johansenInOHPonTimaeus

Plato's Timaeus

Timaeus

Characters: Socrates, Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates
Most of the dialogue is a single speech by Timaeus, who is probably a fictional character, from southern Italy (remember the Pythagoreans and Plato's trip west: "Ancient Greece" is a lot more than just modern Greece: it includes the coast of Turkey and much of Southern Italy and Sicily).
Synopsis of dialogue:

First, Socrates summarizes the Republic, then asks the others to entertain him.
Critias begins an account of Athens which includes Atlantis, but that is postponed (it will resume in the Critias)
Next, Timaeus holds a monologue that takes up most of the dialogue.

Eternal versus Changing world: eternal world is object of dialectic, reason, and knowledge of the sort in the highest part of the divided line of the Republic. Changing world is the realm of opinion, the likely account.
Things don't come to be without a cause: hence, the demiurge or father of the universe.
Model for demiurge's work was eternal world, not changing one

because he had no envy
prior to that, world was in disorder

Since demiurge is good, he wanted the world to be good, and so maximized goodness of the world within limitations of the world (aka "necessity"), which was the four elements earth, air, fire, and water, all shapeless and disordered.
Formed it modeled on eternal model which was in his mind.
The whole universe is a living creature with a soul and intelligence. It is also one and unique. It is in the most perfect shape, that of a sphere and has rotary motion (the most uniform motion).
The world soul is made out of two types apiece of sameness, difference, and being. The combination produced intermediate sameness, difference, and being, which became the world soul. This was divided into the various levels of the heavens.

Please don't ask me to make sense of that here: the Timaeus has more things in it than we can possibly stop and untangle, and I have never really untangled this one.

When the world soul was diffused into the entire universe and began to rotate, its life began.
The elements became (or were) solids: fire = tetrahedron, air=octahedron, water = icosahedron, earth = cube. Note that all are made up of triangles and so can convert into the others, but earth is different (cube). Also a quintessence, aether (dodecahedron), which somehow makes up the cosmos.

Note that crystallography has found 3 or four basic shapes to crystals: see "The Second Kind of Impossible" book by Steinhardt pp16-17: maybe relevant

The end of the dialogue discusses creation of humans.

God's first actions:

30a2-c1:

For god wanted for everything to be good, and nothing, if possible to be bad, and so when he took over everything that was visible in a state of unrest, moving discordantly and without order, he brought it into order from disorder, believing that order was in every way better than disorder. Now it wasn't permitted (nor is it now) that one who is supremely good should do anything but what is best. Accordingly, the god reasoned and concluded that in the realm of things naturally visible no unintelligent thing could as a whole be better than anything which does possess intelligence as a whole, and he further concluded that it is impossible for anything to come into possession of intelligence apart from soul. Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and so he constructed the universe. He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine providence brought our world into being as a truly living being, endowed with soul and intelligence.
This passage will be explored more below in the following summary of Johansen's chapter.

Thomas K. Johansen's 'The Timaeus on the principles of cosmology' in Oxford Handbook to Plato

A basic tenet of ancient philosophy is that a body of knowledge has principles, archai.

Johansen is talking about a variety of foundationalism, and foundationalism often fits ancient philosophy.

But as a counterweight, remember Fine's contention that Plato's epistemology in the Republic is coherentist rather than foundationalist:

Some archai are basic: they are not explained by further archai within the body of knowledge.
Others are explained by, develop from, or entailed by the basic ones.
There are different bodies of knowledge which have different archai (that is one good way to tell you are dealing with a separate body of knowledge, BTW)

"Different sciences have different principles, for example arithmetic and plane geometry" (Aristotle De Anima, 402a21-22)
Think of the divided line in the Republic:

mathematics contains and builds on the first principles of mathematics. These principles are not proven or explained within mathematics. They are, however, explained or proven within dialectic once we reach L4, where we grasp the form of the good.
we are told there that everything else is an image of the intelligible beings, the Forms.

Also in the Republic (521c-534e), we are told that some disciplines pull one towards being, others towards becoming.

Math, astronomy, and others are preparatory to the study of being in dialectic.

In these disciplines, Perceptible objects play only a stepping stone role: they are to be studied only as a stepping stone towards being.

Cosmology, the subject of the Timaeus, however, is concerned with the coming to be of the cosmos: it is a discipline of coming to be, not one of being.

It is not a stepping stone to being as such.
It may use Forms, but it is not about Forms.

Cosmology aims to understand coming into being, although it may share principles with disciplines leading to being as such, but that is not its goal.

Some basic texts in the Timaeus (i.e. these are what Johansen takes to be firm ground we can solidly rely on):

27d5-28b2:

As I see it, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is? The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes away, but never really is. Now everything that comes to be must of necessity come to be by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be without a cause. So whenever the craftsperson (aka "demiurge": this is the first mention of the demiurge) looks at what is always changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were he to look at a thing that has come to be and use as his model something that has been begotten, his work will lack beauty.

IN THAT QUOTATION, WE FIND:

Being is that which is graspable by intelligence with an account (logos: think of the end of the Theaetetus); becoming is that which is graspable by opinion (doxa) with unreasoning (alogos) perception.
Everything that comes into being has a cause (aition).
When a craftsperson uses an eternal model, the product is necessarily beautiful/fine (kalon); if the craftsperson uses a generated model, the product lacks beauty (perhaps this just means it is less beautiful).

28b2-29b2:

"One should consider first about the entire heaven (or cosmos, or let's call it by whatever other name one might prefer to call it by) a question one should consider about everything in the beginning (en archei), namely, whether it always was, having no beginning (arkhe) of coming into being (genesis) or whether it has come into being, having started from some principle (arche). It has come into being: for it is tangible and has a body, and all such things are perceptible and perceptible things, being graspable by opinion with perception, appear to be coming into being and generated."

what does arche mean here?

its first occurrence is the starting point of inquiry: it seems temporal
second use: linked to coming into being: also seems temporal

but there are those who think the temporality of such uses is merely metaphorical: that the Timaeus is not really about a coming into being of the cosmos that happens in time, but rather that Plato used such words metaphorically to refer to a sustaining cause of the existence of the cosmos that is permanently always active. A standing cause.
Johansen thinks this flies in the face of too much of the Timaeus (I'm not sure I agree with her: consider Plato's discussions in the Sophist which sometimes fly in the face of what he is claiming: or the Republic where it turns out that because none of them have seen the Form of the good, they are not actually doing philosophy. Or consider the Theaetetus, where be blithely talks about relativism as if it is a defined objective truth (in order to defeat it). Plato often blithely keeps going in spite of it being the case that what he is saying calls into question what he is saying, and yet, somehow, it still makes sense).

Use of tenses suggests time.
The principle of the world's coming to be is associated with its cause (aition), and that is simply most easily understood as a temporal thing.
28c2-5 reads:

Again, we say it is necessary for what came into being to have come into being by some cause (aition). It is a big job to find the maker (poietes) and father (pater) of this universe, and having found it, it is impossible to state it to everyone.

Poietes refers to a maker of anything, and the Sophist tells us 265b9-10: We say ... that every power is productive (poietike) which becomes responsible for those things that were not earlier (proteron) coming into being later (husteron). The Eleatic Stranger uses the examples of a sperm growing into an animal or a root into a plant, both of which are clearly temporal.
In the Timaeus, the demiurge's actions are like the process of sowing seed: he sows souls into the "instruments of time" before handing them to the created gods to nurture (41c-d, 42d).
"Father" suggests procreation, which is a temporal process.
It still may be only metaphorically temporal, but the way Timaeus tells it, the demiurge's action looks like it happens over time.
AND YET, Bailly asks, time starts when regular motion starts, doesn't it? and regular motion hasn't started yet when the demiurge creates, has it?

The cause as "maker"

28c5-29b1:

But again we need to consider the following point about it [the cosmos]: in relation to which of the models did the builder complete it, in relation to what is the same? or in relation to what has come into being? If this world is beautiful and its craftsman good, it is clear that he was looking toward the eternal model. But if that which it is sacrilegious even to say holds, then he was looking toward a model that has come into being. Surely, it is clear to all that he was looking toward the eternal one, for the world is the best of the things that have come into being, and the craftsman is the best of causes. Having come into being in this way it has been crafted in relation to what is graspable by reason and wisdom and is the same.

In Republic X, the genuine craftsman is contrasted with the pseudo-craftsperson. The genuine craftsperson uses an eternal model rather than one that has come to be (597d). Craftpersonship aims to make as good a product as possible. In Republic I, the craft considers the benefit of what is crafted (342c).

Contrast this with the goal of profit in business or the goal of "getting done" in a rush job? Neither of which primarily consider the good of the product.

So the world is modeled on an eternal paradigm because it is superior to a non-eternal one, and the craftsperson chose it because that's what a craftsperson who lives up to the name does, choose a good model.

Basically, once you accept the hypothesis that there was a demiurge and that there are Forms, it's kind of automatic.

The model or paradigm of the world is not a first principle: the maker (the demiurge) is the first principle, and the model is in the Craftsperson's mind.
30c-31b tells us that the model is a living being which contains other living beings within it.

What could that mean?

Is the model ALL forms? or just certain ones? Probably just some chosen by the maker.

Another arche?

29b1-c3

These things being so, again there is every necessity for this cosmos here to be a likeness of something. Now in every subject it is of utmost importance to begin according to the natural principle (arche), and so, on the subject of a likeness and its model, we need to make the following distinction. The accounts (logoi) are of the same kind as the very things of which they are interpreters. So the accounts of that which is stable and certain and transparent to rationality (nous) are stable and unchanging--insofar as it belongs to accounts to be irrefutable and invincible, they should not fall short of this--whilst the accounts of that which is made as a likeness by reference to that thing [what is stable, etc.], [these accounts] being of what is a likeness are themselves likely and stand in an analogy to those accounts [of what is stable], namely, as being stands to coming into being, so truth stands to conviction.

This is the principle of a paradigm and its likeness.
An account of something that is a likeness should be likely (Johansen says to notice the normativity of that: why?)
More info. at 48b7-c6:

We tend to posit them [earth, water, fire, air] as the elemental "letters" of the universe and tell people that they are its "principles" on the assumption that they know what fire and the other three are. In fact, however, they shouldn't even be compared to syllables. A person with even a modicum of wisdom would not make such a comparison. So let me now proceed with my treatment in the following way: I cannot state "the principle" or "principles" of all things, or however else I think about them, for the simple reason that it is difficult to show clearly what my view is if I follow my present manner of exposition [arguments based on likelihood].

The idea seems to be that we are methodologically bound by the subject matter to give only a likely account.
Consider 53d4-7:

We posit this principle of fire and the other bodies advancing according to the likely account with necessity. But god and, of humans, they who are a friend of god know the principles still higher than these.

The higher principles would be mathematical, which would rely on further principles and ultimately rely on the form of the good.

How should we proceed if we can't use dialectic?

Follow what most wise people say: "a man with even a modicum of wisdom" above. Timaeus is no doubt meant to be such a man.
Aristotle distinguishes between arguments based on principles that are true and primitive, commanding belief simply by being themselves, and arguments that are based on reputable beliefs.
So some arguments are based on "self-evident" principles, while others are based on "reputable beliefs" (which are the best one can do in those inquiries).

Restatement of principle

at 29d7-30a2, Timaeus has finished what he calls his "prelude" and now is ready to begin the exposition of the creation of the cosmos. First, he more precisely describes the principle of coming into being:

Now let us say for what reason (aitia) the constructer constructed coming into being and this universe. He was good, and nobody good ever bears any grudge about anything. Being without grudge, he wanted all things to become as similar to himself as possible. This indeed is in the most proper sense the principle of coming into being and the cosmos which someone would be most correct in accepting from wise people.

Earlier, Timaeus identified the aition of the cosmos as the maker/father/constructer himself. Now, he speaks of an aitia, which is the desire to make the world similar to himself.
How is aitia different from aition?

Aristotle differentiates between an efficient cause and a final cause (as well as a material cause and a final cause, BTW). The difference is as follows: the sculptor is the efficient cause of the statue in that the sculptor applies hammer and chisel to stone: that bring about or effects the statue (effect>> efficient). The idea of the statue which the sculptor has in his head is the final cause: it is the end-state of the statue, where it is ultimately going qua statue.
The aition is the efficient cause. The aitia might be the final cause, say some Plato interpreters. But Aristotle considered desire an efficient cause too!
So the aitia is a restatement of the efficient cause, but a different aspect of it, perhaps.
It is because it appears good to the maker that the world should be thus and so that he makes it thus and so. The good has an attractive force of its own, and that is why the maker has his desire. The good causes his desire.

and where the maker has a choice, the maker chooses the best option: hence this is the best of all possible worlds. Timaeus is a foundational text for such optimistic thinking.

back to Euthyphro? where god doesn't make the pious pious by liking it, but rather likes it because it's pious?

So what appears good to the maker is the final cause, and it informs and directs the maker's desire.

Goodness

The maker is good.
He wants to make a good product, because that is what crafting is.
Because it appears good to him to make the world in this way, he desires to make it in this way.
"This way" is "like the maker", because the maker is good.
But goodness comes in different varieties.
The world is good in a different way from eternal things: we can see that in the creation of time, which is a "moving likeness of eternity." Eternity is a simple unity without parts, but time has parts (past, present, and future).

so Forms and this world exist in incompatible ways: in time and out of time

The goodness of the world is not in being a carbon copy of the eternal.
Rather, the world has analogous properties to the goodness of the eternal.

God's first actions:

30a2-c1:

For god wanted for everything to be good, and nothing, if possible, to be bad, and so when he took over everything that was visible in a state of unrest, moving discordantly and without order, he brought it into order from disorder, believing that order was in every way better than disorder. Now it wasn't permitted (nor is it now) that one who is supremely good should do anything but what is best. Accordingly, the god reasoned and concluded that in the realm of things naturally visible no unintelligent thing could as a whole be better than anything which does possess intelligence as a whole, and he further concluded that it is impossible for anything to come into possession of intelligence apart from soul. Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and so he constructed the universe. He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine providence brought our world into being as a truly living being, endowed with soul and intelligence.

39e7-9 and 48a2 make it clear that the maker has or even is intelligence (nous).
The way it is good is in the way that maximizes its likeness to himself (ensouled intelligence?)
Some scholars try to identify the demiurge with the paradigm that was used.
Johansen thinks this is wrong: the formal paradigm of the world was chosen by the demiurge precisely because it is maximally like himself. The principle of creation is god's desire to make the world like himself, and the paradigm is an instrument to that end.
Why make something like himself?

He is not only the maker, but the father: that's what fathers do.

At 41a-d, he is said to hand over the creation of mortal creatures to lesser, generated, gods: "those things which came into being and came to participate in life through my agency would be equal to gods" (41c2)

Why can't/didn't he himself create mortals?

Because he is a father-creator: he cannot create things unlike himself in that way.
It is not that he cannot create inferior beings: it is apparent in the Timaeus that the maker thinks the world is a better thing for having us mortals in it.

Necessity: another principle

47e2-48e1 introduces another principle, that of necessity.
Intelligence for the most part guided necessity towards the best.

The "for the most part" indicates that intelligence could not fully guide necessity: so necessity has causal efficacy of its own and is an independent principle from intelligence.

What is necessity here?

Also called "the wandering cause" (48a6-7)
Intelligence does what it does for the sake of the good, whereas necessity brings about what it does without regard for the good.
"Wandering" suggests randomness, irregularity: "necessity" suggests determinacy, regularity. What's up?
"Wandering" refers to the fact that necessity is not goal-directed as intelligence is (intelligence's goal is the good)
46d-e suggests necessity belongs to bodies.

Before the creation of the cosmos, before the action of the maker, before the action of intelligence, what were the bodies like?

Earth, air, fire, water.
... and the "receptacle"

... which has NO INHERENT PROPERTIES!
it is the receptacle of coming into being of bodies
space? matter? prime matter?
it is introduced because it is difficult to talk of the elements as being anything: they keep changing into each other, dammit. SO Timaeus refers to them as "traces" of earth, air, fire, and water. They are and aren't what they are? They have not yet been invested with number and proportion
cosmic soup/goo/stew/ooze

"There is then a viewpoint from which one can describe the pre-cosmic and cosmic bodies in the same way: namely, the viewpoint that abstracts from the mathematical order whereby god shaped the bodies (53b4-5)... he can thereby show the properties that the materials of the creation contribute to the bodies in the cosmos: already in the pre-cosmos, bodies come into being as likenesses of forms, possessed with tendencies to move toward kindred bodies and to change into each other....Timaeus understands the way that pre-cosmic bodies contribute properties to the cosmic bodies as a matter of necessity... necessity attaches to the consequences of bodies' having a certain material composition. Properties that bodies have by necessity are those properties which the bodies take over from their material constituents. ...

Examples of necessity's influence:

First, if a body has depth, it is necessary that it has surfaces (53d). Second, if the faces of earth are made of isosceles triangles, it is necessary that earth be stable and immobile (55e). Third, if the head is fleshy, then it is necessary, given the character of flesh, that it lack sensitivity (75a-b).

Bodies are made up of constituent parts. And those bodies might constitute parts of a further body. Think cells > tissue, bone, blood > leg, arm, head > body.
A body at level n+1 has certain properties necessarily because of the properties of its constituent parts at level n.

Intelligence works alongside of necessity at each level: necessity sets limits to what intelligence can accomplish.
Necessity and intelligence are separate explanatory principles.
The receptacle is not meant to account for necessity, because necessity only applies as a body forms a constituent part of a more highly ordered body. At the level of receptacle, that is just the lowest level, and so necessity does not apply. That explains why it is not mentioned between 48a (first mention of the receptacle) and 53d (geometrical composition of bodies)

Necessity is an auxiliary cause which is used by the divine cause (intelligence): we can think of it as an obstacle to design or an aid (think of the constraints on a sonnet writer: they are an obstacle or an aid to beauty: in the hands of a genius, they are simply material out of which or within which to create). If there were no materials (and hence no necessity), there would be no creation.

God's benevolence is the highest principle, but it is one of coming to be, not one of being.
Remember, Cosmology is not studied as a way to study being, but as a way to study becoming.