SOLVENCY: STATUS QUO POLICIES ASSURE SECURITY BETTER THAN NMD

DIPLOMACY DESTROYS FAR MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE EVER WILL

These are not the fancy dreams of idealists. Far more missiles have been destroyed through diplomacy in recent years than any missile defense system could ever hope to intercept. For example, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty brought the destruction of hundreds of US and Soviet surface-to-surface ballistic missiles of 500 to 5,000-kilometer range. START I has brought destruction of hundreds of Soviet missiles deployed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and START II will bring destruction of the entire class of SS-18 heavy Russian missiles.

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANY NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM WILL EVER BE

No treaty is one hundred percent effective or verifiable. However, under the START Treaties, Russia will retire and dismantle 6,600 strategic delivery vehicles, down from 8,500 today. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia will destroy 40,000 metric tons of poison gas. Furthermore, when the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated in 1968, it was predicted that at least 25 nations would develop nuclear weapons. Currently, only eight nations possess nuclear weapons (U.S., Russia, China, Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan and Israel), three more than in 1968. Compare this to the success rate of the Patriot Missile in the 1991 Gulf War, less than 10 percent. Based on the historical evidence, arms control provides a far more effective means to destroy weapons of mass destruction than could be hoped of any missile defense system.

IT WOULD BE MORE COST EFFECTIVE TO SPEND MONEY ON PROGRAMS TO REDUCE THE MOST URGENT PROLIFERATION THREATS.

It would be more cost effective to spend money on programs to reduce the most urgent proliferation threats.

Cost-effective anti-proliferation programs include assisting the dismantlement of Russian warheads, making weapons-usable fissile material in the former Soviet republics more secure, strengthening the IAEA, and improving verification techniques.

THE QUEST FOR AN "ASTRODOME" DEFENSE OF THIS COUNTRY IS A QUEST FOR A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM MORE LIKELY TO BE SOLVED BY DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL MEANS.

This "Maginot Line" complex has led to costly failure more than once in the past. Very practical solutions include the Nunn-Lugar program, which has provided support for the deactivation of 4,700 nuclear former Soviet warheads from deployment and the START I and II agreements, which, if ratified, would result in the retirement of more than 5,000 additional nuclear warheads.

CTBT AND THE ABM TREATY WILL STOP MORE MISSILES THAN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE EVER WILL

FRIDA BERRIGAN , research associate at the World Policy Institute. The New York Times

September 4, 1999, SECTION: Section A; Page 12HEADLINE: Ending Weapon Spread // lnu-acs

The Democrats should be congratulated for their strong support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (front page, Aug. 30). What Senator Jesse Helms and other Senate Republicans fail to realize is that the treaty is a far more reliable defense than any missile defense scheme yet to be tried.

While Mr. Helms is holding the treaty hostage until hearings are held on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the United States is jeopardizing its ability to stop the development of nuclear weapons.

THERE ARE FAR BETTER AND EASIER WAYS TO COMBAT THE THREAT OF SO-CALLED "ROGUE STATES" THAN MISSILE DEFENSE

David E. Leventhal The Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 1999, SECTION: OPINION; READER'S WRITE; Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Alternatives to a national missile-defense system // acs-ln-11-19-99

In "Forcing a rethink of global security," the writer refers to the prevalent claim that building a national missile-defense shield "is considered the only way to counter rogue states." Here are two other ways: 1. The global monitoring system of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Senate just voted down, can catch rogues being roguish. 2. Cooperative US-Russia weapons security projects, which Congress is reluctant to fund, can inhibit rogue purchase or theft of weapons systems from the crumbling Rus-sian weapons establishment. Building a missile-defense shield appears to be an illogical choice. It is technically problematical, very expensive, reactive, conflictive, and inimical to nuclear arms control. The two alternative measures are technically feasible, relatively inexpensive, proactive, cooperative, and supportive of nuclear arms control.

AN INFORMATION-BASED DEFENSE WOULD BE BETTER THAN A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Ben Sheppard, Jane's Sentinel editor, The study of ballistic

missile proliferation formed part of his MSc in Strategic Studies. Jane's Intelligence Review October 1, 1999 HEADLINE: Ballistic missile proliferation: a flight of fantasy or fear? // ln-10/99-acs

Successful measures to counter the SSM threat are not simply about developing missile defence systems and strategies to destroy fixed and mobile missile launchers on the ground. For a fraction of the cost of developing necessary missile defence systems, Western nations can formulate a highly effective information campaign that could make the difference as to whether they could protect their allies and interests abroad or be forced to capitulate. It is time the West already had in place contingency plans on how to respond if faced with such a threat. In an age where public support for military operations is ever more important, failure to do so could have far-reaching consequences for the ability of the West to conduct large-scale power projection operations in the future.

NMD MAKES IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR GREAT POWERS TO MANAGE CONFLICTS ALL OVER THE WORLD

PAUL MANN January 22, 2001 Aviation Week & Space Technology SECTION: WASHINGTON IN TRANSITION; Vol. 154, No. 4; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Bush Team Rethinks Strategic Doctrine //VT2002acsln

The Russian government does share the U.S. assessment that the post-Cold War world has become less stable through regional conflicts, separatism, inter-ethnic strife, terrorism and organized crime. But the world community can meet these threats successfully ''only when international relations, first of all among the nuclear powers, become stable and predictable,'' insists Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov. If the ABM Treaty unravels, the deterrent influence of non-proliferation as a whole will suffer, he wrote last fall in Foreign Affairs.

THAT WOULD LEAVE THE GREAT powers with even less clout to bring to bear on ''problem'' countries, Ivanov insists. ''Indeed, greater global and regional instability would basically encourage arms races, including the use of technologies that are still only hypothetical. Military experts warn of the danger of 'suitcase' delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, which can be stealthily transported to other countries, without the risk of retribution for terrorists, or the need to penetrate missile defenses.''

IT IS BETTER TO MAKE PEACE WITH NORTH KOREA THAN TO BUILD A MISSILE DEFENSE AGAINST THEM

For example, diplomatic negotiation can block weapons development and thus provide further insurance against failure of deterrence. In return for relaxation of its international isolation, North Korea was willing to relinquish a reactor program that would have produced weapons-usable plutonium. Outside money also played a role in North Korea's decision; it is cheaper for a consortium of countries to finance substitute reactors and fuel oil for North Korea than to build missile defenses to cope with possible North Korean nuclear weapons.