Plato Class
Prof. Bailly
Plato's
Complete Works translated by Jowett.
Plato's Complete Works translated by Jowett (another site with
same content, perhaps easier to use)
- I took this text from Project Gutenberg, which uses the Jowett
translation. The Hackett translation I asked you to order is
better, but this one is digital and free to cut and paste, so I
sometimes use it. It's good for us to be reminded that Plato did
not write English and we are accessing him via a translation,
which is a kind of filter at best, not a clear glass window onto
what Plato said.
- Project Gutenberg wants me to
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- This eBook is for the use of anyone
anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg
License included with this eBook or online at
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- The notes in the dialogue are
clearly mine, not part of the text or part of Project Gutenberg.
BOLDFACE indicates things to pay attention to:
Italics and English ALL-CAPS indicates Bailly's own words
that are inserted here and there.
EUTHYPHRO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.
Every Platonic dialogue has some sort of setting in Ancient
Greece, a 'geographic' aspect: it is often a place in Athens.
This structure was a beautiful open air colonnade in the center
of Athens on the main public square.
SCENE: The Porch of the King Archon.
EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you
doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be
concerned in
a suit before the King, like myself?
SOCRATES: Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which
the
Athenians use.
EUTHYPHRO: What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you,
for I
cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
SOCRATES: Certainly not.
EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
SOCRATES: Yes.
EUTHYPHRO: And who is he?
SOCRATES: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly
know
him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis.
Perhaps you
may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair,
and
a beard which is ill grown.
EUTHYPHRO: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the
charge
which he brings against you?
NOTE: This is a central primary text for what we can know
about the charges against Socrates and why he was put to death.
In addition to its geographic setting, every Platonic dialogue
also has some sort of temporal setting that it occurs in.
SOCRATES: What is the charge? Well, a very serious
charge, which shows
a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is
certainly
not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and
who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man,
and seeing
that I am the reverse of a wise man, (a
disavowal!) he has found me out, and is going
to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother
the
state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the
only one
who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the
cultivation of
virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the
young shoots his
first care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This
is
only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the elder
branches;
and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public
benefactor.
EUTHYPHRO: I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the
opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in
attacking
you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But
in
what way does he say that you corrupt the young?
SOCRATES: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which
at first
hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet
or maker of gods, and
that I invent new gods and deny the existence of
old ones; this is the
ground of his indictment.
EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the
familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He
thinks
that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the
court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by
the
world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly
about
divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and
think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are
jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.
SOCRATES: Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much
consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I
suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to
impart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other,
perhaps,
as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.
EUTHYPHRO: I am never likely to try their temper in this way.
SOCRATES: I dare say not, for you are reserved in your
behaviour, and
seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent
habit of pouring out
myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener,
and I am afraid
that the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was
saying,
they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the
time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be
in
earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can
predict.
EUTHYPHRO: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates,
and
that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.
SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or
the
defendant?
EUTHYPHRO: I am the pursuer.
SOCRATES: Of whom?
EUTHYPHRO: You will think me mad when I tell you.
SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?
EUTHYPHRO: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
SOCRATES: Who is he?
EUTHYPHRO: My father.
SOCRATES: Your father! my good man?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And of what is he accused?
EUTHYPHRO: Of murder, Socrates.
SOCRATES: By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common
herd know
of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an
extraordinary man,
and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have
seen his way
to bring such an action.
EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, Socrates, he must.
SOCRATES: I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one
of
your relatives--clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you
would
never have thought of prosecuting him.
EUTHYPHRO: I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction
between
one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for
surely the
pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly
associate with
the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding
against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has
been
justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter
alone; but
if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same
roof with
you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now
the man who is
dead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for us as a field
labourer
on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got
into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My
father
bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to
Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he
never attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded
him as
a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he
did
die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of
cold
and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned
from
the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me
for
taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say
that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a
murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is
impious
who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know
what the gods think about piety and impiety.
SOCRATES: Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of
religion
and of things pious and impious so very exact, that,
supposing the
circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid
lest you too
may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against
your father?
EUTHYPHRO: The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,
Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such
matters.
What should I be good for without it?
SOCRATES: Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be
your
disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes
on I shall challenge
him, and say that I have always had a great interest in
religious
questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations
and
innovations in religion, I have become your disciple.
You, Meletus, as
I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian,
and
sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to
approve of
me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should
begin
by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of
the
young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs,
and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if
Meletus
refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the
indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this
challenge
in the court.
IS THE TEACHER REALLY TO BLAME? IS LEARNING SIMPLY A PASS-THRU
THING, WITH THE STUDENT MERELY AN INSTRUMENT OF THE TEACHER?
ALSO, DOES EUTHYPHRO REMIND YOU AT ALL OF HIPPIAS?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict
me I am
mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall
have a great
deal more to say to him than to me.
SOCRATES: And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of
becoming
your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you--not
even
this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he
has
indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me
the
nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you
knew so well, and
of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they?
Euthyphro 5d ff.
- Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety,
again--is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the
same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which
includes whatever is impious?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to
say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege,
or of any similar crime--whether he be your father or
mother, or whoever he may be--that makes no difference; and
not to prosecute them is impiety.
- ARGUMENT analysis:
- Piety in every action is always the same.
- Impiety is always the opposite of piety.
- Impiety in every action is always the same.
- Which contains NO explicit argument. It contains only
claims, no logical conclusions, no
argument. UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLAIMS
AND CONCLUSIONS IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR YOUR ARGUMENT
ANALYSES.
- These are important claims, ones that seem simple,
but are basic and important. We could reformulate them
in our own words as follows:
- There is one thing that makes every action that
is pious pious.
- AND
- There is one thing that makes every action that
is impious impious. OR
- There is one thing that explains why every
action that is pious is pious.
- AND
- There is one thing that explains why every
action that is impious is impious.
- Query: are impious things simply lacking in the
thing that makes things pious? No, because if that
were the case, then it would be logical to claim that
pizza is impious, and so is spiciness. But that issue
is not taken up here: the dialogue only really
actually concerns what makes pious things pious, what
explains piety, not the nature of impiety.
- Euthyphro grants all of those claims (or at least does
not reject them).
- Euthyphro says:
- Piety is this particular prosecution I am making
against my father.
- More generally, piety is prosecuting anyone
guilty of a crime.
- It does not matter who the criminal is or how he
or she is related to the prosecutor.
- Impiety is not prosecuting a criminal.
- Again, this contains NO explicit argument, only
claims.
- Again, these are basic important claims.
- We can put one assumption that lies behind
Euthyphro's point generally as follows:
- Principles should not be selective: if the
principle is truly correct, then it is correct in
every instance.
- Euthyphro 5e ff.
- And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I
will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have
already given to others:--of the principle, I mean, that the
impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For
do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the
gods?--and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos)
because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had
punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a
nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father,
they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their
way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am
concerned.
SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am
charged with impiety--that I cannot away with these stories
about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me
wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve
of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior
wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know
nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether
you really believe that they are true.
- ARGUMENT analysis
- Euthyphro says:
- I will prove that the impious, whoever he or she
is, should be punished (i.e. claims 6-8 above).
- IMPORTANT NOTE: THIS IS THE CONCLUSION
THE ARGUMENT IS AIMING TO
PROVE: IDENTIFYING THAT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.
- Zeus is held to be the best and most righteous
god.
- Zeus bound his father Cronos because Cronos
wronged his own children.
- Cronos punished his father Uranos for similar
reasons.
- I am simply doing something similar to what Zeus
did in 11 (or Cronos in 12).
- It would be inconsistent to maintain 10 and yet
claim that I am acting impiously, because of 13.
- (unstated: too basic?) Inconsistency is an
indication of error.
- (unstated: too basic?) The same standards
apply to human and divine behavior.
- (unstated: too basic?) There is nothing about
Euthyphro, his father, and the dead thete that
makes Euthyphro's case importantly different from
those of Zeus and Kronos.
- ...
- Note well:
- This IS an argument: it has claims that support
further claims.
- It is not a really good
argument.
- BUT, let's say it again, it is an argument.
- Perhaps the fault is mine in my
formulation/interpretation of it.
- Perhaps the fault is Plato's.
- Or perhaps Plato is reproducing an argument he has
heard, or creating a bad argument on purpose.
- How to improve it and what we might think it is
aiming at:
- Add premises and conclusions;
- a. Whatever a god does is right and
good.
- b. Whatever I do that is the same as what a
god does is right and good.
- c. My father committed an impiety by killing
that man.
- d. Impiety is wrong.
- e. Zeus punished his father for
wrongdoing.
- f. I am prosecuting my father for a similar
impiety (harming his father).
- g. Therefore, what I am doing, prosecuting my
father for impiety, is right and good.
- BUT are those claims present in the dialogue?
- Socrates says:
- I know nothing about the gods.
- And yet, I find the stories people tell (and
believe) about them hard to accept.
- Therefore (by 17 and some assumptions), people
think I am wrong.
- You know about the gods.
- You accept the stories told about them.
- By 16 and 19, your wisdom is superior to mine.
- (unstated: too basic?) Superior wisdom should be
accepted.
- Therefore, by 21 and 22, I should accept your
superior wisdom.
- Note well
- This too is an argument: it has claims that justify
conclusions.
- It is also not a really good one, but for different
reasons (Socrates is clearly being ironic, as the rest
of the dialogue shows: but I think that he is ironic
in that he suspects Euthyphro cannot defend
Euthyphro's own position, not in that he KNOWS that
Euthyphro is wrong)
- Again, there are other ways to formulate/interpret
this argument, I trust, and perhaps this one is not
the best.
- NOTE WELL: the above is an argument analysis, the
kind I want you to create in this class. There is no
one perfect way to analyze an argument: different
people notice different aspects, etc. BUT all argument
analyses share the following: they have claims
that are unsupported, and those claims support
conclusions in such a way that if you grant certain
laws of logic and you accept the claims, you MUST
accept the conclusions. That is what makes them arguments
according to the definition of argument being used in
this class, the one that applies to your argument
analyses.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which
the
world is in ignorance.
SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one
another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets
say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists?
The temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which
is
carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered
with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if
you
would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which
would
quite amaze you.
SOCRATES: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time
when
I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a
more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to
the
question, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as
you
do, charging your father with murder.
EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many
other pious acts?
EUTHYPHRO: There are.
SOCRATES: Remember that I did not
ask you to give me two or three
examples of piety, but to explain
the general idea which makes all pious
things to be pious. Do you
not recollect that there was one
idea which
made the impious impious, and the
pious pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I remember.
SOCRATES: Tell me what is the
nature of this idea, and then I shall
have a standard to which I
may look, and by which I may measure actions,
whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to
say
that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.
EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like.
SOCRATES: I should very much like.
Euthyphro
gives another answer:
EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that
which is dear to the gods, and impiety
is that which is not dear to them.
- Problem: the bucket of bolts in my garage is not dear to
the gods: therefore it is impious?
- 'not dear' is ambiguous between 'dislike' and
'uninteresting.'
SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me
the sort of answer
which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not
I cannot as yet
tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your
words.
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing
or person which is dear to the gods
is pious, and that thing or person
which is hateful to the gods is
impious, these two being the extreme
opposites of one another.
Was not that said?
- Clarifies, confirms, and set up the starting points in an
argument.
- This is not a new move: it is, however, a very important
technique, literarily? argumentatively? pedagogically?
rhetorically?
EUTHYPHRO: It was.
SOCRATES: And well said?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the
gods were admitted to have
enmities and hatreds and
differences?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.
The
following section of the dialogue contends or establishes that
some things can be decided by agreed upon standards: there is a
right and wrong answer and it is
knowable/verifiable/determinable by reference to the standard.
SOCRATES: And what sort of
difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose
for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number;
do
differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with
one
another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them
by a
sum?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not
quickly
end the differences by measuring?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: And we end a controversy
about heavy and light by resorting to
a weighing machine?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure.
Other
things have no agreed upon standard (is it that they are not
agreed upon, or that there is no standard, or that there are
many incompatible standards, or perhaps even non-comparable
standards (relativism))
SOCRATES: But what differences are
there which cannot be thus decided,
and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one
another?
I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and
therefore
I will suggest that these enmities
arise when the matters of difference
are the just and unjust, good and
evil, honourable and dishonourable.
Are not these the points about
which men differ, and about which when we
are unable satisfactorily to decide
our differences, you and I and all
of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
(Compare Alcib.)
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which
we
quarrel is such as you describe.
SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the
gods, noble Euthyphro, when they
occur, are of a like nature?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.
SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good
and
evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would
have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such
differences--would there now?
EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.
SOCRATES: Does not every man
love that which he deems noble and just and
good, and hate the opposite
of them?
BELIEVE IT OR NOT, THAT IS A VERY IMPORTANT CLAIM! the
noble, the just, the good, inspire love! their opposites, the
vile, the unjust, the bad, inspire hatred and loathing! In every
human! Also, consider that 'love' is a significant word: what
does Plato or Plato's Socrates mean by it? DOn't we all want
what we love? and if it requires an action, doesn't loving mean
we want to do it?
Note about translation: "man" translates anthropos,
which refers to 'human,' not 'man.' Do not use 'man' as a
generic term: it is not right. Jowett is old school here.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But, as you say, people
regard the same things, some as just
and others as unjust,--about these
they dispute; and so there arise wars
and fightings among them.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are
hated by the gods and loved by the
gods, and are both hateful and dear
to them?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And upon this view the
same things, Euthyphro, will be pious
and also impious?
EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you
to tell me what action is both
pious and impious: but now it would seem
that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore,
Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be
doing
what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and
what
is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may
be
other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
- But what if
piety just is subjective?
- If I ask you whether brussel sprouts taste good, some will
say "yes," while others will say "no."
- Each person is right, even though they give answers that are
opposite.
- What if piety is like that?
- Does Socrates ever show that it is not?
Euthyphro
suggests there is a universal agreed-upon standard: everyone
agrees that a murderer should be punished (doesn't that depend
on what you mean by "punishment"? and "murderer"?).
EUTHYPHRO: But I believe,
Socrates, that all the gods would
be agreed as
to the propriety of punishing a
murderer: there would be no difference
of opinion about that.
- Once again, Euthyphro offers an
example: murder.
- It seems meant to be a
paradigmatically clear example. One case that shows that for
at least some important things, everyone agrees about
piety/impiety.
- Once again, Socrates finds
that answer problematic and has questions
SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear
any
one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let
off?
EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which
they
are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all
sorts
of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in
their
own defence.
SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that
they ought not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.
SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to
say
and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
The
problem is reaching agreement as to who is guilty and of what.
There is no universal standard for that.
This is a hugely important point, one that Plato will explore
more in other dialogues: it is that principles cannot apply
themselves. Human beings must exercise judgement in order to
apply principles to particular cases. In fact, in spite of the
best efforts of lawmakers and judges and lawyers to make laws
specific and defined, etc., we still need juries and judges to
apply the law. There is always an agent, a human,
between the law and its application.
SOCRATES: Then they
do not argue that the evil-doer should not be
punished, but they argue about the
fact of who the evil-doer is, and
what he did and when?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And the gods are in the
same case, if as you assert they
quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others
deny
that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor
man will
ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be
punished?
EUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main.
The
sticky bit is particulars: agreement about very general
principles is possible, but how to apply them?
SOCRATES: But they join issue about the
particulars--gods and men alike;
and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is
called
in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to
be
unjust. Is not that true?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite true.
- Socrates asks for proof that Euthyphro in this
particular instance is acting piously. Euthyphro will never
give that proof, because Socrates steers the conversation
away from it.
SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my
better
instruction and information, what
proof have you that in the opinion of
all the gods a servant who is
guilty of murder, and is put in chains by
the master of the dead man, and
dies because he is put in chains before
he who bound him can learn from the
interpreters of the gods what he
ought to do with him, dies
unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one
a son ought to proceed against his
father and accuse him of murder. How
would you show that all the gods
absolutely agree in approving of his
act? Prove to me that they do, and
I will applaud your wisdom as long as
I live.
EUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter
very
clear indeed to you.
SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove
that
the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
Renewed
effort at definition:
SOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they
find that you are a
good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you
were
speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does
prove to
me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as
unjust, how do I
know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for
granting that
this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are
not
adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful
to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.'
And
therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will
suppose, if
you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action.
But I
will amend the definition so far as
to say that what all the gods hate
is impious, and what they love
pious or holy; and what some of them
love and others hate is both or
neither. Shall this be our definition of
piety and impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro,
there
is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist
you
in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you
to
consider.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious
and
holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro,
or
simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and
that of
others? What do you say?
EUTHYPHRO: We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will
stand the test of enquiry.
SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The
point which I should first wish to
understand is whether the pious or
holy is beloved by the gods because
it is holy, or holy because it is
beloved of the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we
speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being
seen.
You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know
also
in what the difference lies?
EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand.
SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which
loves?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this
state
of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No; that is the reason.
SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but
conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the
state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being
carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that
my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state
of
action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not
become
because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it
becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of
suffering,
but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not
agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of
becoming or
suffering?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the
state of
being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act
the state.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of
piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,
according to your definition, loved
by all the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because it is pious or
holy, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.
SOCRATES: It is loved because it is
holy, not holy because it is loved?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that which is dear to
the gods is loved by them, and is in
a state to be loved of them because
it is loved of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then that which is dear
to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,
nor is that which is holy loved of
God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things.
EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean,
Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean to say that the
holy has been acknowledged by us to be
loved of God because it is holy,
not to be holy because it is loved.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But that which is dear to
the gods is dear to them because it
is loved by them, not loved by them
because it is dear to them.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
- Hidden in this next little
speech by Socrates is the first instance in Greek philosophy
of a differentiation between essence and accident.
SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if
that which is holy is the same with
that which is dear to God, and is
loved because it is holy, then that
which is dear to God would have
been loved as being dear to God; but if
that which is dear to God is dear
to him because loved by him, then that
which is holy would have been holy
because loved by him. But now you see
that the reverse is the case, and
that they are quite different from
one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to
be loved because it
is loved, and the other (hosion) is loved because it
is of a kind to
be loved. Thus you appear to me,
Euthyphro, when I ask you what is
the essence of holiness, to offer
an attribute only, and not the
essence--the attribute of being
loved by all the gods. But you still
refuse to explain to me the nature
of holiness. And therefore, if you
please, I will ask you not to hide
your treasure, but to tell me once
more what holiness or piety really
is, whether dear to the gods or not
(for that is a matter about which
we will not quarrel); and what is
impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know,
Socrates, how to express what I mean.
For somehow or other our arguments,
on whatever ground we rest them,
seem to turn round and walk away
from us.
- Digression about the nature of talking with
Socrates
SOCRATES: Your
words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the
sayer or propounder of them, you might say
that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are
placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these
notions
are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as
you
yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.
EUTHYPHRO: Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus
who sets arguments in motion; not I,
certainly, but you make them
move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am
concerned.
- Socrates' effort to show Euthyphro how he ought to
proceed in the investigation of piety.
SOCRATES: Then I must be a greater
than Daedalus: for whereas he only
made his own inventions to move, I
move those of other people as well.
And the beauty of it is, that I
would rather not. For I would give the
wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth
of Tantalus, to be able to detain
them and keep them fixed.
But enough of this. As I perceive that you are
lazy, I will myself endeavour to
show you how you might instruct me in
the nature of piety; and I
hope that you will not grudge your labour.
Tell me, then--Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which
is
pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all,
pious?
- Digression which shows that where there is reverence
there is fear, but there is not necessarily reverence
wherever there is fear: intended to show that something can
be a part of a larger group of things.
Skip
down past digression.
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as
you
are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of
your
wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no
real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an
illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings--
'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not
tell:
for where there is fear there is also reverence.'
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
EUTHYPHRO: By all means.
SOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease,
and
the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the
objects of
their fear.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a
feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action,
fears
and is afraid of an ill reputation.
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there
is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there
is
also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear;
for
fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear,
just as
the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion
than
the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite well.
SOCRATES: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when
I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always
the
just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety;
for
justice is the more extended notion
of which piety is only a part. Do
you dissent?
EUTHYPHRO: No, I think that you are quite right.
End
of digression
SOCRATES: Then, if
piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
enquire what part? If you
had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;
for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what
part
of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying,
a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you
not
agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree.
SOCRATES: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice
is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do
me
injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately
instructed
by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
Euthyphro's
next
attempt at defining piety
EUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to
me to be that part of
justice which attends to the gods,
as there is the other part of justice
which attends to men.
SOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point
about which I should like to have further information, What is the
meaning of 'attention'? For
attention can hardly be used in the same
sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For
instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person
is
able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship.
Is it
not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art
of
attending to horses?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is
the
art of attending to dogs?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending
to
the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not attention
always designed for the good or benefit
of that to which the attention is
given? As in the case of horses,
you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are
benefited and improved, are they not?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the
oxen
by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or
attended
for their good and not for their hurt?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly, not for their hurt.
SOCRATES: But for their good?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: And does piety or
holiness, which has been defined to be the
art of attending to the gods,
benefit or improve them? Would you say
that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
EUTHYPHRO: No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
SOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you
the
question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that
you
did not.
EUTHYPHRO: You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of
attention which I mean.
SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods
which is called piety?
EUTHYPHRO: It is such, Socrates,
as servants show to their masters.
SOCRATES: I understand--a sort of ministration to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having
in
view the attainment of some object--would you not say of health?
EUTHYPHRO: I should.
SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder
with a view to the attainment of some result?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder
with a
view to the building of a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers
to the gods: what work does that
help to accomplish? For you must surely
know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best
instructed in religion.
EUTHYPHRO: And I speak the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me--what
is that fair work which the
gods do by the help of our
ministrations?
EUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the
chief
of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the
chief of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I
am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from
the
earth?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And of the many and fair
things done by the gods, which is the
chief or principal one?
Is this the point Socrates refers to below WHERE EUTHYPHRO COULD
HAVE GIVEN THE RIGHT ANSWER, but took a wrong turn?
EUTHYPHRO: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all
these
things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or
holiness is learning how to please
the gods in word and deed, by prayers
and sacrifices. Such piety
is the salvation of families and states,
just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin
and
destruction.
Important meta-dialogue principle: Socrates says he must
follow wherever the answerer (the 'interlocutor') leads.
Another important meta-dialogue principle: the 'interlocutor'
is the one leading the conversation! Hunh? Doesn't Socrates lead
it? Socrates says no: he follows where the interlocutor tells
him to go.
Another important meta-dialogue principle: when the
interlocutor says "yes" to a question, that interlocutor OWNS
that answer. It is the interlocutor's opinion, and not
Socrates'.
SOCRATES: I think that you could
have answered in much fewer words the
chief question which I asked,
Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see
plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me--clearly not: else why,
when we reached the point, did
you turn aside? Had you only answered
me I should have truly learned of
you by this time the nature of
piety. Now, as the asker of a question is
necessarily dependent on the
answerer, whither he leads I
must follow; and can only ask again, what
is the pious, and what is piety? Do
you mean that they are a sort of
science of praying and sacrificing?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And sacrificing is
giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of
the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and
giving?
EUTHYPHRO: You understand me capitally, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your
science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say
will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the
nature
of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and
give gifts to them?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: Is not the right way of
asking to ask of them what we want?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the right way of
giving is to give to them in return what
they want of us. There would
be no meaning in an art which gives to any
one that which he does not want.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro,
is an art which gods and men have of
doing business with one another?
EUTHYPHRO: That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
SOCRATES: But I have no particular liking for anything but the
truth. I
wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods
from our gifts. There is no
doubt about what they give to us; for there
is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any
good
thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they
give
everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business
in
which we have very greatly the advantage of them.
EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine,
Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the
gods from our gifts?
SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which
are
conferred by us upon the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now
saying, what pleases them?
SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing
to the gods, but not beneficial or
dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: I should say that nothing could be dearer.
SOCRATES: Then once more the
assertion is repeated that piety is dear to
the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not
standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the
Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is
another
and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a
circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive,
comes round to the same point. Were
we not saying that the holy or
pious was not the same with that
which is loved of the gods? Have you
forgotten?
EUTHYPHRO: I quite remember.
SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is
holy;
and is not this the same as what is dear to them--do you see?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Then either we were
wrong in our former assertion; or, if we
were right then, we are wrong now.
EUTHYPHRO: One of the two must be true.
SOCRATES: Then we must begin again
and ask, What is piety? That is an
enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me
lies;
and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the
utmost,
and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and
therefore
I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not
certainly known the nature of piety
and impiety, I am confident that
you would never, on behalf of a
serf, have charged your aged father with
murder. You would not have run such
a risk of doing wrong in the sight
of the gods, and you would have had
too much respect for the opinions
of men. I am sure,
therefore, that you know the nature of piety and
impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your
knowledge.
EUTHYPHRO: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go
now.
SOCRATES: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I
was
hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and
impiety;
and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment.
I
would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and
had
given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only
through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.
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