DETERRENCE/DETERRENCE FAILS

MODERN UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS CANNOT BE DETERRED

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT USEFUL AS A RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND WILL NOT BE USED THAT WAY

No nuclear weapon state has been or is prepared to declare as a matter of national policy that it would respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons with nuclear weapons. The solution to these concerns lies in the strengthening and effective implementation of and universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention, with particular emphasis on early detection of untoward developments. The response to any violation should be a multilateral one.

SOME MODERN THREATS ARE "UNDETERRABLE"

PAUL MANN January 22, 2001 Aviation Week & Space Technology SECTION: WASHINGTON IN TRANSITION; Vol. 154, No. 4; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Bush Team Rethinks Strategic Doctrine //VT2002acsln

Rumsfeld concedes that even the ''full-spectrum'' deterrence he champions has its limits, rooted in the two central characteristics of 21st century WMD threats: their inexhaustible multiplicity and their Delphic complexity. Nuclear, biological, chemical and cyber attacks can be brewed in endless variety, over immense expanses of the globe, and easily escape detection.

U.S. military intelligence characterizes the phenomenon as ''undeterrable threats.'' The term refers to individuals or groups possessed with the absolute conviction that they have nothing to lose. They are therefore impervious to classical deterrence because they have nothing of value that the U.S. can hold at risk.

Rumsfeld alluded to this in his Senate testimony, when he stated, ''I don't know that I really understand what deters people today.''

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DON'T DETER CBWs

Goodpaster Committee, for the project on eliminating weapons of mass destruction, 1997; The Washington Quarterly, summer, "Nuclear wars in the post cold war world" //ML

U.S. policy must address these new threats. However, a declaratory role for U.S. nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological attacks, as some have suggested, would be of marginal military utility and any potential gain would be outweighed by the negative effects on U.S. nonproliferation efforts. We take this position for four reasons:

First, despite claims to the contrary, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons against chemical or biological threats has neither been proven nor refuted by firm evidence. Many have already concluded that Iraq was deterred from using biological or chemical weapons during the Persian Gulf War because of an ambiguous nuclear threat from thenPresident George Bush. No one knows this for certain, however.

Second, where a biological or chemical threat is present, the United States may benefit from the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons even without a declaratory commitment to the nuclear option. This is not to suggest that the United States should shift to a policy of implicit-but not explicit -- reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons as a response to a chemical or biological attack. Such a policy would win few concessions from potential proliferators and might create dangerous misunderstandings.