CRITIQUE/WMD MASS TERM

IMPACT: WMD AS A MASS TERM MAKES IT AR MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH REAL TERRORIST THREATS

LUMPING ANTITERRORIST EFFORTS INTO ONE "WMD" CATEGORY STOPS EFFECTIVE PREVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

MICHAEL OSTERHOLM, School of Public Health, Univ. of Minnesota, 2000; LIVING TERRORS: What America needs to know to survive the coming bioterrorist catastrophe //VT2002acs p. XIX-XX

You will also learn why the billions being spent to combat terrorism miss the mark when it comes to fighting microbial terror. Most antiterrorism programs Jump bioterrorism in with what are commonly called WMD weapons of mass destruction -including nuclear devices, bombs, and chemical weapons. But as you'll see, biological weapons are fundamentally different: they are the stealthiest tools of mass destruction ever developed. They can be released silently, with no sign or even smell to announce the act. They can take days or even weeks for the infections they cause to show themselves.

OVERUSE OF THE TERM "WMD" LEADS TO A LACK OF ATTENTION GIVEN TO BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

LAURIE GARRETT, Pulitzer Prize -- winning science and medical writer for Newsday January, 2001 / February, 2001 Foreign Affairs SECTION: CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT; Pg. 76 HEADLINE: The Nightmare of Bioterrorism //VT2002acsln

Many advocates argue that the public health system's role in the fight against bioterrorism can be comfortable only if it is an equal partner of the law enforcement and defense communities. One of the loudest voices speaking on behalf of public health in this regard is Michael Osterholm. In his new book, Living Terrors, Osterholm argues that "the overuse of the term 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD) has done a great deal to stunt the necessary attention to the looming threat of biological terrorism." The WMD terminology places defense against bioterrorism in the hands of the military and the police, Osterholm insists. And that means, he says, "our priorities are really screwed up."

NUCLEAR WMD FOCUS MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE ACQUISITION PHASE FOR TERRORISTS SEEKING CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

To judge the likelihood of terror-ist attacks with chemical or biologi-cal weapons a clear understanding of the weapon acquisition process from the perspective of the demand side–the terrorist organization–is required. The demand side is often reduced solely to motivations, such as the relative power and prestige the possession of non-conventional weapons confers to a non-state group, and the difficulties of state retaliation against terrorist groups, because they know no territorial boundaries. Such reasoning is based on a state-level analysis of nuclear weapon proliferation, even though it is far from established that these motivations play any significant role in the acquisition of CB weapons by states.

WMD MASS TERM MAKES EFFECTIVE ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BY TERRORISTS MORE DIFFICULT

Part of the problem of rationalizing the use of CB weapons for ter-rorist purposes lies in the qualification of CB weapons as weapons of mass destruction. This has two major implications. First, it draws the attention of the analyst away from the political motives for resorting to CB weapons and to-wards the consequences of such employment. As small quantities of toxic chemicals, pathogens, and toxins are said to be able to produce massive casualties, prevention, emergency response, and logistics become the prime focus of policy analysis. The immensity of the en-visaged consequences, in turn, de-fies any rational explanation of the political motives for the terrorist act and adversely affects the assessment of the rationality of the perpetrators.