Polybius Book 36.9 and 17
On the Destruction of Carthage
9 Both about the Carthaginians when they were crushed by the Romans and
about the affair of the pseudo-Philip many divergent accounts were current
in Greece, at first on the subject of the conduct of Rome to Carthage and
next concerning their treatment of the pseudo-Philip. As regards the
former the judgements formed and the opinions held in Greece were far from
unanimous. There were some who approved the action of the Romans, saying
that they had taken wise and statesmanlike measures in defence of their
empire. For to destroy this source of perpetual menace, this city which
had constantly disputed the supremacy with them and was still able to
dispute it if it had the opportunity and thus to secure the dominion of
the own country, was the act of intelligent and far-seeing men.
Others took the opposite view, saying that far from maintaining the
principles by which they had won their supremacy, they were little by
little deserting it for a lust of domination like that of Athens and
Sparta, starting indeed later than those states, but sure, as everything
indicated, to arrive at the same end. For at first they had made war with
every nation until they were victorious and until their adversaries had
confessed that they must obey them and execute their orders. But now they
had struck the first note of their new policy by their conduct to Perseus,
in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they had now
completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage. For the
Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the
Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, although they had
accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders.
Others said that the Romans were, generally speaking, a civilized people,
and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that
they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither
night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and
fraud, and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were
legitimate for them. But in the present case, throughout the whole of
their proceedings in regard to Carthage, they had used deceit and fraud,
offering certain things one at a time and keeping others secret, until
they cut off every hope the city had of help from her allies. This, they
said, savoured more of a despot's intrigue than of the principles of a
civilized state such as Rome, and could only be justly described as
something very like impiety and treachery. And there were others who
differed likewise from these latter critics. For, they said, if before the
Carthaginians had committed themselves to the faith of Rome the Romans had
proceeded in this manner, offering certain things one at a time and
gradually disclosing others, they would of course have appeared to be
guilty of the charge brought against them. But if, in fact, after the
Carthaginians had of their own accord committed themselves to the faith of
the Romans and given them liberty to treat them in any way they chose, the
Romans, being thus authorized to act as it seemed good to them, gave the
orders and imposed the terms on which they had decided, what took place
did not bear any resemblance to an act of impiety and scarcely any to an
act of treachery; in fact some said it was not even of the nature of an
injustice. For every crime must naturally fall under one of these three
classes, and what the Romans did belongs to neither of the three. For
impiety is sin against the gods, against parents, or against the dead;
treachery is the violation of sworn or written agreements; and injustice
is what is done contrary to law and custom. Of none of these three were
the Romans guilty on the present occasion. Neither did they sin against
the gods, against their parents, or against the dead, nor did they violate
any sworn agreement or treaty; on the contrary they accused the
Carthaginians of doing this. Nor, again, did they break any laws or
customs or their personal faith. For having received from a people who
consented willingly full authority to act as they wished, when this people
refused to obey their orders they finally resorted to force.
On Fate
17 For my part, says Polybius, in finding fault with those who ascribe
public events and incidents to Fate and Chance, I now wish to state my
opinion on this subject as far as it is admissible to do so in a strictly
historical work. Now indeed as regards things the causes of which it is
impossible or difficult for a mere man to understand, we may perhaps be
justified in getting out of the difficulty by setting them down to the
action of a god or of chance, I mean such things as exceptionally heavy
and continuous rain or snow, or on the other hand the destruction of crops
by severe drought or frost, or a persistent outbreak of plague or other
similar things of which it is not easy to detect the cause. So in regard
to such matters we naturally bow to public opinion, as we cannot make out
why they happen, and attempting by prayer and sacrifice to appease the
heavenly powers, we send to ask the gods what we must do and say, to set
things right and cause the evil that afflicts us to cease. But as for
matters the efficient and final cause of which it is possible to discover
we should not, I think, put them down to divine action. For instance, take
the following case. In our own time the whole of Greece has been subject
to a low birth-rate and a general decrease of the population, owing to
which cities have become deserted and the land has ceased to yield fruit,
although there have neither been continuous wars nor epidemics. If, then,
any one had advised us to send and ask the gods about this, and find out
what we ought to say or do, to increase in number and make our cities more
populous, would it not seem absurd, the cause of the evil being evident
and the remedy being in our own hands? For as men had fallen into such a
state of pretentiousness, avarice, and indolence that they did not wish to
marry, or if they married to rear the children born to them, or at most as
a rule but one or two of them, so as to leave these in affluence and bring
them up to waste their substance, the evil rapidly and insensibly grew.
For in cases where of one or two children the one was carried off by war
and the other by sickness, it is evident that the houses must have been
left unoccupied, and as in the case of swarms of bees, so by small degrees
cities became resourceless and feeble. About this it was of no use at all
to ask the gods to suggest a means of deliverance from such an evil. For
any ordinary man will tell you that the most effectual cure had to be
men's own action, in either striving after other objects, or if not, in
passing laws making it compulsory to rear children. Neither prophets nor
magic were here of any service, and the same holds good for all
particulars. But in cases where it is either impossible or difficult to
detect the cause the question is open to doubt. One such case is that of
Macedonia. For the Macedonians had met with many signal favors from Rome;
the country as a whole had been delivered from the arbitrary rule and
taxation of autocrats, and, as all confessed, now enjoyed freedom in place
of servitude, and the several cities had, owing to the beneficent action
of Rome, been freed from serious civil discord and internecine massacres.
. . . But now they witnessed in quite a short time more of their citizens
exiled, tortured and murdered by this false Philip than by any of their
previous real kings. . . . But while they were defeated by the Romans in
fighting for Demetrius and Perseus, yet now fighting for a hateful man and
displaying great valor in defence of his throne, they worsted the Romans.
How can anyone fail to be nonplused by such an event? for here it is most
difficult to detect the cause. So that in pronouncing on this and similar
phenomena we may well say that the thing was a heaven-sent infatuation,
and that all the Macedonians were visited by the wrath of God, as will be
evident from what follows.