NEGATIVE/ROGUES/IRAQ

WE ARE BETTER OFF WITH AN INSPECTION IMPASSE THAN A NEW INSPECTION SYSTEM IN IRAQ

INSPECTIONS STAND-OFF IS THE BEST POLICY BECAUSE IT STOPS FUTURE WMD DEVELOPMENT

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

Better that the United States embrace an impasse than support half-baked efforts to resolve it. True, a standoff deprives the United States and the world of both a means to further curtail Iraq's existing programs and an on-the-ground monitoring force, but an impasse does quite effectively stop Iraq's future WMD development. The United States can compellingly argue that Iraq is not complying with its U.N.-sanctioned non-proliferation obligations and thus justify the continuation of sanctions. And Iraq, not the United States, clearly remains the recalcitrant party.

A CONTINUED INSPECTIONS IMPASSE IS BETTER THAN FAULTY AFF INSPECTIONS

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

At first blush, such an approach appears duplicitous, but it is actually far less disingenuous than support for or cooperation with enfeebled inspections. Washington would simply demand that if inspections occur, they be effective. If this is impossible -- and today, it is -- a continued impasse is a more honest policy than a flawed compromise.

PROLONGING THE IMPASSE OVER INSPECTIONS IS THE BEST POLICY AT THIS TIME

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

PROLONGING an impasse over inspections is better than the superficially attractive but deeply counterproductive resumption of enfeebled inspections. To be sure, an ideal policy for the United States would involve the return of inspectors. It would combine three elements: lasting sanctions on WMD-related items, intrusive inspections and monitoring comparable to those in UNSCOM's early days, and an international and regional consensus to use force should Iraq violate any agreements. Such an ideal, however, is flatly unattainable. Inspections achieved their earlier successes only because of strong support from the international community. Today, however, Russia is an aggressive advocate of Iraq's cause and a full-throated critic of inspections and sanctions. France and China also oppose all three items of the ideal U.S. policy, and -- except for a handful of traumatized Gulf emirates, especially Kuwait -- the Arab states often hesitate to support U.S. strikes on Iraq. Not surprisingly, then, all the various inspection regimes on the table are not intrusive.

IN TERMS OF INSPECTIONS, NO LOAF IS BETTER THAN HALF A LOAF

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

A watered-down version of inspections, however, is not acceptable. In this case, no loaf is better than half a loaf. If inspectors return to Iraq, Washington will soon find itself in a jam. Saddam may again refuse to cooperate, leaving the United States almost alone in seeking military strikes. Even more dangerous, however, is the possibility that Saddam will cooperate. This would spell not only the end of inspections but also the end of sanctions. Iraq would then be free to reconstitute its WMD programs -- a clear and present danger to the entire Middle East.

CURRENT IMPASSE OVER INSPECTIONS IS THE BEST POLICY FOR NOW -- NOT NEW INSPECTIONS

Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

Ironically, then, an impasse over inspections is actually the best outcome for the United States. As long as Saddam does not let inspectors into the country -- and he has rejected even the suggestion of compromise here -- the United States can plausibly argue that Iraq retains its WMD programs. Saddam, not the United States, appears the villain. Washington can keep sanctions relatively robust and gain support for its campaign to isolate and punish Baghdad. If inspectors return and certify Iraqi "compliance," however, the end of sanctions and Iraq's pariah status cannot be far behind.