NEG/TERRORISM/BIOLOGICAL

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE TOO DIFFICULT FOR TERRORISTS TO PRODUCE

YOU CAN CREATE TOXINS, BUT IT TAKES A VERY LONG TIME FOR TERRORISTS TO CREATE ENOUGH TO KILL LOTS OF PEOPLE

While it is theoretically true that a quart of nerve agent contains about a million lethal doses, the oft-discussed basement terrorist would labor roughly two years to make enough sarin to kill five hundred outdoors and another eighteen years to produce the ton of sarin required to kill ten thousand. No one disputes that bathtub manufacturing poses a threat to public safety, but this setting is incongruous with causing mass casualties.

MAKING THE BIOLOGICAL AGENT IS A LONG WAY FROM PRODUCING A USEFUL WEAPON

MICHAEL OSTERHOLM, School of Public Health, Univ. of Minnesota, 2000; LIVING TERRORS: What America needs to know to survive the coming bioterrorist catastrophe //VT2002acs p. 102-3

Some of the foremost experts in biological weaponry have said things that seem to support that point of view. "I know how to make a weapon," says William Patrick, who developed biological weapons for the United States during the 1960s. "Ken Alibek knows how to make a weapon. I don't think our domestic terrorists have the capability to make a weapon yet ... it takes some doing, it really does."

Alibek agrees-up to a point. In Biohazard he writes that making the kinds of biological weaponry that he and his staff developed is not a trivial matter, even if you can cultivate a dangerous pathogen. "The most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability," he writes. "The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents."

TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REQUIRES A NATIONALLY FUNDED PROGRAM

MICHAEL OSTERHOLM, School of Public Health, Univ. of Minnesota, 2000; LIVING TERRORS: What America needs to know to survive the coming bioterrorist catastrophe //VT2002acs p. 1 14

The distinction is vitally important. The missile assault that the United States was preparing in the 1960s, and which the Soviets labored on until 1992, is indeed outside the range of even the bestfunded terrorist group. The technological wizardry required for turning germs into weapons and then creating delivery systems that can get them to their targets in a still-deadly state takes the kind of allout development effort. that only nationally funded programs can mount.

ACQUIRING SMALLPOX TO MAKE A WEAPON IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT

MICHAEL OSTERHOLM, School of Public Health, Univ. of Minnesota, 2000; LIVING TERRORS: What America needs to know to survive the coming bioterrorist catastrophe //VT2002acs p. 107

Some agents are harder to find and produce than others. Smallpox, as Dr. Peters of the CDC notes, is relatively easy to grow once you get it, but acquiring smallpox would be difficult.

BIOLOGICAL "ETHNIC" WEAPONS ARE NOT A REALISTIC THREAT

It has been suggested that functional genomics some day will generate data that may be used to identify genetic markers peculiar to specific human populations. If this was done, pathogens and toxins might be developed that mainly affect persons of populations possessing specified genetic markers (Larson, 1970; Hammerschlag, 1974; Lancet editorial staff and International Advisory Board, 1996; British Medical Association, 1999). This type of weapons has been called "ethnic" weapons; i.e., weapons that preferentially harm or kill designated national or ethnic populations. While stories about ethnic weapons make for exciting reading, the research required to develop an ethnic weapon would be extremely difficult, have a high probability of failing, take a long time to carry out, and be expensive. Realistically, the probability of such research being undertaken at all is low; and even if it were to be done by, for example, a well-supported national program, it would probably take more than 25 years to realize findings meaningful for biological weapons development.

INCREASED SOCIAL AWARENESS HAS MADE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR TERRORISTS TO GET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

In addition, many sectors of society have ac-quired a greater awareness of the security risks involved in prolifera-tion and will therefore be less likely to be unwitting partners in the ac-quisition of CB weapons by terror-ists. These elements are and will remain major impediments to the widespread use of CB weapons for terrorist purposes.

MANUFACTURING AND DISSEMINATING ENOUGH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO DO MUCH DAMAGE IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS

However, the processes to manufacture and disseminate them in sufficiently large quantities to obtain these effects are far more complex than those associated with other chemical and biological materials. Despite large investments, Aum Shinrikyo’s CB weapon pro-grams continued to be plagued by considerable problems. The depen-dency on outside sources for equip-ment and compounds combined with the fact that such a CB weapon pro-gram must be run in total illegality considerably complicates the quest for such weaponry. Contrary to widespread belief, the norms against both state and sub-state acquisition and use of CB weapons have been greatly strengthened.

EFFORTS TO WEAPONIZE PATHOGENS IS TOO RISKY FOR TERRORIST SCIENTISTS

First, complex research undertaken to weaponize pathogens is risky because it is more likely to fail than achieve its objectives. The problem of pleomorphic effects is particularly daunting. Pleomorphic effects are manifested as undesirable characteristics that appear in a genetically engineered organism simultaneously to sought-after positive characteristics. Thus, even if a laboratory succeeded in genetically engineering a pathogen so it exhibited a new or enhanced characteristic desirable for weapons use, such as antibiotic resistance or added toxin production, the newly developed organism might simultaneously present a weakness to environmental stresses and/or decreased virulence. If so, a new cycle of research, development, and field-testing would have to be done to remove the pleomorphic effects while retaining the sought-after characteristics. If the researcher was unskilled and/or unlucky, he or she might have to undertake several subsequent research, development, and testing cycles before being able to field a strain of pathogen that had improved weapons capabilities over the parent strain. As a consequence of potential difficulties with pleomorphic effects, it is likely that in the next five years or more only well supported, long-term national BW programs would attempt genetic engineering projects for the purpose of weaponizing pathogens.

KNOWLEDGE ITSELF IS TOO RUDIMENTARY FOR TERRORISTS TO WEAPONIZE PATHOGENS

Second, science’s understanding of many natural phenomena, such as infectivity, pathogenesis, host-parasite relationships, and others, is rudimentary. Lack of fundamental information about these phenomena prevents the undertaking of much applied research to, for example, enhance the ability of organisms to infect target hosts, cause severe damage to host systems, and be more specific as to preferred hosts. Further, some important phenomena, such as virulence factors and the ability of a pathogen to penetrate the host’s skin or intestinal wall, are controlled by several or many genes; however, the present level of scientific capability allows bioscientists to transfer or modify only single genes. It therefore is impossible to modify phenomena controlled by multiple genes, thus severely circumscribing approaches to weaponizing pathogens.