HST287: 16-Sept-2004 Reading Notes
Collingwood, Idea of History
Epilegomena
About the Epilegomena:
Knox compiled it from 1930s lectures and portions of a late 30s book.
Thus, we are seeing his revision of Collingwood's works, edited during
the war. Collingwood wrote The New
Leviathan at about the same time as the lectures. In it he works
out his ideas
against nazism and fascism and about duty "which is related to
civilization and the gradual elimination of force from the relations
between people." He is moving history beyond the realm
of the merely theoretical, beyond even re-enactment, and into action.
Human Nature and
Human History
The science of human nature
1) observe
2) determine patterns/laws based on observations
In this section he is arguing that (p. 228-230)
1) Methods of modern history gew up under ideas of natural science, to
wit, history consists of events to be observed, classified, and
categorized. This leads to problems such as mistaking culture and
tradition for race and pedigree.
2) Those who tried to create a "science of human nature" assumed that
human nature was consistent throughout history or that humans do not
learn as history progresses. They do not situate the historical person
in their own historical place.
(Thus, they can look at historical people and assume "weren't they
stupid for not realising...")
This one is the key to why Collingwood
is still good to read: he's meta- izing historical thought!
People with historical consciousness will take from history, develop
and criticize, and use that heritage to their advantage. So, even if
Collingwood's ideas themselves are incomplete, we can take his ideas,
add other historical ideas of the 20th century, and go from there. If
that is the case, Collingwood will not be wrong, just incomplete.
3) The question of psychology: it should stay out of history and focus
simply on mind (he's prophetic: in the 21st century: brain p.231)
"The science of human nature [understanding what understanding is]
broke down because its method was distorted by the analogy of the
natural sciences." (p. 208)
He says history "is recognized as a special and autonomous form of
thought, lately established, whose possibilities have not yet been
completely explored." (p. 209) [relate this to humanities computing]
His thesis: the science of human nature was a false attempt--falsified
by the analogy of natural science--to understand the mind itself, and
that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by the methods
called scientific, the right way of investigating mind is by the
methods of history.
Natural process: past dies and is replaced by present
Historical process: past survives in the present (p. 225)
He says historians must be concerned with both the inside and outside
of history--outside: what happened, inside: what were the motivations
or thoughts of those involved (p.213) Science only deals with the
"outside"
History is not an account of change (one damn thing after another), it
is re-enactment in the mind of the historian.
Parochialim and bias: "It was
easy for men of the 18th century to make this mistake ["mistaking the
transient conditions of a certain historical age for the permanent
conditions of human life"] because their historical perspective was so
short, and their knowledge of cultures other than their own so limited,
that they could cheerfully identify the intellectual habits of a
western European in their own day with the intellectual faculties
bestowed upon Adam and all his progeny." (p. 224)
Evolutionist p. 225
(Thought: He believes in evolution but what he is saying is not
dependant on
evolution: people can learn through history, rather, what has happened
in the past will shape what happens in the present and so human
cultures will change, but that does not necessarily imply evolution)
2. The Historical
Imagination
History resembles philosophy (why) and science (because knowledge is
inferred and reasoned) but is neither. It is a third thing,
1) The "Common sense" theory: essentials are memory (write down the
truth) and authority (believe the writer). The historian must not
tamper with the Facts.
Consequences: that's silly. Historians always select with bias.And when
they agree with an authority they are actually saying "I believe this
so you should believe me" i.e. they are claiming that mantle of
authority.
2) The Bradley belief: the historian is free to jettison historical
information at will if it does not meet with his own presuppositions.
The historian judges his authorities.
Consequences: well duh
3) The historian must be detective: gathering evidence, examining it
critically, imagining the event,
3. Historical
Evidence
History is not science in the sense that you can gather data, observe
and experiment.
"History...is a science whose business is to study events not
accessible to our observation, and to study those events inferentially,
arguing to them from something else which is accessible to our
observation, and which the historian calls 'evidence' for the events in
which he is interested." (p. 252)
History is inferential: it is inferred from evidence
Testimony should always be suspect.
Scissors-and-paste (multiple testimony, multiple sources) is also
suspect.
Two movements away from scissos-and-paste history: (esp. Vico)
1) The historian must be critical, meaning evidence should be weighed
carefully, and also the historians assumptions about the evidence
should be weighed. Vico: look for the meaning behind the words. Qustion
your interpretation, don't dismiss out of hand.
2) use archaeology
Just funny:
"Scissors-and-paste historians who have become disgusted with the work
of copying out other people's statements, and, conscious of having
brains, feel a laudable desire to use them, are often found satisfying
this desire by inventing a system of pigeon-holes in which to arrange
their learning." p. 264
19th century: the art of turning scissors-and-paste historians into
"natural scientists" by collecting facts, looking for patterns, and
extrapolating from the patterns a theory of universal history (p. 265)
The problem: you can always find patterns ("things that are things")
but they mean nothing without critical interpretation
The detective story analogy (except of course the daughter actually
poisoned him...)
"The potential evidence about a subject is all the extant statements
about it. The actual evidence is that part of these statements we
decide to accept...everything in the world is potential evidence for
any subject whatever..." (p. 280)
Daunting to the s&p historian--how can you round up enough
evidence.
Not daunting to the scientific historian who realises that "every time
he asks a question he asks it because he thinks he can answer it...he
has already in mind a preliminary and tentative idea of the evidence he
will be able to use. Not a definite idea about potential evidence, but
an indefinite idea about actual evidence." (p. 280-1)
Holmes vs. Poirot: s&p gathering vs. little grey cells cogitation
(Lord Acton: Study problems, not periods." (p. 281)
4. History as
Re-enactment of Past Experiences
1) An act of thought can be sustained, revived in one mind, and revived
in another across time.
2) Does that make all history impossible? Just a re-working of one's
own experience? No, because with enough critical evidence (and an
understanding of our subjectivity limitations) we can re-enact past
thoughts.
"Historical knowledge is that special case of memory where the object
of present thought is past thought, the gap between present and past
being bridged not only by the power of present thought to think of the
past, but also by the power of past thought to reawaken itself in the
present." (p. 294)
Autobiography: coloring the past with knowledge of the present--seeing
how the consequences came about from what happened.
To be sure of how one felt/acted in the past one must have evidence
from that time, not just a recollection colored by subsequent events.
Thought is both immediacy (flow of consciousness) and mediation
(detached from that flow).
"Thus, the mere fact that someone has expressed his thoughts in
writing, and that we possess his works, does not enable us to
understand his thoughts. In order that we may be able to do so, we must
come to the reading of them prepared with an experience sufficiently
like his own to make those thoughts organic to it." (p. 300)
5. The
Subject-matter of History
"Of what can there be historical knowledge? Of that which can be
re-enacted in the historian's mind." (p. 302)
What is not?
- nature, because changes are not conscious of change
- experience, because it is either sensation (feeling) or
psychology (empathizing with feelings of others)
- the act of thought, because it occurs in time and time passes
There can be histories of:
- politics
- warfare
- economics
- morals
- science
- art (or at least artistic achievement)
- philosophy
- religion
because these are all a function of reflective thought in pursuit of
solving a problem. As such they can be re-enacted in the mind of the
historian (pp. 310-313) Isn't this circular?
6. History and
Freedom
7. Progress as
created by Historical Thinking
Historic progress is not evolution. The idea of historical
process...refers to the coming into existence not merely of new actions
or thoughts or situations belonging to the same specific type, but of
new specific types." (p. 324)
The "optical illusion" of judging history as good periods and bad
periods based on the prejudices of the historian (p. 328)
Is history "evolution" or "Fortune's Wheel?" Hoorah! Collingwood sees
that "the historian can never take any period as a whole."
Progress when it happens, happens only in one way: by the retention of
the mind, at one phase, of what was achieved in the preceding phase."
(p. 333)
So, how does he see historiography? He has explained how previous
historians didn't get it, but has implied that they have moved in a
particular direction?
Questions
sin of ommission,
there is a "right way of investigating mind" instead of many right ways
there is a historian, instead of many
"historians re-enact critically" but he leaves out the dangers of doing
so--bias, lack of evidence (12th cent. bliauts)
sin of commission, Knox's role in determining what becomes the
Collingwood canon
bad SCA history - putting our belief systems on those of the past
--------------------------------
Questions Submitted
1) In the section on Human Nature and Human History (pp. 228-230)
Collingwood argues that:
a) Methods of modern history gew up under ideas of natural science, to
wit, history consists of events to be observed, classified, and
categorized. This leads to problems such as mistaking culture and
tradition for race and pedigree.
b) Those who tried to create a "science of human nature" assumed that
human nature was consistent throughout history or that humans do not
learn as history progresses. They do not situate the historical person
in their own historical place. Thus, they can look at historical people
and comfortably assume "weren't they
stupid for not realising..."
This one is the key to why
Collingwood
is a good read:
he's meta- izing historical thought, always a safe practice.
People with historical consciousness will take from history, develop
and criticize, and use that heritage to their advantage. This applies
to Collingwood's theory as well. Critics may call the ideas incomplete,
but we can take his ideas,
add other historiographic theories of the 20th century, and go from
there. If
that is the case, Collingwood will not be wrong, just incomplete. His
work is malleable enough to cover a variety of circumstances.
So far, so good. The interesting question is what happens when the
ground shifts out from beneath him. For example, he was writing in and
responding to an environment that included the rise of evolutionism (or
worse, social Darwinism) and the changes in the methods and definitions
of science (not to mention the impact of the idealogically based WWI
and the build-up to WWII). Knox transplanted him into the post-war era,
and Dray and Van der Dussen into the 1990s. How will he fare as we move
into the world of brain science theory, genetics, and information
overload? (No I don't have an answer to that one! Maybe by December...)
2) "The potential evidence about a subject is all the extant statements
about it. The actual evidence is that part of these statements we
decide to accept...everything in the world is potential evidence for
any subject whatever..." (p. 280) He points out that this is daunting
to the s&p historian--how can you possibly collect enough
evidence? He suggests this is not daunting to the scientific historian
who realises that "every time
he asks a question he asks it because he thinks he can answer it...he
has already in mind a preliminary and tentative idea of the evidence he
will be able to use. Not a definite idea about potential evidence, but
an indefinite idea about actual evidence." (p. 280-1)
One consequence of this belief in the field of history in the 20th
cent. is the push to collect more evidence and, possibly, the effect on
contemporary ideas about creating more evidence for future historians.
That is, if we have
more information we can make more informed re-enactments. The 20th
century has seen many efforts in the area of getting better data
-
inclusion
(east/west, gender, race), better collection methods (archaeology,
paleography, etc.), better methods for quatification. But what are some
consequences? "Even with all these aids, he may still miss an important
piece of
testimony, and thus provide sport for his friends; but on any given
question the amount of testimony that exists is a finite quantity, and
it is theoretically possible to exhaust it." (p. 278)
Collingwood may have thought the testimony available in his day was a
finite quantity. This may or may not have been true when he wrote this
(I doubt it). But the consequence of this push to collect more data,
combined with the technological ability to do so leads to a point where
there is too much data to make observation and study of it practical.
Thus, the historian must select the data to be studied. Collingwood may
hope that selection will be based on critical thought, not prejudice
and bias, that the questions themselves will not be made from a place
of bias. Hence, the charge that he is an idealist?
3) Is history "evolution" or "Fortune's Wheel?" Is man moving forward,
monolithically, on a progressive path, or just moving through period
after period (Who was it that said "History: it's just one damn thing
after another"?) Hoorah! Collingwood sees
that "the historian can never take any period as a whole." "Progress
when it happens, happens only in one way: by the retention of
the mind, at one phase, of what was achieved in the preceding phase."
(p. 333) That is, a society may show progress in one area and regress
in another.
So, how does he see historiography? He has explained how previous
historians didn't "get it," but has he implied that they have moved
monolithically in a
particular direction. In so implying, does he see his own work as
evolutionary?
By the way, his ideas about history as re-enactment reminded me
of
your question about teaching
women's/African-American, etc. history without the experience of being
a
woman/Afircan-American, etc. Collingwood seems to think the historian
can enter the
mind and truly experience (p. 296--Nietzche and the wind in his
hair)--if we have sufficient evidence are the thoughts we create
comparable to theirs. I'm not quite willing to follow Collingwood all
the way there. I can't help but think the answer is no for
experiencing, but yes as far as teaching.
And favorite quote that shows his lectures may have been rather fun:
"Scissors-and-paste historians who have become disgusted with the work
of copying out other people's statements, and, conscious of having
brains, feel a laudable desire to use them, are often found satisfying
this desire by inventing a system of pigeon-holes in which to arrange
their learning." p. 264
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hope.greenberg@uvm.edu,
created/updated: 16-Sept-2004
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