FEASIBILITY: NMD FAILS TO STOP A "ROGUE" ATTACK
100 GROUND BASED INTERCEPTORS WILL BE INSUFFICIENT FOR PROTECTION FROM LIMITED BUT SEQUENCED ATTACK
Joseph Cirincione is the Director of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project. March 30, 1999 , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
NON-PROLIFERATION Missile Defense Failures Offer Lessons http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/brief27.htm//ACSEven if a NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE system worked as planned, a system of 100 ground-based interceptors with space-based sensor satellites will be very limited. Deputy Secretary of Defense John White reported to Congress in June 1996:
"If the number of threats increases or the complexity of the threats increases then this basic system is likely to provide poor protection of the U.S. This poor protection is due partly to a lack of sufficient discrimination capability against complex threats, which will cause the interceptor inventory to be depleted by shooting at warhead decoys, allowing some real warheads to penetrate the defense"
NMD FAILS TO STOP ROGUE USE OF WMD
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, April 3, 2001: Editorial; Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Cooperating with Russia best buy in nuclear safety //VT2002acsln
And of course, missile defense can do nothing at all about rogue entities who try to buy up Russia's impoverished nuclear scientists or pilfer plutonium or bomb-making equipment.
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM HAS ONLY SEVEN MINUTES TO STOP A NORTH KOREAN MISSILE ATTACK ON SAN FRANCISCO
Janadas Devan The Straits Times (Singapore), October 31, 1999 SECTION: Review Focus; Pg. 41 HEADLINE: Big "ifs' put doubts in missile shield // ln-acs-11-11-99
By the time such interceptors can be launched, the hypothetical Korean missile will be just 15 minutes from San Francisco and if all goes well destroyed six to seven minutes later.