HST287: 28-Oct-2004
Reading Notes
Flyvbjerg, Bent Making Social
Science Matter. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
The Science Wars
Flyvbjerg begins with a remembrance of the Sokal Affair and suggests
that 1) the natural and social sciences are indeed at war and that 2)
the social sciences should not follow the methodological
practices or the standards of the natural sciences. Something else is
needed.
He goes on to suggest that that "something" is phronesis.
Definitions:
- episteme: analytical, scientific knowledge
- techne: technical knowledge or know-how
- phronesis: value-centered, action-oriented knowledge
My
Detour:
Why was Sokal hoax so well-received?:
Science, Technology, & Human Values,
Autumn 1997 v22 n4 p506(17)
The
Sokal affair
in context.
(physicist Alan Sokal's experiment designed to determine whether parody
of cultural studies will pass as serious academic paper) Stephen
Hilgartner.
http://web1.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/422/210/53544563w1/purl=rc1_EAIM_0_A20123225&dyn=5!xrn_1_0_A20123225?sw_aep=vol_b92b
1) "Differences in prehoax perceptions. In the late twentieth century,
physics enjoys the status of the most scientific of sciences."
2) "Differences in the institutional resources of the targets. As a
well-established profession, social work could fight back with a
variety of institutional resources, such as professional codes and
ethics committees."
3) "Differences in how the cases fitted into the agendas of interested
commentators and media gatekeepers. The humanities and social sciences
in contemporary American universities have been at the center of the
so-called culture wars, receiving considerable attention on campuses,
in popular books, and in the mass media."
"A third irony arises from my comparison of the Epstein and Sokal
controversies. The contrasting fates that these experiments enjoyed
cannot be attributed to differences in methodological strength;
instead, the contrast poses a fascinating puzzle about the public
construction of credibility. And to solve such puzzles, we need careful
social and humanistic studies of science."
But what about the meme? One big difference between Epstein's study of
1990 and Sokal's article of 1996 was the Internet!!
2) Rationality,
body, and intuition in human learning
Dreyfus and Dreyfus's levels of human
learning process:
- Novice - rules-based
- Advanced beginner - some context dependence
- competant performer - learning to prioritize
- proficient performer - involved, experienced, intuitive
understanding but still analytical
- expert - intuitive, non-analytical cognition, holistic
So: "rationality may endanger sensiticity to context, experience, and
intuition"
3) Is theory
possible in social sciences
Brownian motion, even science isn't scientific
not Kuhnian paradigms: pre-paradigm argument, Asimov's psychohistory is
possible? no wrong question
Foucault p. 36
4) Context counts
Dreyfus and Bourdieu:context is everything
Science: Theory must be explicit, universal, abstract, discrete (no
human interest), systematic (rules, laws), complete and predictive
The arguments:
- pre-paradigmatic: maybe it can become a science someday
- hermeneutic-phenomenological: study of human activity can only be
based on self-interpretation, if that's not stable, study isn;t stable
- historical contigency: humans can't study objectively what they
are themselves the objects of, also Foucault thinks it is only certain
historical periods, Flyvbjerg thinks it's all
- tacit skill argument: predictability can't happen when based on
context-dependant situations
5) Values in social and political inquiry
Habits of the heart
social questions: where are we going, is this desireable, what should
be done
6) The power of example
Misunderstandings of case studies:
7) The significance of conflict and power to social science
must have a well developed conception of power
Habermas: it's not subjectivity, it's intersubjecticity: "clarify your
presuppositions!"
p. 91: the 5 requirements, also see article
8) Empowering Aristotle
Foucault: power is inherent in everything, power comes from below,
power cannot be acquired (it flows), where ther is power there is
resistance
theory must always be considered with praxis
9) Methodological guidelines for a reformed social science
"The result of phronetic research is a pragmatically governed
interpretation of the studied practices. ..it does not try to develop
theory or universal method...Phronetic social science explores historic
circumstances and current practices to find avenues to praxis. The task
of phronetic social science is to clarify and deliberate about the
problems and risks we face and to outline how things may be done
differently, in full knowledge that we cannot find ultimate answers to
these questions or even a single version of what these questions are."
(p. 140)
11) Social Science that matters
- drop efforts to emulate natural sciences
- take up community problems
- communicate our results effectivley
Questions
1) Flyvbjerg builds his argument that a strictly "scientific" approach
to social sciences will not work, then proposes an alternative. It's an
interesting, appealing approach. But does his initial assumption apply
to all forms of social science research that is modeled on natural
science methods? Are there any areas of social science that do respond
well to these methods? (I'm wondering about the predictive nature of
studying populations for purposes of assigning insurance risks, or
economics, etc.)
2) There are two jokes/phrases about research, especially funded
research
- "If we knew what we were doing it wouldn't be called research."
- "Don't apply for research funding until after you have your
research results."
The first represents a traditional definition of what research is for,
the second, a more practical analysis of the current situation that
determines what/whose research will actually get done. Sadly, I wonder
if Flyvbjerg's approach addresses the former, but not the latter.
3) Not a question, more of my usual cherche le web:
The Sokal Affair!!
In an article titled "The Sokal Affair in Context" (Science,
Technology, & Human Values,
Autumn 1997), Stephen Hilgartner compares Sokal's hoax to a similar one
by Epstein and asks why Sokal's made such a big splash. He concludes
that some of the reasons had to do with the fact that Sokal was a
physicist (thus a deified scientist), that the field of social work was
better able to fight back, thus prolonging the controversy, and that
the case made a media splash because it "fitted into the agendas of
interested
commentators and media gatekeepers. The humanities and social sciences
in contemporary American universities have been at the center of the
so-called culture wars, receiving considerable attention on campuses,
in popular books, and in the mass media."
He concludes that "the contrasting fates that these experiments enjoyed
cannot be attributed to differences in methodological strength;
instead, the contrast poses a fascinating puzzle about the public
construction of credibility. And to solve such puzzles, we need careful
social and humanistic studies of science."
But, of course, reading this fresh after Foucault, epistemes, and
discourses, etc. we must ask "what does he leave out" (Flyvbjerg
doesn't mention it either). The Epstein hoax was in 1990. Sokal was
1996. What happened in between? The web had reached the public
consciousness and online communication had expanded immensely. The
Sokal affair was, I believe, an early example of what is now being
called a "meme."
http://maxwell.lucifer.com/virus/alt.memetics/what.is.html
Would the fervor over Sokal's article have reached the same pitch so
quickly without being fueled by online discussion groups, etc.? Just
what was the impact? Now that would be an interesting question to
pursue. (And where do memes fit in with Foucault's ideas of powers,
Habermas's democratic discourse, and Flyvberg's phronesis: are they
casuses or effects, are they different from traditional modes of
discursive flow, or the same-old same-old but maybe faster?)
hope.greenberg@uvm.edu,
Created/updated: 24-Oct-2004/28-Oct-2004
Back to HST287