NEGATIVE/BIOLOGICAL

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE AN EXAGGERATED THREAT

CBW PROLIFERATION RISKS HAVE DECLINED SINCE THE COLD WAR

ELISA HARRIS, National Security Council, 2000; REPAIRING THE REGIME, "The nature of the threat"// VT2002 acs p. 228-229

Notwithstanding this perception and these developments, one could argue that the CBW proliferation problem has, in fact, declined since the end of the Cold war. There are several points supporting this argument.

First, extraordinary political changes have greatly reduced the dominant CBW threats to U.S. and allied interests. Today, it is virtually inconceivable that Soviet chemical weapons or residual BW capabilities would be deliberately used against U.S. military forces or allies. Instead, the main threat is the theft of weapons or the brain drain of scientists to the Third World. This underscores the importance of US. programs for assisting in chemical weapons destruction in Russia, for helping dismantle former CBW facilities, and for working with the Russians to redirect people to cooperative peaceful purposes.

ANTI-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS AGAINST CBW HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL

ELISA HARRIS, National Security Council, 2000; REPAIRING THE

REGIME, "The nature of the threat" // VT2002 acs p. 229

Third, export control efforts, interdiction efforts, and sanction policies are informed by increasingly better intelligence on proliferation programs. These have helped slow down and, in some cases, limit proliferators' CBW capabilities. Export controls cannot stop a determined proliferator, but export controls and interdiction efforts are having a major effect on some of the proliferation programs of concern.

Successes in this area are often classified because of the sensitivity of intelligence; however, John Gannon, the head of the National Intelligence Council, said at a recent conference that preventing Libya from obtaining needed chemicals and equipment and technical expertise has set back the Libyan CW program by some ten years. This example is one of the successes of export controls and interdiction efforts being targeted by an increasingly more robust body of intelligence information.

THE CBW THREAT HAS BEEN MITIGATED EVEN IF IT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY ELIMINATED

ELISA HARRIS, National Security Council, 2000; REPAIRING THE: REGIME, "The nature of the threat" // VT2002 acs p. 230

There is clearly a CBW proliferation problem. But because of a combination of forces-some beyond our control, like political change in the Soviet Union and in South Africa, others arising from policies consciously pursued by the US. government on the military side, export controls, intelligence, interdiction, arms controlthe CBW proliferation threat has been mitigated. Not eliminated, but mitigated since the end of the Cold War.

USA IS BETTER ABLE TO DEAL WITH CBW THREATS NOW

ELISA HARRIS, National Security Council, 2000; REPAIRING THE REGIME, "The nature of the threat" // VT2002 acs p. 229

Second, U.S. military capabilities for dealing with CBW threats have increased as well. The United States today has an unsurpassed conventional military force structure. The United States is investing in tactical missile defenses against CBW threats and is giving increased and much-needed attention to passive defenses, measures aimed at detecting and protecting troops from these weapons' effects.

Although still vulnerable, the United States is clearly better positioned today to operate in a chemical or biological environment than any other force around the world. These military capabilities, the conventional, and the passive and active defense clearly must affect an adversary's calculation as to whether or not to use CBW against U.S forces.

THE CWC HAS ACTED TO HALT CBW PROLIFERATION

ELISA HARRIS, National Security Council, 2000; REPAIRING THE REGIME, "The nature of the threat" // VT2002 acs p. 229

A fourth reason why one could argue that the CBW threat is less today is arms control efforts such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC has helped cap the bulk of the theoretical CW proliferation problem by legally binding countries not to acquire chemical weapons. Today there are 126 state parties to the CWC.

The CWC has also begun to help roll back CW proliferation programs. South Korea and India are two very good examples. Both countries were not publicly identified or acknowledged as chemical weapons proliferators. Both have acknowledged the development, production, and possession of chemical weapons; these programs are in the process of being dismantled under the CWC.

The CWC is giving the United States and the international community new tools for dealing with CW proliferation threats and for things like challenge inspections. Under this treaty, the United States has an opportunity to pursue CW program concerns in countries like Iran.