NEGATIVE/ROGUES/IRAQ

NEW INSPECTION SYSTEM IN IRAQ WILL FAIL

NEW INSPECTORS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FIND IRAQ'S WMD FACILITIES

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

A new round of inspections would probably not unearth much of Saddam's remaining WMD programs. Unless the international community is willing to significantly ratchet up the pressure on Iraq through tighter sanctions and military strikes, Iraq is not likely to be any more compliant with a new inspection mission. Unfortunately, current international sentiment seeks to ease pressure rather than increase it. Thus inspectors would not have access to sensitive sites in Iraq, and Iraqi officials would resume their deception campaign. Inspectors would probably discover only what Saddam wanted them to, or at best marginally improve the West's knowledge of Iraq's WMD programs, leaving Iraq's existing WMD capabilities untouched.

AFF ASSUMPTIONS FAVORING RETURN OF INSPECTORS ARE FALSE

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

The champions of inspections make three assumptions: that the return of inspectors will lead to the end of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs; that some inspections are better than no inspections; and that an impasse over inspections is unsustainable. All three assumptions are false.

WE MUST LEARN FROM UNSCOM EXPERIENCE BEFORE LAUNCHING IN TO NEW INSPECTIONS REGIME

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

The UNSCOM experience provides a fundamental lesson about successful arms control. Ferreting out a WMD program requires either the cooperation of the state involved or a willingness by the international community to ensure compliance with the relevant agreements, using force as necessary. To no one's surprise, Saddam's Iraq never cooperated. More alarming, the international community was reluctant to use force to back up the inspectors despite Iraq's repeated flouting of U.N. resolutions. As a result, UNSCOM fell short. Iraq "could have an unknowable number of SCUD-type missiles, with sufficient anthrax and VX to cause immense damage," noted Tim Trevan, a former senior adviser to UNSCOM. "This represents an impressive power projection capability in the hands of a regime that has amply shown the political will to use it. That should be enough to scare anyone into action. It scares me."

NEW SERIES OF INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ WILL BE A SHAM

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

The first and most basic hitch is that any renewed inspections regime would be too weak and riddled with loopholes to be effective. The concessions made by Annan restricted inspections tremendously. Unless they are repealed, inspections will be a sham.

INSPECTIONS WILL FAIL BECAUSE OF LACK OF DAY-TO-DAY COOPERATION FROM IRAQ

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

The inspectors' limited effectiveness was and is not due to the composition of UNSCOM itself or any of its likely successors. Indeed, its dedicated staffers and two doughty leaders, Ekeus and Butler, withstood tremendous pressure from Iraq and its allies, sticking to their guns and demanding that Iraq be held accountable for its defiance of the Security Council's will and international law. Rather, the problem is with squaring a circle: having some kind of inspections when the government in question flatly will not cooperate and when the international community will not enforce its own rules. Iraq regularly stopped UNSCOM from acquiring sensitive documents simply by blocking inspectors' access and moving the documents out the back door. Iraq's interference was hardly subtle, and its pretexts for noncompliance were often pathetic. But UNSCOM could do little more than issue firmly worded reports of Iraqi noncompliance; the commission (and its possible replacements) had no stick with which to punish Iraq. Except for the United States and Britain, the major powers would not back the commission up. And as long as there is no significant punishment for defiance, Iraq will not budge. Instead, Baghdad will appeal the decisions of UNSCOM or any successor body to the great powers, effectively neutering it.

EVEN A MORE ROBUST INSPECTION SYSTEM SUFFERS FROM THE SAME PROBLEMS

DANIEL BYMAN, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Foreign Affairs January, 2000 / February, 2000 SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 119 HEADLINE: A Farewell to Arms Inspections // acs-ln-2/4/2000

Second, the long-term outlook would remain bleak even if UNSCOM's successor were more robust. Simply discovering and destroying Iraq's WMD capabilities is not enough to stop Iraq over the long term so long as Iraq can simply rebuild its WMD programs. Given Iraq's impressive engineering and scientific base and its erstwhile (and future) oil wealth, it could quickly rebuild its arsenal if sanctions were lifted as a reward for "cooperating" with inspections.