FEASIBILITY: RUSHING NOW GIVES US AN INFERIOR SYSTEM LATER

RUSHING TO A WEAK NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM NOW WILL STOP US FROM USING A BETTER ONE LATER

"Choosing a system now will limit our options to build a better system that is better matched to the threat. Choosing a system now will limit our options to build a better system that is better matched to the threat. In this case, the choice is between building an advanced system to defeat an actual threat, versus a less capable system to defeat a hypothetical threat."

"Think of this problem in terms of buying a personal computer for college. If you had ordered your computer as a high-school sophomore, it would have been obsolete by the time you started college. It would lack the capabilities you now need and would be impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to upgrade."

Defense Secretary William Perry - April 25, 1996

A HUGE INVESTMENT NOW IN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE MAY WELL SADDLE THE U.S. WITH OBSOLETE TECHNOLOGY AND AN INADEQUATE SYSTEM FOR THE FUTURE.

Rapid advances are only now occurring in information technologies critical to ballistic missile defense. Otherwise, the U.S. may repeat the extravagant deployment in the 1970's of a Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which cost $26 billion (in fiscal 1995 dollars) to develop and deploy that was taken off line immediately after deployment.

RUSHING AN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM NOW WOULD SADDLE THE USA WITH AN OBSOLETE SYSTEM

Deciding to deploy a national missile defense system now would saddle the United States with a system which would likely become obsolete in the near future. The Administration's "3 + 3" program's testing schedule was deemed "too aggressive" by the recent Welch Panel. Typically new military programs take on average seven to ten years in the test phase before deployment.

FAST DEPLOYMENT DOES MORE HARM THAN GOOD, BETTER TO WAIT FOR BETTER TECHNOLOGY AND RENEGOTIATION OF THE ABM TREATY

James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution. The New York Times November 26, 1999, SECTION: Section A; Page 43; HEADLINE: A Missile Shield Could Backfire //acs-ln-12-22-99

The idea is sound, but a politically motivated rush to carry it out could do more harm than good. The technology for a missile shield isn't ready, and there's another, larger problem: Building it too fast risks damaging our relationship with Russia and could fuel nationalist fervor just as a Russian presidential election approaches.

TRYING TO DEPLOY TOO EARLY DEGRADES OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

ANN ROOSEVELT BMD Monitor November 26, 1999 HEADLINE: NMD Review Offers Concerns, Praises //acs-ln-12-22-99

The panel also found program guidance still requires allowing for an emergency deployment in 2003, which will be "difficult to convert to realistic program actions." This could lead to an "emphasis on near- term deployment readiness at the expense of properly completing the development activities needed for a system that meets the stated operational need."

EARLY DEPLOYMENT MEANS A WEAK SYSTEM AND A SECURITY DISASTER

The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY.) February 18, 2000, SECTION: FORUM Pg.10a HEADLINE: EDITORIAL; Playing defense // ACS-LN

But a system rushed into the field without adequate testing will neither reassure Americans nor deter our enemies.

The deployment decision should be put off until we've got something reliable to be deployed.

BEST DECISION IS TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER TECHNOLOGY IS PROVEN

Los Angeles Times February 18, 2000, SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; HEADLINE: MISSILE DECISION: GO SLOW // ACS-LN

An election year isn't the ideal time to decide on a project as momentous as NMD. Recognizing this, some Republicans have wisely urged delay. Others threaten to politically beat up Clinton and Vice President Al Gore if deployment isn't approved. The prudent course in deciding clearly is to wait until NMD's effectiveness is demonstrated. A flawed system that wouldn't protect Americans or dissuade aggressors would only be a costly sham.