CRITIQUE/PROLIFERATION IMAGE

THE PROLIFERATION IMAGE PROMOTES PROLIFERATION - INDIA AND PAKISTAN ARE EXAMPLES

DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 149-150

The NPT has generally been hailed as a tremendous success. The treaty was negotiated at a time when it was commonly expected that there would be roughly 20 nuclear weapon states by 1980, with France and the PRC having just joined the three initial nuclear powers. India's 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) test was the only open blemish on the NPT record after it was signed-although a number of states were trying to achieve nuclear status, of which several had actually developed some form of nuclear weaponry. By 1980 there were still only the five nuclear powers declared by the NPT's conclusion in 1968, and that figure still stood at the time of the UN Security Council Summit in 1992. As we have seen, Iraq was discovered to have been close to building a nuclear weapon, and South Africa had both built and dismantled six nuclear bombs. 18 Thanks to Mordecai Vannunu, Israel's secret arsenal was made less secret, although it was still not officially acknowledged. Indeed, the apparent success of the NPT explains in part its importance in the construction of the "proliferation" image in the postCold War world. The fact that India and then Pakistan have now openly tested nuclear weapons should be of tremendous concern to those who have championed the "proliferation" image. It is no coincidence that the move to declare nuclear status came when it did; rather, the events on the subcontinent in May 1998 can be seen as a product of the practices I have examined.

PROLIFERATION IMAGE DOES NOT MAKE US SAFER FROM WMD, BUT CREATES A RICH POOR GAP AND TRIGGERS NEW CRISES IN IRAQ AND INDIA

DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 160-161

As it presently stands, the "proliferation" image is remarkably effective, although not in the instrumental sense of achieving the goals it has been set. The events of 1998 have demonstrated in no uncertain terms that in the sense of its stated goals, proliferation control has been a failure. "Proliferation" has been effective in the somewhat different sense of having produced effects. What "proliferation" is effecting is a world in which a rift is produced between rich and poor, North and South, masquerading as a collective effort to produce universal security. Iraq's recalcitrance in complying with UNSCOM is central to that masque; it plays the part of villain with consummate skill, enabling the repeated display of force so central to a security play. Yet the impressive displays of high-technology destructive power cannot entirely hide the fact that such displays are needed. The more mundane practices of monitoring the movement of technologies have consistently failed to achieve their aims, so the oceanic displays of missiled might are necessary. By producing a world of inside and outside, which is a world of haves and have nots, the proliferation discourse also effects the one thing so clearly lacking in its image of the relationship between technology and arms: a reason for those with the technology to turn it to a military use, as India did in May 1998.

MUST ESCAPE FROM PROLIFERATION IMAGE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH IRAQ AND INDIA

DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 159

The most likely sites of change emerge from the apparent disasters of 1998. The issues of both Iraq and India will need to be reconsidered as a result of the UNSCOM crises and the South Asian nuclear tests. The latter in particular raise the possibility of a fundamental rethinking of "proliferation" because of India's explicit contestation of its central features. The Indians have repeatedly decried the inequities of the "proliferation" image that permit some and not others to be armed and that restrict access to technologies that are crucial not only for arms but also for civilian economic processes. Their argument, which has been largely consistent throughout the nuclear era, has been that they would forgo any nuclear option as part of a general process of nuclear disarmament.

IT IS THE PROLIFERATION IMAGE WHICH HAS TRIGGERED EVENTS IN IRAQ, INDIA AND PAKISTAN

DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATEPROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 154

The conclusions to be drawn from this brief examination of UNSCOM and the Indian tests are damning. Both the repeated crises in Iraq and the shocking nuclear tests in South Asia must be seen as products of the practices of proliferation control, practices the states of the Western world have developed in answer to the UN Security Council's 1992 pledge to take appropriate action to combat the evils of proliferation. It is difficult to see any way to claim that actions which produced the events in Iraq in 1998, as well as the first two instances of open nuclear proliferation since the NPT was signed, are at all appropriate.

WHEN THE CTBT WAS REFRAMED USING THE PROLIFERATION IMAGE, IT TRIGGERED INDIA AND PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TESTS

DAVID MUTIMER, Prof. Political Science York University, 2000; THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY // VT2002 acs p. 153-154

The reframing of the CTBT in terms of "proliferation" enabled the 1996 text by altering the U.S. interest in the CTBT in such a way that the United States led the drive for its completion. At the same time, however, it created the conditions of possibility for the most serious breach of the nuclear nonproliferation regime-the Indian tests and the subsequent tests by Pakistan. The linkages that have emerged between India's accession to the CTBT and issues of disarmament, technological access, and international status provide evidence of the importance of this reframing. Each of these issues is central to the contestation of the "proliferation" image, and none had previously been raised by India with reference to the CTBT. Indeed, the CTBT had been pursued by India as an alternative to the NPT, which it criticized precisely in these terms. The conclusion seems obvious: once again the practices of proliferation control seem far from appropriate, producing outcomes that are perverse.