Physics 2.3 (194b17-195a4)
Airtotle's four causes
- First off, Aristotle's 4 "causes" are not all causes in the
way
that most modern English speakers think of causes.
- For Aristotle, science = causal knowledge
- Thus knowledge of what causes are is essential for every
science
- we think we have knowledge
of
a thing
only when we have grasped its cause (APost. 71 b
9-11. Cf.
APost. 94 a
20)
- we think we do not have
knowledge of a thing until we have
grasped its why, that is to say, its cause (Phys. 194
b 17-20)
- Aristotle's "causes" are often better thought of as
"explanations" or "reasons."
- Take any single thing, then ask yourself four questions:
- What is it made of?
- What made it/what action/what trigger led to its
creation/coming to be/happening/becoming what it is?
- What is it: shape, structure, arrangement? What makes it one
sort of thing rather than another? What holds it together?
What about
the way it is put together makes it work?
- What is it for? What end is it likely to serve? What goal is
it
likely to reach?
- Those four questions correspond to Aristotle's four causes:
- Material cause: "that out of which" it is made.
- Efficient Cause: the source of the objects
principle of
change or stability.
- Formal Cause: the essence of the object.
- Final Cause: the
end/goal of the object, or what the object is good for.
- A note about final causes: they always presuppose the
formal
cause: in order to explain the goal/purpose/end, you must
use the
formal cause.
- Each of those four questions leads to a different sort of
explanation of the thing.
- The material cause:
“that out of which”, e.g., the bronze of a statue, the letters
of a
syllable.
- The formal cause:
“the
form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g.,
the shape of a statue, the arrangement of a syllable, the
functional
structure of a machine or an organism.
- The efficient
cause:
“the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g.,
the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man who
gives
advice, the father of the child.
- The final cause:
“the
end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”,
e.g., health is the end of the following things: walking,
losing
weight, purging, drugs, and
surgical tools.
- Take a statue:
- Its material
explains
its existence: a bronze statue is a
certain sort of thing, and its material constituents, the
elements that
make up bronze, cause it to have certain properties and
explain a lot
about it.
- Some qualities of bronze are important for the statue-ness
of
the statue. Others are not. Those that are important explain the statue and
are the
material cause.
- bronze is also the subject of change, that is,
the thing that undergoes the change and results in a statue.
- art of bronze casting in the artisan = efficient cause or the
principle
that produces the statue (Phys. 195 a 6-8. Cf. Metaph. 1013 b
6-9).
- the
artisan manifests
specific knowledge, which is the salient explanatory factor
that one
should pick as the most
accurate specification of the efficient cause (Phys. 195 b
21-25).
- this knowledge is not
dependent upon and does not make reference to the desires,
beliefs and
intentions of the individual
artisan
- it helps us to understand what it takes to
produce the statue: what steps are required
- Its form explains its existence: it is not *just* a lump of
bronze, it also has a certain shape, structure, and
arrangement.
- can an explanation of this type be given without a
reference to the statue? no!
- Its purpose as a statue explains it: it is "to
commemorate,"
"to instantiate beauty," "to decorate," or some combination
of those or
something else. The need for a commemorative object, or the
need to
express beauty, or the need for a decorative object can
explain the
statue.
- bronze is melted and poured in the wax cast. Both the
prior
and the subsequent stage are for the
sake of a certain end, the
production of the statue.
- Clearly the statue enters in the explanation
of each step of the artistic production as the final cause or that for
the sake of which everything is done.
- conceptually the efficient and the final cause can be
separated, but the formal and final causes are tightly
linked.
- By "final causes," Aristotle offers an explanation that
refers
to
the telos or end of
the
process= a teleological
explanation
- teleological explanation does not necessarily depend upon
the
application of psychological concepts such as desires,
beliefs and
intentions. But if they are present, they are often integral
to the final cause, although it's possible that they are
merely accidental to whatever is the object of explanation.
- Aristotle explains
natural process on the basis of a
teleological model
- the artistic model is understood in non-psychological
terms.
- Causes, like primary substances, have what we can call species
and genera, and the species and genera of the cause are also
causes (we
might call them secondary causes).
- The material cause of the statue, bronze, is a metal, and so
metal is a material cause of the statue.
- In somewhat modern terms, the material cause of our body,
organs, are made up of something like tissue as their matter,
which is
made up of cells as its matter, which are made up of cellular
organs as
their matter, which are made up of plasms, which are made up
of
molecules, which are made up of elements, etc.
- all the way down this ladder, we may have mere
matter and most basic form.
- Causes also have coincidental properties/aspects, which are
coincidental causes.
- For instance, let us say that Joe the sculptor makes a
statue:
Joe is the efficient cause of the statue. But Joe also is a
mountain
climber, and so we might say that a mountain climber is the
efficient
cause of the statue. If we are more precise, we say that Joe's
sculpting craft is the efficient cause, and the other
qualities of Joe
are coincidental efficient causes.
- Aristotle's project with causes is scientific explanation
- thus he is interested in general causes for general
phenomena
- that is not to say he does not understand that particular
things have particular causes
- this statue is caused by this bronze, this
sculptor's skill,
this form, and for this end.
- Aristotle searches “for
general causes of general things and for particular causes
of
particular things” (Phys. 195 a 25-26)
- idiosyncrasies that may be important in studying a
particular
bronze
statue as the great achievement of an individual artisan may
be
extraneous to the more general case of statues.
- Chance causes some things, as does luck.
- luck is a subset of chance (note that this is slightly
different terminology from that in our translation: I am using
"luck"
for what was termed "chance" there)
- Only things that can act can be lucky.
- "Acting" is being confined to "agents" on this
terminology: a pebble is not an agent. A person is.
- Things that cannot act cannot be lucky, but can be affected
by
chance.
- A pebble is affected by chance. A person is affected by
luck.
- An example of chance is coincidence: coincidence can be a
cause,
but coincidences have no cause (Physics
2.4 ff.):
- A scenario: 10 people fall and hurt themselves on a single
day
in a single building: no single thing is the cause of those 10
falls
(one falls because she wore very slippery shoes and happened
to step in
a puddle of grease, another falls because a man pushed her out
of his
way, another falls because he had a heart attack, etc. The
institution
that owns the building decides to radically overhaul their
building to
avoid accidental falls BECAUSE of the coincidence of 10 falls,
which
drew their attention to potential liability. But THERE IS NO
SINGLE
CAUSE for those 10 falls all occurring in the same building on
the same
day.
- Cf. Aristotle's man who ate spicy food, went to well, was
killed by brigands: no tight causal connection between spicy
food and
being killed by brigands, but that is nonetheless why the man
was
killed: bad luck.
- There is no direct cause of chance/luck, even though every
thing
has a cause.
- In the scenario above, each accidental fall has its own
causes,
and so you can explain all ten of those falls via direct
causes. What
you cannot explain is why they all happened on the same day:
that is
the coincidental part of the scenario. But that coincidental
part is
what CAUSED the institution that owns the building to revise
its
policies.
- ABOUT FINAL CAUSES
- Physics II 8 is
Aristotle's general defense of final causes.
- He needs to defend them because, he claims, his
predecessors
believed only in efficient and material causes.
- His defence of final causes shows that there are aspects
of
nature that cannot be explained by efficient and material
causes alone.
- Final causes, he claims, are the best explanation for
these
aspects of nature.
- Aristotle holds, for example, that certain teeth have
certain
shapes because of what they are for. Those of carnivores are
designed
to tear and rip. Those of herbivores are designed to crush
(cf. Physics
198b24-27).
- "Final" causation is often referred to as "teleology," which
derives from Greek τελος "end, goal."
- Teleology is often thought of as requiring an agent
separate
from the thing that has a final cause. For instance, if an oak
tree has
a final cause, must there not be something apart from the oak
tree that
uses the oak tree for some goal or end?
- The ultimate result of many teleological views is that there
must be a God who designs the world: if things have a purpose,
whose
purpose? If things have a design that makes them FOR certain
goals,
there must be a designer.
- Aristotle would say that there is no need for such a
separate
agent, no need for a designer, for there to be teleology. The
goal of
the acorn is to become an oak tree. The acorn aims to fully
actualize
the form of a full-grown oak tree, but is not an agent, and no
agent set it in motion. It is a "self-mover."
- A question to ask about teleology is whether it uses an
occurrence in the future to explain something that happens
now. If that
is the case, how can we call it a cause? If the thing that
does the
causing occurs AFTER the thing that is caused, the normal
relation of
cause to caused is backwards.
- Well, what of it? Think of genes: they provide a sort of set
of
instructions for the acorn to build itself. They cause the oak
to react
to its environment in certain ways. They cause the oak tree to
produce
more acorns (which is perhaps its purpose). I see no need for
god to
enter the picture, and I see no need for a future event to
cause a
present one there. Can we characterize genes as involving
final causes?
I think so.
The final cause in nature is a potential within things
to become
what they become.
- The Rain, for example:
- Phys 198b19-21
explains that it rains because of material processes: warm air
is drawn
up and cools off and becomes water, which comes down as rain.
- 198b21-23 explains that the crops may be nourished or
spoiled
as a result of the rain, and yet it does not rain for the sake
of that
result. It is a coincidence.
- Why is it not a coincidence that the front teeth grow sharp
for
cutting, while the rear teeth are broad for grinding? When the
animal's
teeth grow that way, it survives. When they do not, it dies.
Why not a
coincidence? (198b23-27)
- Aristotle replies that he wants an explanation of why it is
a
regular occurrence that the teeth grow in such a way that the
animal
survives. It is implausible that it is a coincidence every
time. Final
causation is offered to explain the regularity.
- In some ways, it is just a bandaid: we want to know more
about
how that works: Darwin offered a mechanism: does that
mechanism make
final causes extraneous?
- Darwin's theory holds that natural selection works like a
giant filter: those traits that confer a reproductive or
survival
advantage survive.
- Is this different from final causation?
- an advantage is toward some goal: there can't be an
advantage that is not for some goal
- the goal is primarily survival of the species and
secondarily survival of the individual
- it levels the goal of humanity and that of gnats and
protozoans: is that a problem for Aristotle?\perhaps
tertiarily there
might be some favoring of "well-being" and
"development of potential" in that individuals who are
faring well are
more likely to also mate and reproduce?
- A house and an organism, for examples
- In de Partibus Animalium
(Parts of Animals),
Book I,
Aristotle presents an argument for the priority of the final
cause over
the efficient cause.
- Take a house:
- all the building materials are delivered
- they are necessary: without them a house cannot be built
- they are not sufficient: they will just sit there unless
there is something more
- the builder comes: the skill she has is an efficient cause
- but all of this is for the sake of a house: a house is the
final cause.
- from the very start, all is done with the house in view
as
the goal
- without it, nothing happens
- Take an organism:
- Parts of Animals
640a18-19 says that "generation
is
for the sake of substance, not substance for the sake of
generation"
- the proper way to explain the generation of an animal is
to
begin with the end of the process, the adult full-grown
animal.
- when Empedocles explains the formation of the spine as the
result of some fetal behavior, Aristotle says that is
insufficient:
- first off, the fetus had to have the power to move, so
that
must be part of the explanation
- furthermore, the spine is for-the-sake of support of an
adult human's weight. That must be part of the explanation
as well.
- procreation and causality
- Aristotle maintained that something that is in motion
requires
an efficient cause not just to set it in motion, but also to
keep it in
motion.
- Aristotle had no concept of inertia!!!
- also no concept of causation at a distance (gravity,
magnetism, etc.)
- For Aristotle, efficient causation required contact, and
that
contact had to occur as long as the caused thing was
changing/moving
- So what about procreation? see Generation of Animals I and II.
- animals procreate, because it is the closest they can get
to
immortality (immortality is a goal because it would involve
permanent
being, which would involve more full actuality)
- males are superior: they contribute more form for the
human:
they contribte the last thing that is necessary to create a
viable
human.
- remember this is Aristotle: he was limited in some ways
by
his environment and culture: nonetheless, as a
philosopher, he might/could/should
have risen above those limits.
- females contribute menses, cooked-up blood that falls
short
of human form: it is closer to human than earth, air, fire,
and water,
but it falls short.
- The female residue
[menses] is potentially what the animal is by nature,
and it contains
the parts potentially, although not actually, and
because when
something active and something passive come into contact
... the one
immediately acts and the other is acted upon in the
manner in which
they are active and passive. And the female provides the
matter, the
male the origin of the change. (GA II4
740b19-25)
- active and passive is explained at Metaphysics Theta,
1046a4-18
- active and passive correspond to efficient and
material
cause
- the male is the efficient cause, the source of the
change
- the female is material cause, the thing acted on
- the semen does its work, then evaporates!
- so what about the need for an efficient cause to
maintain
contact while the change is taking place?
- does Aristotle think that the change to a human soul
takes place right away?
- What is sought now is
not
the material out of which but the agency by which the
parts come to be.
For either something outside them makes them, or
something which exists
within the seed and the semen; and whatever it is must
either be a part
of soul or soul, or something which possesses soul. But
it seems
unreasonable to suppose that anything outside could
create anything to
do with the viscera, or any of the other parts; for it
cannot cause
movement without being in contact, and nothing can be
affected by it
unless it causes movement. Therefore it must be
something which exists
within the fetation, either as a part of it or as
distinct from it. (GA II1 733b32-734a6)
- in the case of things with natures, the nature operates
by
permeating the material and operating from within, not
from without.
- the father's semen apparently causes a change to the
material, which then acquires a nature which works from
within.
- the materialists hold that mechanical materialistic
explanations work for it all, but Aristotle wants an
explanation of the
organization of the growth of the human fetus.
- God and the final cause
- God, for Aristotle, is necessary, because there has to be
something which is purely actual. More on this elsewhere:
please accept
for now that Aristotle thinks there must be something that is
pure
actuality.
- God exists as pure actuality consisting in rational
contemplation of the best thing, god itself.
- God is the final cause of EVERYTHING
- everything aims to imitate God's perfect actuality
- everything seeks actuality, the fulfillment of its
potential,
full being.
- this "aiming" or "seeking" need not be conscious,
involving
beliefs, etc.:
- even the elements, earth, air, fire, and water, strive
to
become fully actual, which would involve their fulfilling
their
potential:
- each has its own proper place, which is part of its
goal.
- Causal explanation
- the best explanations will consist of all four causes, but
the formal and final will have priority over the efficient and
material.
- Aristotle realized that not everything has all 4 causes.
- An eclipse of the moon has no final cause (Metaphysics 1044b12)
- deprivation of light by the interposition of the earth
between the sun and the moon is the efficient cause
- there is no final cause
- Aristotle thought that the natural world has nisuses or
strivings within its members:
- acorns are simply aimed at becoming oaks
- human embryos are aimed at becoming adult humans
- thus he thinks that developmental biology is an
error-theory: the thing that needs to be explained is not
why things
become what they do, but why in so many cases they fail.
- common objection: Aristotle is just saying that things do
what they do because that is the sort of things they do.
- where's the explanation in that?
- reply:
- until we come up with a way to bridge the gap from a
mechanical/material explanation at the most basic
microscopic level
(atoms? quarks? energy?) to the macroscopic level (us,
plants,
mountains), there is a point to asking what is different
about the
macroscopic level
- Aristotle's theory sorts the world into natural kinds:
humans beget humans, plants beget plants. Certain things
come to be
from certain things, and that has to do with their form
and their goal.
- if we believe DNA is the code of life, how far are we
from Aristotle? Think of it as a formula for local
decrease in entropy:
that's what a "final goal" is: the instructions for a
local decrease in
entropy: DNA is the formula
- Also, Aristotle's theory contributes to our
understanding
of how organisms work: the function of parts and the
relation to
wholes. That's what final and formal causes are about.
- Thus formal and final causes do a bit more work than
merely
saying that things do what they do because that's the sort
of thing
they do.
- Aristotle as historian of philosophy
- Aristotle begins the Metaphysics
with a survey of how his predecessors investigated causes
- this is part of Aristotle's typical procedure: phainomena,
endoxa, puzzles, then solutions.
- among the most important predecessors:
- Leucippus and Democritus developed ancient atomism: a
materialistic theory which posited atoms and void as the
basis of
reality.
- Empedocles posited four elements: earth, air, fire,
and
water, which can be compounded and dissolved by two
forces, Love and
Strife
- Anaxagoras held that everything had the seeds
of
everything else in it, but Mind directed it all.
- Pythagoreans held that number imposed a limit or
structure on matter's indeterminacy.
- Plato held that there is material and formal
causation,
according to Aristotle. Plato also held that everything
is arranged for
the best, which is a sort of teleology, but not like
Aristotle's.
- Aristotle's comment:
- While all generation
and
destruction may well be from one or more elements, still
why does this
occur, and because of what cause (aition)? For it can't be that the
substrate
moves itself. I mean for instance that neither
wood nor bronze
are responsible (aitios) for
each of their changes: it's not the wood which makes the
bed or the
bronze the statue, but something else is the cause of
the change in
each case. To investigate this is to investigate the other cause, that from which
comes the
origination of change. (Metaphysics A3 984a19-27)
- For neither earth nor
anything else of
that sort seeem a likely cause of things either being
or becoming good
and beautiful, and nor did they seem so to them (Aristotle's
predecessors). Nor can it be right to
entrust such a
matter to chance and fortune (Metaphysics A3
984b11-15)
- Aristotle was the first to engage in anything like a history
of
philosophy.
- But he is not an impartial historian.
- Aristotle's account of his predecessors is oriented almost
completely toward his own way of viewing causes: thus he
claims
predecessors who
have a different idea got it wrong or missed crucial things.
- This situation is frustrating, because Aristotle's account
of
his predecessors, especially those called "Pre-Socratics,"
is often our
best source for our own knowledge of his predecessors: the
Aristotelian
lens distorts their intentions and makes it difficult to see
their
ideas clearly.
- Unfortunately, many people blame Aristotle for this. That
is
unfair, because Aristotle was not trying to give a
disinterested
account of his predecessors' thoughts. He is, rather, trying
to show
that his ideas have a history, but are new, different, and
better in
various ways.
- The fact that his account is often our best information
about
his predecessors is not his fault. But it's still
frustrating, because
we would really like to know more about those predecessors.
- Texts of interest for Aristotelian causes
- Physics II.3 (general discussion of types of causes)
- Physics II.8 (final cause: has bits tantalizingly
close to evolutionary theory)
Good additional material: Cause of Persian War (hankinson P. 225-6),
stars twinkling (ibidem 225), antlers (ibidem 227).