NEG/TERRORISM/GENERAL

TERRORISM IS BEING DETERRED NOW

WMD TERRORISM CAN BE DETERRED

Almost certainly, some terrorists will not be deterred, regardless of counterterrorism capabilities or policies, but some will. Rather than ad-dressing the question of whether terrorists can be deterred, this paper is intended to identify the potential deterrent value of these capabilities and provide the means for maximizing that potential. Placing greater emphasis on the deterrent value of these capabilities by casting what Graham Pearson describes as a "web of deterrence," can greatly reduce the scope of the threat by thwarting at least some potential CBRN terrorists. As this paper attempts to articulate, many counterterrorism capabilities do have potential deterrent value

PROMISE OF PUNISHMENT FOR WMD TERRORISTS AFTER THE INCIDENT AND ADDED ACQUISITION BARRIERS CAN DETER AN ATTACK

Increasing the costs incurred by the terrorist af-ter an incident fosters the percep-tion that the risks associated with the undesired action are above ac- ceptable levels. In addition to in-creasing costs incurred after an inci-dent, steps taken to complicate the process of CBRN weapon acquisi-tion can serve to convince potential terrorists that CBRN weapons are ei-ther too difficult or too expensive to acquire.

WMD TERRORISM HAS MORE WAYS TO BE DETERRED THAN NUCLEAR FORCES

But, the three basic instru-ments of deterrence in the Cold War remained constant: each side’s nu-clear forces, their knowledge and understanding of each other’s capa-bilities and intentions, and an ability to communicate with one another. In the context of CBRN terrorism, the type and number of instruments are broader than in the nuclear context. Like the nuclear context, they in-clude communication, awareness, and punitive measures. Unlike the nuclear context, both denial meas-ures and defensive measures also have utility in influencing a CBRN ter-rorist’s decision.

THE BEST PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM IS A CREDIBLE DETERRENT

Barry L. Rothburg, Fall 1997, "Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in the United States", Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law.

In fact, there may be no ideal solution, but advances in technology, changes in policy, and a more aggressive posture can at least reduce the chances that the United States will fall victim to nuclear terrorists. Rebuilding a credible deterrent is among the best options. If the United States works to stern nuclear proliferation, secure Russia's stockpiles, craft a flexible deterrence policy, and develop new technologies to detect and trace nuclear materials, there may be a chance. Changes must be made, and fast, because the threat will only get worse as more countries develop nuclear weapons and more materials leak out of former Soviet Republics.