’s Apology than to Socrates’ actual
defense.
53b4-5, that Thebes and Megara are well-governed, has been taken
by well-known scholars (Ryle and Wilamowitz) as evidence that the
dialogue must have been written after 370 and 395 respectively. That is
poppycock for the obvious reason that Thebes and Megara are said to be
well-governed not at the time of the dialogue’s writing, but at the
fictional dramatic date of the dialogue. Whether they were or not is
not our concern right now.
Historicity: a private
conversation. Perhaps Crito told Plato about it.
Xenophon, Apol. 23
says that Socrates’ friends urged him to escape, but Xenophon may not
have first hand evidence--he could be getting it from the Apology. But the information was
probably notorious, and easily verified.
Crito the character and the
historical figure:
Found in Apology at
33d9f. (he is a demesmate (Alopeke) and peer of Socrates, and is among
those cited whom Meletus did not produce as witnesses against Socrates,
and his son Critoboulos is also mentioned) and 38b6-7 (Crito and his
son bid Socrates offer to pay 30 Minae).
He will reappear in the Phaedo
59b, during Socrates’ last hours, and at 115d7, he is said to have
offered to go bail for Socrates, as surety that Socrates would not
escape--Burnet’s note tells us that Crito offered to be surety to him
during the interim period between the trial and the return of the boat.
In the Euthydemus, he
is Socrates’ main interlocutor in the frame of the dialogue, and he
consults Socrates about the education of his son.
He was supposedly quite rich.
Idomeneus in Jakoby Fr. Gr. H. 388 F 17--somehow differs with
Plato on Crito.
Xenophon lists him among the true Socratics (Mem. 1.2.48) and
tells us a story that blackmailers were bamboozling him until Socrates
suggested a way to solve the problem by getting someone to bamboozle
the blackmailers, which worked (Mem.
ii.9)
D.L., who is perhaps not to be trusted, says he wrote 17
dialogues!
Philosophical Background Material
The Crito
follows Plato's Apology. In
the Apology, Socrates defends
himself against charges that he: 1) Corrrupts the youth, 2) Does not
believe in the gods of the state, and 3) Introduces new gods. A
plausible interpretation of the charges has it that his philosophical
beliefs and the fact that he shares them with the youth and anyone else
who will listen constitute the basis for those charges.
In the Apology, Socrates
suggests that his philosophical activity is the result of a divine
mission given to him by the oracle at Delphi, which said that no one
was more wise than Socrates. Socrates, who was unaware of being wise in
anything at all, proceeded to try to show that other people were wiser
than he. None of them, however, have passed muster as of the time of
his trial. So he concluded that he is wiser than they in this and this
alone: he knows no more than they do about virtue, except that he alone
realizes/admits that he does not know it.
What Socrates does not know is a matter of debate. He says he does not
know the most important things, how to live one's life. In other words,
he does not know right and wrong, how to be excellent as a human. His
answer to remedy his ignorance is to search for knowledge. Thus he
continually asks people questions and interrogates their supposed
knowledge. Famously, he says that the unexamined life is not worth
living. Hence he talks with people: many youths think of him as their
teacher (they do learn from him), and many folk resent his curmudgeonly
logic-splitting way of embarrassing them when they claim knowledge of
anything important.
This is about political thought, so what do we know of Socrates as a
citizen? The Apology says
that his trial was his first appearance before the court. He may have
been in juries. He also claims not to have spoken in assemblies. He had
served in the army and acquitted himself honorably. He once presided
over the council, and refused to try the Ten Generals who had failed to
pick up the dead at Arginusai on the grounds that it was illegal to do
so: the crowd would have gladly executed him for that opposition. Also,
under the short-lived Oligarchy called The Thirty, he refused to bring
Leon of Salamis to execution: that too was an action that imperilled
his life. Other than those brave civic acts, which he did not seek out,
but were thrust upon him, he has lived a quietist life, it seems, in
spite of being a citizen of Athens, th emost participatory of
participatory democracies. And yet, as can be seen in the Apology and Gorgias, Socrates realizes and even
boasts that his activity is of great political import: he keeps people
focussed on the most important things, namely how to live one's life,
how to be an excellent human, and that is surely the key to how the
polis can be the best that it can be.
One claim made by Socrates in the Apology
has particular import for the Crito.
Socrates says in the Apology that
had the jurors freed him on condition that he not philosophize (i.e.
not carry on his characteristic activity of interrogating people), he
would have continued to philosophize in contravention of their decree.
That is to say, even if the polis had passed a law forbidding such
activity, he would have disobeyed!!! Compare Antigone's claim that she
will follow the unwritten law even in defiance of the written law. This
is not civil disobedience as we might think of it, an extreme
persuasion tactic to force change by subjecting oneself to flagrant
prosecution for violating an unjust law: it is rather obedience to a
higher law.
Matters Of Interest in the Crito:
Socrates is devoted entirely to reason, or so
he says in the Crito. What
can that mean?
Why obey/stay in/be loyal to a democratic system of government when one
does not trust the opinion of the many?
Socrates held that in order to say that something is an X, one first
had to know what X’s are.
He does not know what right and wrong are, he says.
How can he know that staying in Athens is right and leaving wrong?
What special status does abiding by an agreement (to abide by a
verdict) have, especially in the face of a manifestly unjust verdict?
Socrates seemed to indicate in the Apology that those jury members
who condemned him had no standing as far as justice was concerned. If
that is so, he is clearly claiming that his condemnation is unjust,
isn't he? Why obey an unjust verdict? Could it be that there is no
higher law that tells him what to do, as there would be in the case
that the jury forbade him from philosophizing? Or maybe it is that he
just does not consider death a harm to him.
What about claims made in the Euthyphro
and in the Apology to the
effect that Socrates did not think people had real knowledge about
religion? If that is so, how can they condemn him for religious
offenses? If they do not have such knowledge, why should he abide by
their incompetent judgment?
Are the results of the Crito
intended to be universally applicable? i.e. should everyone abide by
all decisions of the courts? only some?
OR, is it intended to apply to Socrates and Socrates alone, because of
something unique about him or his position? OR is there some middle
ground (it should apply to those who grew up in a system?).
Crito says:
- The masses will think Crito is not willing to help his friend
- One must pay attention to the masses because they can do
tremendous harm.
- Socrates should not worry about Crito possibly exposing himself
to censure for bribery--foreigners can bankroll the escape (45a-b)
Crito has friends in Thessaly who will take Socrates in.
- Morally, Socrates is bound not to throw away his life and to
support his family.
Socrates' reply:
- 44c6-9--Socrates tells Crito that his worries about the opinion
of the masses are inappropriate--the best sort will know, and who cares
about the masses’ opinions anywho?
- The many cannot harm Socrates--44d1-10--why does Socrates think
that the many cannot do him any harm? Apology
40a8 said that the
many think death an extreme of evil, but Socrates rejected that belief
there. In
other words, even if they put him to death, they will not have harmed
Socrates.
Also therein is the important and strange Socratic principle that
the expert at doing good will also be the best qualified for doing
harm!-- m€a dÊnamiw t«n §nant€vn (44d7) -- but
Socrates seems also to hold
that knowing the good compels its performance--intellectualism. Given
intellectualism, is this ability to do harm only theoretical?
Perhaps he is saying that the masses are by nature neither
intelligent nor unintelligent--neither rational nor irrational--they
are like the tree falling, they are just non-rational. That is perhaps
questionable, and we are still left with the bizzarre claim that the
masses cannot do harm, but we are also left with the result that harm
can
perhaps still be done by individuals.
Crito 484b4-C9Burnet suggests that the reason why they can
neither harm nor benefit is that they cannot make a soul wise or
foolish, and that is the only real harm or benefit. One does wonder
then why Socrates seems to think that the masses (d∞mow) is a seductive
and corrupting influence? esp. in the Gorgias
and the Alcibiades I. Perhaps
the key to that lies in the power one grants to the people over one’s
soul--one can let them seduce one or not, and therein lies the
culpability.
- Socrates does not need to reply to this, although it is an
interesting question why he did not propose exile as a penalty: he
would not really have been killed elsewhere: he was a celebrated
intellectual and would have found perhaps controversial welcome, but
nonetheless welcome somewhere, and he could have moved on if need be.
- Principles cannot be selectively applied--what Socrates claimed
before he was condemned to death must be the same afterward, unless
Socrates has changed his mind about his principles. Crito is an exploration of that
possibility. The meta-principle that principles cannot be selectively
applied is an important and strong one.
Crito 48b-49b: Gregory Vlastos on its importance
In this text, Socrates argues in favor of reforming Greek
morality.
As analyzed by Vlastos in Socrates: Ironist and Moral
Philosopher, Chapter 7, Cornell 1991.
Crito 484b4-C9
I. "We should never do injustice."
II. "Therefore, we should never return an injustice."
III. "We should never do evil [to anyone]."
IV. "Therefore, we should never return evil for evil [to anyone]."
V. "To do evil to a human being is no different from acting
unjustly to him."
Add to that:
Crito 49a4-b6
VI. It is never good [for anyone] or noble [for anyone] to do a
wrong.
If we take these statements seriously, Socrates is claiming not
just that doing wrong is bad, but that it is so bad that it can NEVER
be good. It's clear that some wrongs lead to large amounts of things
people value (pleasure, comfort, security, life-preservation, money and
other possessions, esteem), but Socrates says all wrong is bad. There
can be no good that results from a wrong that is sufficient to
counterbalance the wrong.
Why is that?
Vlastos' answer: doing wrong harms the wrongdoer in ways that
make the wrongdoer's life not good.
A Theory of Political Obligation
in the Crito
This section is largely dependent on Penner's contribution to The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman
Political Thought.
One simple point seems to be made in the Crito: citizens should either persuade
of obey. Unjust laws, verdicts, etc. will occur, and the
citizen is obliged to do one of two things: persuade other citizens to
change or remedy the injustice, or obey the law, verdict, etc. even
though it is unjust.
Reasons:
- The state is at least partly responsible for one's very
existence: the relation between one's parents and one's procreation are
legal matters.
- The state has raised and educated the citizen just as parents
raise and educate.
- The adult citizen who does not leave, although he is free to do
so, tacitly agrees to abide by the laws and decisions of the state. It
is not a relationship of convenience.
This is usually held to be somewhat different from the social contract
theory, for in the social contract theory, the agreement to the
contract is the source of obligations. Here, however, the antecedent
raising and procreating create the obligations. And yet, it seems that
in the Crito there are two
arguments:
- Socrates has benefitted greatly from Athens and its laws, thus he
has obligations to it.
- Socrates agreed to the laws, thus he is obliged to obey.
Are the two arguments separate or not?
Some claim that the Crito is
about the moral obligations which precede the social contract. That is
problematic, for Socrates apparently says he would disobey the law in
the Apology (see above). The Crito, however, seems to say that
all disobedience is immoral. We can avoid that problem as follows:
- Agree that the Apology
and the Crito are
inconsistent.
- Claim that Socrates is addressing different audiences in the two
dialogues and so uses different arguments (Grote's argument)
- Deny that the Apology
really threatens disobedience (deStrycker and Slings' argument)
- Fancy Dancing
- Claim that Socrates is saying he would disobey the law ONLY in
the case that the law prevented him from engaging in persuasion (i.e.
it said "obey," not "persuade of obey").
- Claim that the Crito
addresses our obligations to the state as long as no other prior more
important obligations interfere while the Apology considers a case in which
one's prior obligations to the gods interferes.
- Claim that if the state were to forbid Socrates from
philosophizing, the act of disobeying the state would itself be
an instance of "trying to persuade," which is covered in the "persuade
of obey" doctrine of the Crito.
- Claim that this is not about moral obligations: rather this is
about what one should do "if one wants to do well." In that case,
harming the laws without even offering persuasion is not "doing well."
Thus in MOST cases, it will not be doing well to disobey parents or
state, but in SOME cases, it is: those are the cases where one cannot
"do well" if one obeys. If the state forbade Socrates from
philosophizing, it would be forbidding him from the thing that is most
central do "doing well," namely the effort to figure out what "doing
well" is. It would forbid him from caring for his soul, and should be
disobeyed in that case. It is best to love the state, just as it is
best to love one's parents, as long as neither interferes with one's
caring for one's soul. (Penner's position)
At 53c, Socrates has the laws say that if he stays and is executed, he
will have been wronged by men, not the laws themselves (the verdict was
unjust, not the law, I guess), but if he escapes, he will have wronged
the laws. Being wronged by men (not laws?) is preferable to wronging
laws.
Socrates is a quietist, who thinks it is best to keep one's head down
and let others worry about running the state, for they are at best
traffic engineers: they are not engaged in truly important things. The
truly important things are care of one's soul and that of others.
Socrates engages in that wholeheartedly.