NEGATIVE/ROGUES/NORTH KOREA

WE MUST KEEP SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

CLINTON ADMINISTRATION WILL GO AHEAD WITH NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

RICHARD W. STEVENSON, The New York Times, October 4, 1999, Section A; Page 16;  HEADLINE: Missile System Passes a Test As a Target Is Destroyed // ln-acs

Republicans have been pushing for such a system for years, and with opposition among Democrats melting away as missile technology proliferates around the world, the Administration has suggested that it will go ahead if the technology works and the costs are kept under control.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT DESTROYS ALL ARMS CONTROL AND ANTI-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS

RICHARD W. STEVENSON, The New York Times, October 4, 1999, Section A; Page 16;  HEADLINE: Missile System Passes a Test As a Target Is Destroyed // ln-acs

Critics of the national missile defense plan say deployment would risk a new escalation in nuclear arms competition by undermining current and planned treaties, forcing Russia and China to upgrade their offensive systems and encouraging India, Pakistan and other budding nuclear powers to respond.

"What we really have at stake here is the entire arms reduction and nonproliferation regime," said Tom Z. Collina, director of the arms control and international security program for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a research group that opposes the missile defense program.

SANCTIONS LIFTING ALONE FAILS -- THERE CAN BE NO REAL DEAL WITH NORTH KOREA UNLESS THE USA SIGNS A PEACE TREATY WITH NORTH KOREA, CHANGE IN USA TROOP DEPLOYMENT, REPLACES THE UN MILITARY ARMISTACE COMMISSION, AND ALSO LIFTS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

SELIG S. HARRISON, senior fellow of the Century Foundation, director of a study on U.S. policy in Korea, November 5, 1999, Los Angeles Times HEADLINE: commentary; how to end the missile threat from north korea; foreign policy: the u.s. would have to change its security role, end economic sanctions and formally end the war. // acs-ln-12-28-99

Although the fighting stopped in 1953, the Korean War has never formally come to an end. The Military Armistice Commission, set up as a temporary expedient to oversee the cease-fire, lingers on. So does the United Nations Command, which provided a genuinely multilateral umbrella for U.S. intervention in the conflict but is now only a fig leaf for what is a unilateral U.S. security commitment to South Korea. Even the wartime U.S. economic sanctions imposed against North Korea are still in force, though they will be partially relaxed in exchange for a temporary moratorium on North Korean missile testing just negotiated with Pyongyang.

It is increasingly clear that the United States would have to phase out all three of these Cold War anachronisms as the price for a comprehensive, long-term missile deal with North Korea. Pyongyang has offered such a deal, but only if Washington agrees to link it with a formal end to the war and a basic change in the U.S. security role in Korea. Economic incentives alone, recommended by presidential envoy William Perry in his report on North Korea policy last month, will not get Pyongyang to give up its missile program.

ECONMOMIC SANCTIONS ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO STOP NORTH KOREAN MILITARY EXPANSION -- WE SHOULDN'T MAKE ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS UNTIL THEY ACT TO REDUCE THE MILITARY THREAT

William R. Hawkins, U.S. Business and Industry Council. The Weekly Standard December 20, 1999 SECTION: FEATURES; Pg. 27 HEADLINE: Appeasing North Korea; The Clinton administration's policy has strengthened one of the world's most dangerous tyrannies // acs-ln-12-28-99

Economic sanctions combined with the collapse of much of North Korea's unreformed Stalinist economy have greatly undermined Pyongyang's conventional military strength. The lack of hard currency has curtailed the importation of modern weapons, and fuel shortages and starvation (which has claimed an estimated one million lives in a country of 24 million people in the last five years) are taking their toll on military readiness. But maybe not for long. The Clinton administration's lifting of sanctions, allowing investment in North Korea and the opening of the U.S. market for Pyongyang's exports, could enable the regime to reverse this decline.