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PARMENIDES:

First, some questions:

Can you actually think, know, believe that 2+2=5? What does it mean to do so?  Can you make it happen in the real world that 2+2=5?

You can think of a unicorn.
Can you show me a real unicorn, one that lives and breathes and reproduces and whinnies?

Are the following two sentences true: 1) I could have skipped class today. 2) I am here, and therefore it is not the case that I could have skipped class today.

Does the following sentence mean anything: "Yesterday, I will turn into a titanium unicorn and then I have eaten some awesome and fabulous for breakfast."?

What is the difference between that sentence and saying "I could have skipped class this morning."?


Parmenides Notes:


first person to really question whether what most think exists and seems to exist does exist or is really what exists. In other words, he invented 'being.'

first person to engage in sustained logical argument: in a way, he also invented this.

he speaks by “divine revelation”—divine because logic exists outside of human activity and is eternal: he does not rely on divine infallibility or ipsedixitism: he relies on the force of logic and that alone to secure the accuracy/truth of what he is saying. So he does invoke divinity, just not as the guarantor of what he says.

he takes apparently undeniable premises and reaches conclusions unwelcome to common sense.

the inexorable logical force of such argument may be Parmenides’ single most important discovery.

For the moment, we will assume that “is” and “be” mean “exist”, although it is possible to read it as predicative or veridical or some combination of existential and predicative.

11.6.1-3
1. It is possible for what can be spoken and thought of to be.
2. It is not possible for nothing to be.
Therefore,
3. What can be spoken or thought of is not nothing.
Therefore, by 1, 2, and 3
4. What can be spoken or thought of exists, i.e. it is something.

1. assumes that if we can think it, it is possible for it to be: a centaur, a terminator, etc.—that seems acceptable, or does it? can we really think of a centaur?
2. is probably a fallacy, but Parmenides probably did not know it. Why is it a fallacy?
#1 relies on a meaning of “is possible” under which 1 can be rephrased as “thinking and saying something give it some sort of existence, and there is nothing to prevent thinking or saying whatever can be said or thought” or “It is the case that whatever is thought or spoken of exists in some fashion by virtue of being thought or spoken”
#2 relies on a meaning of “is not possible” under which 2 can be rephrased as “It is the case that what does not exist does not exist”
The difference in the two meanings of possible is that the one is just “in virtue of the fact that it does not exist now in fact, it cannot exist now in fact”
the other one is speaking of what could happen:
So, I can say that “It is not possible for me to be in Singapore right now, because I am here”—the fact that I am here makes it impossible.
BUT I can also say, “It is possible that I be in Singapore right now”—i.e. nothing prevents it aside from the fact that I am not.

11.6 next says that most mortals mix up being and non-being—they think that things come to existence and leave existence.

11.8 !!!!! the single longest piece of sustained logical argument yet in Western thought.

lines 6-15—proof that IT is ungenerated (IT is meant to refer to the thing that Parmenides says exists)

lines 15-18—reiterates dichotomy between what is and what is not.

19-21 argues that IT is timeless

6-9
1. What is not cannot give rise to anything or foster the growth of anything.
2. What is not cannot be intelligently spoken or thought of.
Therefore,
3. Coming into existence out of what is not cannot be coherently conceived.
4. Therefore, what is there to be spoken or thought of cannot have come to be out of what is not.

10-11
1. if it came into existence out of what is not, it came into existence at a certain time.
2. If it came into existence out of what is not at a certain time, then what is not necessarily had different attributes at that time than it had at other times.
3. What is not cannot have different attributes at one time than another.
4. Therefore it cannot have come into existence out of what is not.

1. There is no particular time at which IT should come into existence as opposed to some other particular time.
2. It cannot come into existence at all times.
3. Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that it came into existence at all.

Think about it this way: There is no reason for it to be generated at one time rather than another, and without a reason, it could not have come to be.

12-14
1. what is not cannot give rise to anything at all except itself.
2. IT is not what is not.
3. Therefore, what is not cannot have given rise to IT.

NOTHING COMES FROM NOTHING!!!

5 + 19-21
1. IT is now.
2. Therefore, IT never was nor will be.

1. If IT came into existence or if IT will come into existence, then IT was not or is not.

Thought experiment to try to make this plausible: Think of 2+2=4—it makes no sense to say that it used to be true or that it will come to be true.

At any time IT is identical to what IT is at all other times.

NO ARGUMENT for that, but it seems Parmenidean, given that he thinks IT is eternal, ungenerated, unperishing, and unchanging.

Past and future only make sense relevant to each other and the present, so things like 2+2=4 are timeless, and cannot be said to be true only at specific times.
IT always exists fully.

It also exists in all places fully. NOT SPATIAL.

22-33 and 44-49
1. It exists fully. That is, its existence is full and continuous—there is no time or place in which it does not exist.
2. Therefore it is necessarily undivided.

1. It cannot come to be or perish as a whole.
2. It is necessarily undivided.
3. Therefore no part of it can come to be or perish.
4. Therefore it cannot acquire or lose parts.

1. it is spatially and temporally undivided.
2. Therefore, it is unique.

1. If there were two distinct ITs, they would have to be different somehow.
2. ITs exist everywhere and at all times.
3. Therefore they cannot be distinct spatially or temporally.
4. If IT #1 had something that IT#2 lacked, then IT#2 would not exist fully, and so IT#2 would not really be IT.
5. Therefore there can be only one IT.

34-41
1. IT is unique.
2. IT is what is there for saying or thinking.
3. Therefore only IT can be thought or said.

There is only one thing to think about—it is whole, unique, unchanging, and cannot be divided.
The only thought there is to think it “IT is”

IT is not anything which relies on other things, so calling it one, unchanging, motionless, etc. is, strictly speaking, not true, because lack of change, lack of motion, and unity all require the existence of other things.

ANYTHING that has any NON-BEING in it does not exist at all.

38-41 every single word there is is a name for IT, whether we realize it or not.
1. IT is the only thing which exists.
2. What is not cannot be named.
3. Therefore all names name IT.

So how can Parmenides express what he expresses? He seems to speak of nonbeing, of unchangingness, and myriad other things which are not. He does so only by way of moving from our imperfect world to the only possible thought and proposition: IT IS.

11.2—what is “it”?    
1) 11.6 what is there to be spoken or thought of    
2) 11.2.1-3 any subject of inquiry

11.2—what does “is” and “be” mean?     We have two ways, being and not being 11.2—which can apply to each of the four senses of “is” and “be”
1) existence—a tiger exists   
1.1 x exists and must exist
1.2 x does not and cannot exist
2) predicat ive—the tiger is hungry       
2.1. x has and must have at least one predicate
2.2. x does not and cannot have any predicates.
3) a fusion of 1 and 2, where “the tiger is hungry” means    
3.1 x exists and must exist and has and must have at least one predicate
both that the tiger exists and is hungry.        
3.2 x does not exist and cannot exist and does not and cannot have any predicates
Cf. Unicorns exist” and “a unicorn is one-horned”
4) veridical—that tigers have four legs is the case..   
4.1 p is the case and cannot fail to be the case
4.2. nothing is or can be the case.

The second way, not-being is utterly unlearnable: we have four versions of it:

what does "not-being" mean?

ON 1, we can say that if something does not exist we cannot know it or express it verbally, because there is no “it” to be known or expressed.
ON 2, we can say that if something has no predicates, there is no way to know or express it, because there is no way to learn about it.
ON 3 we have a combination of 1 and 2
ON 4,  we can say that if nothing is the case, then nothing can be known or truly stated since only what is the case can be truly stated.

BUT what if we say in objection to 1 that we can indeed know about unicorns, which do not exist, that they have four legs and a head. Parmenides denies that nonexistent things have heads, arms or anything at all. They can have no parts or attributes. They cannot even be plural. So 'knowing' those things about them is nonsense, has no meaning, equates to knowing nothing. But still, my 'knowledge' that unicorns have one horn works pretty damned well.

AND if we say in objection to 2, “If x has no predicates, we can at least attribute the predicate ‘predicateless’ to it”
Parmenides denies even that, however, We cannot even say about it that it lacks predicates.
Again a fundamentally incoherent, inexpressible philosophical position.

what if we say in objection to 4, “If nothing is the case, then it is the case that nothing is the case, and so we can know at least that nothing is the case.”
That leaves Parmenides with a fundamentally incoherent, inexpressible philosophical position. It's quite a challenge. A puzzle.

HE is assuming that language and knowledge are OF REALITY
in order to say or know anything about anything, it has to exist.