NEGATIVE/ROGUES/IRAN

THE USA MUST MOVE VERY SLOWLY WITH IRAN, NOT ADOPT THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN

WE MUST STAY UNCONNECTED WITH IRAN UNTIL AFTER THE CURRENT SYSTEM COLLAPSES

Mansour Kashfi, April 16, 2001 Oil & Gas Journal; Pg. 12 HEADLINE: A new Iran is only a matter of time //VT2002acsln

American oil companies are apparently awaiting the inevitable lifting of the trade sanctions against Iran by the new administration, hoping to rush there to enjoy a large share of vast Iranian oil and gas resources.

Before making any commitments, however, they should realize that the present Iran is not a responsible player in the modern world community and obviously hostile to the established universal rule of laws.

When the Islamic regime loses control and collapses, Iranian oil delivery will freeze, and her international commitments will not be honored. Certainly, there will be a period of political instability that will intensify with an oil market disruption.

IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO REMAIN DISTANT FROM IRAN NOW TO BECOME MORE INVOLVED AFTER THE TRANSITION

Mansour Kashfi, April 16, 2001 Oil & Gas Journal; Pg. 12 HEADLINE: A new Iran is only a matter of time //VT2002acsln

Despite the oil companies' enthusiasm regarding Iran's abundant hydrocarbon resources, they should be cautious, and their behavior should not show signs of support of a regime which indulges itself while the Iranian people are practically starving.

A democratic Iran without clergies in power would be the Iran that oil companies should wish to invest in and do business with. Undoubtedly, it will be the capital and know-how of the oil companies that will ultimately revitalize the Iranian economy. However, for a healthy operation and a secure source of oil and gas supply, they should side with the people of Iran.

Certainly, their distance from an uncivilized regime, their intention of supporting democracy in Iran, and their expression of concern for suffering Iranians at this time of oppression will gain oil companies their welcome when a new Iran is in place.

GRADUAL ENGAGEMENT SOLVES BEST BY AVOIDING A POSSIBLE HARDLINER BACKLASH

Gary G. Sick, Executive Director, Gulf/2000, and Senior Research Scholar and Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Rapporteur: Gina Eichner Cinali , October 29-3 1, 1998 (US Relations With Iran and Iraq: Convergence and Contention in the Persian Gulf, The Stanley Foundation )//Ixnx hxm

One participant cautioned that "the US could 'spook' the Iranians by engaging in too vigorous an embrace at this point-when Iran may not be ready-and that such an embrace might have negative repercussions." In this view, positive signals from the West are scrutinized by all factions within Iran and can be used by conservatives against KhataMI. Given Khatami's fragile position, the best support the United States can render may be in "moderating its praise for moderation," lest Western praise play into the hands of conservative factions working against Khatami. Another participant recalled that earlier hopes for change in Iran with the election of Rafsanjani were disappointed as that president encountered internal opposition.

REFORMS ARE MORE LIKELY IF KHATAMI WORKS SLOWLY

Holger Jensen, The Washington Times, November 10, 1999, HEADLINE: Iran's split psyche // lxnx hxm

Maurice Copithorne, a special investigator for the United Nations, reports that human rights in Iran have suffered a setback since the riots, particularly press freedom. While Mr. Khatami's commitment to reform "appears undiminished," he said, "the slow rate of implementation is leading to increasing skepticism."

Mr. Khatami has to move slowly, however, or lose the support of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah All Khamenei, whose backing is crucial to the president's political survival. Without it he would never be able to stave off the. hard-liners who have jailed some of his key supporters, put others on trial for "undermining the Islamic revolution" and are Just waiting for Mr. Khatami to make a misstep.

THE US MUST MOVE SLOWLY IN DEALING WITH IRAN

The Boston Globe, February 26, 2000, HEADLINE: HOPEFUL SIGNS IN IRAN//Ixnx hxm

Consequently, 85 percent of eligible voters went to the polls last week and created a political earthquake, defeating about 150 incumbent hardliners and awarding more than 70 percent of the 290 seats in Iran's Parliament to backers of reformist President Mohammad Khatami. He wants to build a civil society based on the rule of law, protect women and other citizens from the hardliners' morals police, and explore an opening that may lead to normalization of relations with the United States. Because Khatami and the new reformist majority in Parliament do not have their hands on the main levers of power, however, Washington must respond cautiously to the dramatically altered political reality in Iran. Military and security affairs remain the domain of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who recently vetoed a unanimous vote by Iran's Supreme Council for National Security to resume relations with the United States.

President Clinton and his successor will need to evince patience, tact, and a certain subtlety in seeking to revive a diplomatic relationship that can offer considerable strategic and economic benefits to both countries. Nothing peremptory should be done that would have the unintended effect of strengthening the hand of the faltering hardline factions in Iran.

MULTIPLE FACTORS POINT TO THE FACT THAT IRAN WANTS GRADUAL NORMALIZATION WITH THE U.S. NOT IMMEDIATE

Philip Bowring, International Herald, March 10, 2000, HEADLINE: Why Iranians Will Take Their Time

However, while President Mohammed Khatami exudes politeness toward Americans, there are reasons why Iran does not feel in much of a hurry to change its policies and speed normalization with an America that may soon recognize where its own national interest lies.

Clerical influence (and money) will ensure that the issues of Jerusalem and the Shiite community of Lebanon are not abandoned. Tran's reformers would prefer to tangle with conservatives on domestic issues. Iran will not stand in the way of a deal between Israel and Syria, but neither will it unilaterally drop support for Hezbollah without a major gain elsewhere.

The notable success of Tehran's efforts to improve relations with Arab nations, notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, has reduced its isolation. Helped by mutual oil interests and Arab frustration at perceived Israeli intransigence, this detente has undermined American influence.

Iran has been normalizing relations with Europe. Ministerial exchanges are accompanied by an upsurge of investor interest in a middle-income country of 65 million in a key strategic situation and politically more stable than most in the region.

Most Iranians are angered by (successful) U.S. attempts to prevent Central Asian countries from using Iran as conduit for oil and gas exports. Washington has promoted noneconomic alternatives, even preferring to deal with the murderous, drug-financed Taleban in Afghanistan rather than talk to Tehran.

There is resentment of the intensity of U.S. efforts to deny arms to Iran, despite Iran's recent history of being invaded by a (Westem-armed) Iraq, and the proximity of a Pakistan with Chinese- supplied missile and nuclear weapon technglogy.