FEASIBILITY: COUNTERMEASURES AND DECOYS FOIL NMD

DECOYS EASILY DECEIVE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

JONATHAN F. REICHERT, Ph.D., is president of TeachSpin Inc., The Buffalo News

May 2, 1999, SECTION: VIEWPOINTS, Pg. 1H HEADLINE: STAR WARS REVISITED;

U.S. STILL PURSUING A TECHNOLOGICAL MIRACLE TO PROTECT IT FROM;

HARM.THERE'S JUST ONE PROBLEM -- IT WON'T WORK // lnu-acs

A few hundred are easily carried in a rocket, and in the low-density upper atmosphere, they have the same ballistic trajectory as a real bomb. Modern radar-absorbing materials surrounding the bomb could make the missile stealth.

USE OF DECOYS MEANS REAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS WILL PENETRATE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) March 29, 1999, SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 12A HEADLINE: Star Wars lite; Missile defense would be costly mistake // lnu-acs

     If a cooperative enemy launched decoy-free ICBMs, U.S. countermeasures would still have to be 100 percent successful. The prospect of "only" one or two nuclear warheads getting through is not reassuring. Nor is the success rate of high-altitude tests _ less than 20 percent.

CYBER WAR WILL MAKE NMD USELESS

JAMES ADAMS, National Security Agency Advisory Board, May, 2001 / June, 2001 Foreign Affairs SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 98 HEADLINE: Virtual Defense //VT2002acsln

Destructive as it is, Moonlight Maze is just a taste of dangers to come. U.S. military leaders increasingly recognize that losing information battles will undermine the country's ability to fight any battles at all. Missile defense, for example, will not be worth the billions it will cost if digital attacks undermine its software or infrastructure. And opponents of missile defense could handicap the system at the development stage by attacking the technology at its source -- breaking into the computer networks of the corporations that design the system and making slight modifications that ensure huge costs and long delays.

EASILY USED DECOYS MEAN FAST DEVELOPMENT OF NMD IS A RUSH TO FAILURE

Jack Ruina March 04, 2001, The Washington Post SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. B03 HEADLINE: 46 Years, No Winners. Aim Elsewhere //VT2002acsln

Thus, an attack by even a small power could succeed by including a number of simple but varied decoys to mimic the real warhead, which also could be disguised. The interceptor would have only moments to discriminate and to destroy the real warhead within this swarm of confusing objects.

Recognition of such problems led a 1998 Defense Department panel, chaired by a former Air Force chief of staff, to characterize the NMD program as a "rush to failure." Today, the rush continues, and the program's failure to meet its goal is more apparent, as demonstrated by recent NMD intercept technology field test failures.

EASY AND INEXPENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES RENDER MISSILE DEFENSES USELESS

Janadas Devan The Straits Times (Singapore), October 31, 1999, SECTION: Review Focus shield"; Pg. 41 HEADLINE: So many possible holes // ln-acs-11-11-99

These are all fairly expensive counter-measures. Cheaper ways to fool sensors include releasing dozens of replica decoys which resemble actual warheads; making actual warheads look like decoys; wrapping warheads in metal-coated Mylar balloons to reflect radar beams; and releasing a number of empty balloons equipped with small heaters to confuse the infrared sensors of kill vehicles.

Warheads can also be covered with radar-absorbing materials; shaped to reflect less radar energy; or be encased in a shroud and cooled by liquid nitrogen.

The infrared signal radiated by a shrouded warhead would be so little, the warhead would be all but invisible until it was within a few hundred metres of the interceptor.

MISSILE DEFENSE COUNTERMEASURES COME IN A WIDE VARIETY OF MODES

Janadas Devan The Straits Times (Singapore), October 31, 1999, SECTION: Review Focus shield"; Pg. 41 HEADLINE: So many possible holes // ln-acs-11-11-99

MIT scientists writing in Scientific American list these and other counter-measures:

* Surround warhead with thousands of tiny radar-reflecting wires called chaff;

* Disguise warhead among debris from exploded booster rockets to jam radars;

* Lead attack with nuclear explosions to blind infrared detectors;

* Attack missile-tracking satellites and coastal radars;

* Add thrusters to warhead to enable manoeuvres; and

* Launch low-flying cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles from ships.

COUNTERMEASURES ARE THE LOGICAL RESPONSE NATIONS WILL MAKE TO NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

Greg Seigle, JDW Staff Reporter, Jane's Defence Weekly, September 15, 1999 HEADLINE: CIA warns on 'rogue' nations' missiles moves // ln-10/99-acs

Defence analysts say it is logical that nations building ICBMs would also include decoys that make them difficult to shoot down. "If they put all their effort into building missiles, they presumably would want to make them effective," said David Wright, a scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "It's quite clear you can make simple yet effective counter-measures for ICBMs."