NEGATIVE/ROGUES/GENERAL

SO-CALLED SMART SANCTIONS WILL FAIL

"SMART SANCTIONS" AGAINST IRAQ ARE NO IMPROVEMENT

Gerald M. Steinberg, Dir. Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University March 2, 2001, The Jerusalem Post SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 1A HEADLINE: Not-so-smart sanctions for Iraq //VT2002acsln

So, instead of working to replace Saddam or keeping Iraq in quarantine until he is finally forced out, the current strategy is to implement "smart sanctions." In this way, we are told, the suffering of the Iraqi people will be relieved, while Saddam will be prevented from adding to his military capabilities.

This certainly sounds good, at least until the details are examined. The problem is that the sanctions that have been in place for many years are already "smart" and "humanitarian." For years, Iraq has been allowed to use its revenues from oil sales to purchase foods and medicine. However, this approach is not consistent with Saddam's objectives. He has used the money to build more huge "presidential monuments" in Baghdad and to rebuild the illegal weapons programs. The Iraqi people remain hostages.

THE LOGIC OF "SMART SANCTIONS IS UNCLEAR AND HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED

ROBERT WALL and DAVID A. FULGHUM March 5, 2001 Aviation Week & Space Technology SECTION: WORLD NEWS ANALYSIS; Vol. 154, No. 10; Pg. 41 HEADLINE: Altering Sanctions May Benefit Iraq's Rearming //VT2002acsln

HOW EASING OVERALL SANCTIONS would allow the U.S. to better control Iraq's weapons program is unclear, though. ''The Iraqis have long experience in end-running export controls,'' noted Charles Duelfer, a scholar at the Center for Security and International Studies and a former deputy director of the U.N. arms inspection team in Iraq. In fact, he indicated that revised sanctions may make it easier for Iraq to accelerate weapons programs.

One of the objectives U.S. policy makers are aiming for is to have the immediate neighbors of Iraq more rigorously enforce the sanctions than has been the case in recent months. But that strategy is unlikely to be successful, Duelfer said. ''The borders are quite porous.''

CHANGE TO SMART SANCTIONS ARE VIEWED AS A CONCESSION BY THE TARGET NATION

Gibson, 1999 (Lt. Col. Susan S., Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Army, Emory International Law Review, Spring)

With all these benefits, one would expect to see far more targeted sanctions and far fewer comprehensive sanctions. In truth, targeted sanctions are much more difficult to implement than comprehensive sanctions. Politically, they lack the dramatic impact of comprehensive sanctions. For decisionmakers who want to show the world that they are taking decisive action, comprehensive sanctions make a much splashier display. For those cases where comprehensive sanctions are already in effect, changing to targeted sanctions can seem like a concession to the target nation.

TARGETED SANCTIONS ARE HARDER TO IMPLEMENT

Gibson, 1999 (Lt. Col. Susan S., Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Army, Emory International Law Review, Spring)

In practice, targeted sanctions require a more sophisticated level of information and planning and often demand greater speed in implementation. Once in place, targeted sanctions require frequent monitoring to assess whether they are hitting their intended targets. Even an initial assessment that the sanctions are accurately aimed could change if the regime elites find a way to evade or adjust to the sanctions. Targeted sanctions may also require greater international cooperation and even changes in national laws, particularly if the goal is to freeze the personal assets of the rulers. Unless every nation is willing to identify and freeze these personal bank accounts, the money will flow to any noncooperating nations. Changes in laws, effective monitoring, and sophisticated information regarding regime elites require greater international efforts and at least moderate resources and financing. In 1995, former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended that the United Nations establish a mechanism to assess the impact of sanctions before they are imposed and to monitor them once they are in place "in order to enable the Security Council to fine-tune them with a view to maximizing their political impact and minimizing collateral damage." This mechanism was needed in 1995; it still is.