sophist258a259b

Sophist 254

They want to find a small set of forms to discuss so that they can avoid getting too confused.

Note that this seems to say that the principle of why discuss these forms is not that these forms are all the forms there are in some set of forms: it is a principle of keeping the discussion simple and controllable.

The Visitor suggests that they start with the forms of being, rest, and change.

Why these? because they want to discuss why some forms cannot associate with some other forms, and rest and change seem to be examples of two forms that cannot associate with one another. They also seem to be examples of things that there are forms of.

NB "associate" is used here to translate Plato's words for how these things interact, but we could have used "blend" or "combine" or "mingle" or "mix": the point is to refer to the relation two or more forms can have with each other.

They also want to discuss why some forms can and do associate with other forms: being seems to associate with every form, so it is a good example for their discussion.
There is no claim that these three forms are somehow special or the only forms that could be discussed when discussing the issues they want to discuss: rather they are just good examples to use.

Immediately, they find that each of these three is different from the other two but is the same as itself

And so they posit that there is a form of sameness and difference, and that each of the other three associates with both of these.

Next, they ask "what is difference" and "what is sameness": they are trying to make sure that they have not simply redescribed being, change, and/or rest or somehow introduced things that are already included by admitting being and change and rest: 254e-255a
What sense can we make of 255a?

It starts out with the claim "Change and rest are certainly not different or the same"
Perhaps we can analyze that statement into two statements:

a. "Change is not different or same," which means

1. Change is not the same thing as difference.

not sure about this: but difference is quite often a relation between two completely separate things, whereas change is what, a process? a relation between two things that are one thing? it does seem that change is different from difference, but somehow related, given that once a thing changes, it is then different from how it was.

2. And change is not the same thing as sameness. That seems obvious.

b. "Rest is not different or same," which means

3. Rest is not the same thing as difference. That seems obvious.
4. And Rest is not the same thing as sameness.

Why not? a thing resting is staying the same
well, the only opposite of sameness that I can think of is difference
and the only opposite of rest that I can think of is change
so sameness and rest have different opposites
so they cannot be the same as each other, unless we revisit the idea that change and difference are not the same as each other.
as is often the case, we need to offer Plato thoughts to fill in the gaps he leaves and find a way for what he says to make sense.

That makes some sense. At least each claim seems plausible. Let's call points 1-4 above "the explanandum" (Latin for "the thing that needs to be explained")

we might be content with simply saying these are plausible and so accepting them, but 255a seems to want to argue for them, or at least further explain them.

And at the end of 255a, "If either change or rest comes to be either same or different, then it will force the other to change to the contrary of its own nature, since it will share in its contrary."

That seems to repeat the same thing, and to be an argument for it as a conclusion.
So we seem to be on the right track in imagining that 255a is arguing for this claim, or at the very least explaining more about it.

In between, in the middle of 255a, we find "whatever we call change and rest in common can't be either one of them": what does that mean?

Whatever it means, it should provide part of the reason for the explanandum, because it is in response to "Why not?"
Perhaps it means the following

Consider a thing, call it Athing.
If it is true that Athing is both changing and resting, Athing cannot itself be either change or rest.
If Athing itself were change, and it is resting, then change would be resting.
If change itself were resting, it would become rest.

Because change and rest are contrary opposites: a thing that is changing cannot be resting and a thing that is resting cannot be changing. That is simply definitional of what resting and changing are.
Thus any thing that is changing in some respect that comes to be resting in that same respect simply becomes resting in that respect and is no longer changing in that respect.
So if Athing were itself change, it could not be both change and rest in common, in any respect.

This does not mean that if Athing were cheese, and it were both ripening (i.e. changing) and remaining cheese (i.e. resting), it couldn't thus be both changing and resting: but it would be doing so in different respects (back to the most basic premise of the argument for the tripartite soul). It's just that it changes in one respect and rests in another. It doesn't do both in the same respect.

And likewise, if rest is changing, it would become change.

So if Athing were itself rest, it could not be both change and rest in common, in any respect.

They agree that both rest and change associate with the same and the different 255b
But that change is not the same or the different, and also that rest is not the same or the different.
What of being and the same: are they distinct? 255c

In order to prove that they are distinct, the first step is to assume that they are not distinct. A reductio ad absurdum.

Change and Rest associate with being. (i.e. Change and rest exist).
We assumed that being and same are not distinct, which means they are the same, that there is no difference between them.
Thus we can exchange same with being in 1.
And we get "Change and Rest associate with sameness"
They agree that that is impossible!
Why?
Perhaps it is because "associate with being" means "be an existent thing": both change and rest exist and are equally existent.
But "associate with same" means "X is the same as Y": and so if they associate with same, change would be the same as rest.
That seems to come up with a decent argument in some sense.

Why does it require assumptions? because change does associate with same (change is the same as change) and rest associates with same (rest too is the same as rest). So the statement that "Change and Rest associate with sameness" is unobjectionable if we can take it apart into those two relations.
But they say that it is impossible that "Change and Rest associate with sameness". So we need to find a plausible sense of that statement that is impossible.

If it means "rest is the same as change" then it would be impossible. So perhaps, assuming that the author thought the argument made sense, we can assume that "Change and Rest associate with sameness" is meant to entertain the idea that they do so together in the same relation. But "Change and rest are the same as change and rest" is unobjectionable unless it means that "change is the same as rest" or "rest is the same as change," in which case it is impossible.

What of being and different: are they one thing or two distinct things? 255d

We can say that "X associates with being." (i.e. X exists) and it is complete. There is no need for some other thing.

Two things are enough: being and some other thing.

But we cannot say "X associates with difference." (i.e. X is different from) and have that be complete: we need a third thing: X, difference and some third thing, Y.

With difference, there is always some third thing: difference, a subject X, and some third thing Y.

If being and different were one thing and not two things, they would not be like that: you could make a complete thing in the same way with both.
So being and different are not one thing.

Next, they try to assess the overall relations between the 5 things they have gathered together, namely being, rest, change, different, and same.

Change

Change is completely different from rest.255e

This differs in phrasing from what was said above, but it is consistent with change and rest being incompatible contraries.
Either it says something different from what was said above, or it says it in different words.
Either way, it is plausible.

Change associates with being.256a

i.e. Change is an existent thing.

Change associates with difference 256a

Change is different from any number of things.
E.g. Change is different from sameness (256a)

remember, difference requires a third thing: in this case that third thing is sameness.

Therefore, change is not sameness. 256a

But change is the same (as itself).256a

A footnote in our text says that they said that back at 255a: they meant 255b.
Why and how is change the same?

because everything associates with the same
to understand this and make it plausible, we have to think of this as saying that every thing is the same as itself, but that it is not identical to the relation "being the same as itself"

in other words, when we say "X is the same as itself," we are often pointing out that X just is X, but sometimes, when we say "X is not the same as itself," we mean that "X is not the same as being the same as itself": we are pointing out that the sameness-to-itself relation itself is a thing, and X is not that relation: X is X, and being-self-identical is being-self-identical, but being self-identical is not being X.

So, to repeat and emphasize, they agree that "Change is the same and not the same." That seems contradictory, but only because Greek and English can be ambiguous and incomplete.

What we mean by "Change is the same and not the same." can be put more precisely and clearly as "Change associates with the relation the same as itself AND Change is not the same thing as the relation the same as itself is."

Change could somehow bear a relation to rest (e.g. as incompatible things relate to one another via incompatibility), but it cannot bear the relation of identity(sameness) with rest or the relation of associating with rest. 256c

BUT what of the relation "be the contrary of": is that a form? at least in the way the Sophist talks of forms, it seems to be. That might throw a wrench in the works.

Change relates to different : 256c

it is not the same thing as different
but it associates with different by being different from any number of third things

Change relates to being: 256d

It is different from being because it is not the same thing as being
But it associates with being because change exists, and that is what associating with being means, that something exists.

If we were to run the same analysis as we just did with change through with all 5 of the kinds, we would find that all of these 5 kinds, being, same, rest, different and change both are and are not in various ways. 256e
The way in which they are not is by associating with different. 256e
They all are by associating with being.
They all are the same as by associating with themselves.
Being has a wide range, but different has a wider, infinite range. 256e
But being can associate with different and in that case, as a subject of different, it has as wide a range as different does.
Behind all of this analysis is the fact that some kinds can associate with some other kinds, and some cannot.

different associates with an infinite range.
being associates with a smaller range, but through different it associates with different's range.
same associates with the same range as being, but that does not make it the same as being.
change associates with a smaller range still.
rest also associates with a smaller range still. 257a

The Payoff:

257b: That which is is different from that which is not, but that which is not has two meanings

that which is not can try to refer (unsuccessfully?) to that which does not exist.
OR that which is not can be incomplete and refer (successfully) to that which is not _______ (fill in the blank with some third thing that is other than the subject).

Because that which is is a complete combination, while that which is not needs that third thing.
Thus speaking of that which is not is not nonsense.

Further payoff: knowledge and difference 257c-d
different is "chopped up" just like knowledge is chopped up.

"chopped up" seems to mean that although different is one thing (it associates with one and being), but because it requires a third thing to be complete, it is chopped up into as many parts as there are third things.
In just the same way, know requires a third thing and blends with a range of things that make it chopped up.

But it is not as infinitely chopped up, is it?
because know associates with many separate things, it acquires many names, as many names as there are expertises.

What of

beautiful and just etc. and not beautiful and not just 257d-e
Plato wants to say that different associates with many separate things, but it acquires names from those things

there is beautiful and different from beautiful

of course, 5 associates with different from beautiful
but no one would call 5 "not beautiful" in the way Plato is after
I think he is after "the ugly", a particular kind of "not beautiful"

a parallel case would be "evil" and "not good": pizza and reliability are "not good" but that doesn't make them evil: evil is a particular way of being "not good"

some things are "set over against" other things

consider that change and rest are incompatible with each other
so are white and black
so is beautiful and not beautiful (in the sense of ugly: but not in the sense of merely being different from beautiful: what is that specific sense in which ugly is over against beautiful?)
That is what Brown was after with her "incompatibility range" interpretation.

Sophist 258d-259b

Visitor: We've pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about.
Tht.: In what way?
V.: Because he says, remember,
Never shall it force itself on us, that that which is not may be;
Keep your thought far away from this path of searching.
Tht. That's what he says.
V. But we've not only shown that those which are not are. We've also caused what turns out to be the form of that which is not to appear. Since we showed that the nature of the different is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared to say that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different that's set over against that which is.
Tht.: And what we've said seem to me completely and totally true.
V. Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we've made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of that which is. We've said good-bye long ago to any contrary of that which is, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it. With regard to that which is not, which we've said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we've made a mistake--or else , so long as he can't do that, he should say just what we say. He has to say that the kinds blend with each other, that that which is and the different pervade all of them and each other, that the different shares in that which is and so, because of that sharing, is. But he won't say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it is different from that which is, it clearly can be what is not. On the other hand, that which is has a share in the different, so, being different from all of the others, it is not each of them and it is not all of the others except itself. So that which is indisputably is not millions of things, and all of the others together, and also each of them, are in many ways and also are not in many ways.
Tht. True.
V. And if anyone doesn't believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better than what we've said. But if he thinks he's recognized a problem in it and enjoys dragging the argument back and forth, then he's been carried away by something that's not worth much of anyone's attention--to go by what we've just been saying, anyway. A thing like that isn't clever or hard to discover, but the other thing is both difficult and at the same time beautiful.
Tht. What other thing?
C. The thing we said earlier. That is, we should leave pointless things like this alone. Instead, we should be able to follow what a person says and scrutinize it step by step. When he says that what's different is the same in a certain way or that what's the same is different in a certain way, we should understand just what way he means, and the precise respect in which he's saying that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice versa, or when he makes what's large appear small or something that's similar appear dissimilar--well, if someone enjoys constantly trotting out contraries like that in discussion, that's not true refutation. It's only the obvious new-born-brain-child of someone who just came into contact with those which are.
Tht. Definitely.
...

Next, the Visitor says that to try to separate everything from everything is unmusical and unphilosophical.

What could it mean "to separate everything from everything"? It might mean to see "change" as just change, not as existent, unified, different from other things, or the same as itself: change would be "separate."
Is it the Late Learner's problem?
It's hard to make any sense of all this, because presumably change and being, etc. would also be separate from "being an object of thought" and "being something that can be referred to" (assuming those are relations/forms that are out there to be separated).

The given reason why it is unmusical and unphilosophical is that "the weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible for us"

Wow!
So the possibility of speech is there because of the interweaving of forms

Weaving together = blending = associating = ....whatever forms do when they get together with each other
I've always thought Plato was more concerned with an extra-mental reality and an extra-linguistic reality.

i.e. I think the forms are (aspects of) reality, not exclusively existent in our thought, perception, or representation of them.
But all that is being said here is that weaving together makes speech possible: it doesn't say that that's all it does or even that that is a fundamental function of the weaving.

Maybe he is saying that speech only works if it is grounded in reality, if it accurately tracks the forms' real relations.

We don't need to do so now, but one does want to ask "What about me? I don't know forms, and I don't think I am referring to or thinking about forms when I speak usually. So is my speech impossible? Or is it made possible behind the scenes by forms that I just don't know but still use?"
Back to the problem of "what do we recollect?"--is it ordinary concepts or something deeper that only a few reach? Or maybe both, but in different ways or at different levels.

Speech associates with being. 260a
Without speech, philosophy would be impossible.

One wonders if he thinks thought is speech? are spatial thoughts (like how to manipulate a shape in space) that don't use words possible without forms? or are they just referred to here by "speech." i.e. does he mean "communication" and not just spoken "speech"

Thankfully, Theaetetus asks why speech is impossible without forms associating. 260b
Visitor replies:

Does speech and belief blend with not being?

I think this means: do speech and belief refer to not being?

Can I say "Change is different from rest"?
obviously, I can, but remember, they are asking whether we can, and so, for the moment, they have to entertain the notion that maybe it really is not possible to say "Change is different from rest": that that just does not accurately pick out a real relation in the world

Assuming that is what speech and belief do: pick our or refer to or point at real relations out there in the world.

Note that suddenly we are no longer talking about just speech.

Speech AND belief.
As though nothing new or objectionable has been introduced by bringing in belief.
So somehow speech and belief are similar or perhaps even the same thing. At least they are connected in such a way that it is not objectionable to bring belief in.

A reasonable assumption is that speech just IS belief (at least some speech is: statements)

finally, at 263e, they say that speech and thought are the same except that the second one occurs without sound, it is conversation inside the soul
and 264a says that when one has a sense perception and that is associated with a statement, that is a kind of thought called an "appearance"

264b seems to recap that, but looks like it adds that appearance is a blending of sense perception and belief

and 264a says that belief, speech, and appearances are all of the same kind and so capable of being true or false
but we're getting ahead of ourselves. Back to 260b

Visitor says that if speech and belief do not blend with not being (i.e. difference), then everything said must be true!
But if speech and belief do blend with not being (i.e. difference), then there will be false belief and false speech!
Why? because falsity in speech and belief == believing and saying those which are not. 260c

Wait wait wait: when I say "Rest is not change" which is the same as saying "Rest is different from change", I am not false, am I?
Surely it can't be that any saying of that which is not is false.

...jump to 261d (because nothing between 260d and 261d seems to offer a persuasive or plausible argument to me: perhaps we will have to return)
they are taking up speech and belief and how they do or do not blend with what is not.
do names all fit with each other, or only some, or none? 261d
some do and some don't
when you put some words one after another, they work, but when you put others one after another, they do not

seems plausible:

for example "this thing" or "that works well" or "Justice is served" all seem to work
but "thing well justice" "served this works is" or "works is thing" do not seem to work (cf. examples at 262 b-c)

262a says that some words are the subject of a sentence, and some are the rest

NOTE WELL: this treatment of speech ONLY talks about simple statements

a much more sophisticated system would need to be set out to understand "If...then" statements or "whenever ..., then ..." or even "this ...., and that ...." statements.
they know that; they are talking about "the simplest and smallest kinds " of speech for now (262c)

speech accomplishes something 262d

just naming would not accomplish anything, seems to be implied

seems wrong, but leave it be

so when you combine a subject with a predicate, you accomplish something
be proud for a moment (ok, done?)
now let's ask, what do we accomplish
they call it "weaving": 262d

they spoke of forms interweaving! does that help? no, not obviously, but maybe later

words that "fit together" produce speech 262de

still no real good way to define subject and predicate or the relation between them, just dancing around it

Speech is always "about" something 262e
and it has some particular quality 262e

what?

example of speech accomplishment: "Theaetetus is sitting." 263a

it's "about" theaetetus263a
its particular quality is that it is true 263b

example 2: "Theaetetus flies"263a

it's "about" theaetetus again 263a
its particular quality is that it is false 263b

it says about something that is (Theatetus) something else (is a flying thing) that is, but as a blended unit (Theaetetus is flying), it is different from what is.
but instead of actually saying that Theaetetus is different from a flying thing, it says he is a flying thing.

so it says of Theaetetus something that is not about him. 263b

they seem to think they have found false speech and false belief and false appearances at 264b