A dilemma is an argument of the form:
P or Q.
If P, then R.
If Q, then S.
Therefore, either R or S.
SOME CLAIMS IN GORGIAS
Gorgias claims to teach all comers the art of persuasion,
which does not actually teach knowledge, but persuades without
knowledge.458e
Gorgias' persuasion works only among the ignorant, not among the
knowledgeable, for the knowledgeable will not be persuaded without
knowledge. 459a
The orator/persuader need have no knowledge of the area about
which the orator persuades.459c
Gorgias claims to teach virtue, the knowledge of the just and
unjust. 460a
Someone who has learned what the just is is necessarily a just
man. 460b
Therefore the orator whom Gorgias teaches will be a just man. 460c
Gorgias said at the beginning of the conversation that the teacher
of oratory should not be blamed if the orator uses his oratorical
skills unjustly. 460e
Gorgias also said at the beginning of the discussion that oratory
was concerned with speeches about the just and the unjust in
particular. 460e
Gorgias spoke about using oratory unjustly. 461a
But the argument has shown that the orator is just and is
incapable of using oratory unjustly. 461a
So, how can we construct a dilemma from that?
1. The orator can either use oratory only justly or
both justly and unjustly.
2. If the orator can use oratory only justly, then
Gorgias was wrong to say that the orator can use oratory unjustly.
3. If the orator can use oratory both justly and unjustly,
then Gorgias was wrong to say that the orator can use
oratory only justly.
4. Gorgias said both that the orator can use oratory only
justly and both justly and unjustly.
5. Therefore, either Gorgias was wrong to say that
the orator can use oratory only justly, or Gorgias was
wrong to say that the orator can use oratory both justly and
unjustly.
Polus interrupts at 461b to say that Gorgias should not have conceded that he will teach people what is just. Socrates, taking off his kid gloves, claims that oratory is a species of flattery: the one that has to do with politics. As flattery, Socrates thinks oratory is shameful. Polus responds by claiming that the orators have power, and that people like tyrants are the ones who have the most power. Polus thinks power makes one happy, because one can do what one wants. Socrates demurs. Socrates claims that the tyrants do what they see fit, but not what they want, for we want to do what is beneficial, and what tyrants do is not beneficial. That argument is powerful and interesting.
There may be something drastically wrong with the following arguments which Socrates exercises on Polus.
To be proven:
Doing what is unjust is worse than suffering it. 474b
Polus thinks suffering injustice is worse than doing it,
but that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering
it.
So Polus does not think that bad and shameful are the same, nor
that their opposites, good and admirable, are the same. 474d
Anything that is called admirable is called admirable because of
some pleasure or benefit from it.474e
Anything that is called shameful is called shameful because of
some pain or badness from it.475a
One thing is more admirable (/shameful) than another because it
causes more pleasure or benefit (/pain or badness).
So if doing what is unjust is more shameful than suffering it, it
must be the case that doing what is unjust surpasses suffering it
in pain or badness, or both. 475b
Doing injustice does not surpass suffering it in pain.
So if doing what is unjust is more shameful than suffering
injustice, doing injustice must surpass suffering injustice in
badness. 475c
So doing injustice must be worse than suffering it. 475d
To be proven:
Being punished for wrongdoing is better than not being punished.
Being punished is the same as paying what is due. 476a
All just things are admirable, insofar as they are just. 476b
In all cases of a thing acting (agent) and a thing acted upon
(object), the object is affected in whatever way the agent acts.
The agent administering punishment justly is an agent and acts in
a just manner. 476e
The object of just punishment is affected justly.
Just things are admirable.
If they are admirable, they are good, for they are either pleasant
or beneficial. 477a
Thus one paying what is due by being punished has good things
being done to her.
Hence, she is benefitted by having something bad in her soul
removed.
Socrates and Polus think that the benefit is that her soul
undergoes improvement.
Bad conditions of the soul are ignorance, injustice, cowardice,
and the like. 477b
Corruption of one's soul is the most shameful of the possible
corruptions (of one's property, one's body, or one's soul).
Being corrupted in soul is most shameful either because it is most
painful or because it is the most bad.
Being poor, weak and sick does not surpass being corrupted in soul
in terms of pain.
Therefore, if being corrupted in soul is more shameful than being
corrupted in body or property, it must be have much more badness
than being corrupted in body or property.
Thus being corrupted in soul is the worst thing there is in terms
of badness.
If someone has committed injustice (i.e. is corrupted in soul), we
take them to a judge just as we take those corrupted in body to a
doctor.
We take them to the judge so that they will be acted upon (be made
to pay what is due).
Making someone who has committed an injustice pay what is due is
acting justly and removes the injustice.
Thus the object who is made to pay what is due is acted upon
justly.
And justice is what removes the injustice.
Of the three treatments, financial management, medicine, and
justice, justice is the most admirable.478b
Of the three treatments, the medicine of a doctor, the measures
recommended by a financial advisor, and the punishment of a judge,
none are pleasant.478b
Thus they cannot be admirable because of being pleasant. If they
are admirable, it is for some other reason.
In the case of medicine, it is worth undergoing the pain because
it removes something very bad.
In the case of justice, it is worth undergoing the pain because it
removes something even worse.
A person would be happiest as far as the body goes, if she weren't
sick to begin with. 478c
A person would be happiest as far as the soul goes, if she weren't
unjust to begin with.
Of two people who have something bad in their body or soul, the
one who gets treatment is happier.
Thus it is better to get justice (punishment) than not to get
it.478d
So the happiest person is the one who has no badness in the soul.
The second happiest person is the one who has it treated.
Getting out of punishment is avoiding treatment for a serious bad
thing in the soul: i.e. avoiding getting better.
Anyone who knows what punishment is and that they have done
injustice will want to be punished.
Anyone who has done injustice and does not seek punishment is
ignorant.
Oratory is a skill of persuading without knowledge.
If it is used to avoid punishment, it is worse than useless: it is
perniciously bad.
Oratory seems to have no use to Socrates. 481b
There is an interesting question to ask about such "myths" in Plato: what status do they have? They are not argument. They don't seem to have the force of reason. Then again, neither does much of the dramatic setup of the dialogues, and yet they certainly contribute to the message. How?
Are we to think that the myths sketch out positions that
Socrates/Plato was not prepared to prove but nonetheless believed
in fervently?Or merely that they stir up issues in a way akin to
the way that fiction does?
The elements of this myth seem to be: 1) the soul survives death. 2) The soul is judged after death, naked (i.e. just the soul, no body, wealth, power, etc.). 3) The judge is another soul. 4) Death is nothing other than the separation of soul from body. 5) The soul retains all that it acquired (examples are whip marks and scars from false oaths and injustice). 6) The soul is to bear whatever it is fitting for it to undergo after death, depending on its condition. 7) Those who rightly suffer punishment/vengeance benefit from it and/or serve as examples to others. 8) There is no other way to be rid of injustice than suffering and pain (525b). 9) Some souls are incurable (525c). 10) Archelaus (Callicles' hero) and others are among the incurable: Homer tells of many in Hades. 11) It won't matter whose son you are in Hades: the judging is impartial. 12) Some souls go to the Isles of the Blessed (especially philosophers--526c). 13) Socrates lives his life trying to practice the truth, dismissing honors among men, trying to be as good as he can.
If the incurable are to be examples, to whom are they to be examples? To us (but what if those are just stories)? To souls that have already lived their life? Does that mean that there is the possibility of being just or unjust after death (this seems to be the case from 527e)? or are souls reincarnated (as Plato holds in other dialogues?).
Socrates' conclusion is that on the other side, just as here in this world, we must avoid doing justice more than we avoid suffering it; we must be rather than seem good; if someone does injustice, that person should seek out punishment; we should shun flattery. Furthermore, nothing serious can happen to someone who is really fine and good, a practicer of virtue.