FEASIBILITY: TECHNICAL PROBLEMS PREVENT NMD DEPLOYMENT

BUSH CANNOT BE ABLE TO DEPLOY NMD QUICKLY BECAUSE OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

Simon Tisdall January 13, 2001 The Guardian (London) SECTION: Guardian Home Pages, Pg. 3 HEADLINE: US Military expansion: Fear of attack triggers arms build-up: Rogue states identified in attempt to boost spending //VT2002acsln

But given the mounting pressure from Republican hawks and from within his own cabinet, Mr Bush is considered unlikely to back away from his vow to deploy an expanded version of NMD as soon as technical problems have been resolved. The repeated failure of NMD test firings last year persuaded Mr Clinton to leave a decision to his successor.

IT IS NOT WORTH RUSHING INTO DEPLOYMENT IF THE TECH ISN'T READY AND THE RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS ARE INCOMPLETE

The New York Times, February 17, 2000, SECTION: Section A; Page 28; HEADLINE: Forced Dash to a Missile Defense // acs-ln

But a weapons system this complex must go through long and rigorous testing before engineers can be sure it will reliably shield American cities from enemy missile attack. Until that standard has been met, a decision to begin construction of the proposed $27 billion missile system would be premature, and not worth the risk of imperiling nuclear arms control treaties with Russia.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAMS ARE IN A RUSH TO FAILURE

Editorials; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution July 8, 1999, SECTION: Editorial; Pg. 18A HEADLINE: Missile defense a costly fantasy // lnu-acs

Most knowledgeable scientists outside the companies being paid to develop the system say it is unworkable with current technology, or with any technology conceivable in the next decade. In the assessment of a panel headed by Gen. Larry Welch, the former Air Force chief of staff, the U.S. missile-defense program has been engaged in ''a rush to failure.''

WE COULD DEPLOY AN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM NOW, BUT IT WOULD NOT WORK

If the political will was present, the United States could deploy a ballistic missile system now. Proponents of deploying a national missile defense system argue that the only impediment to deploying a national missile defense system is the ABM Treaty; if the political will to circumvent or abandon the Treaty existed, the US could deploy a national missile defense system. It is true that the United States could deploy a national missile defense system, but it would not work. Current missile defense programs have been plagued with test failures, cost overruns and technical difficulties. Indeed, missile defense is the equivalent of "hitting a bullet with a bullet in space," to quote BMDO director General Lester Lyles. Deploying a national missile defense system now would actually increase U.S. vulnerability to a ballistic missile attack, because Russia and China would refuse to scale back their nuclear arsenals, and would perceive themselves more vulnerable to a potential US attack.

RUSHING INTO NMD IS THE WRONG APPROACH

Samuel R. Berger, President Clinton's national security adviser, February 13, 2001, The Washington Post SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. A21 HEADLINE: Is This Shield Necessary? //VT2002acsln

Without question we need to broaden America's defenses against weapons of mass destruction. But plunging ahead with missile defense deployment before critical questions are answered is looking through the telescope from the wrong end: from the perspective of bureaucratically driven technology rather than that of the greatest vulnerabilities of the American people.

EARLY DEPLOYMENT WILL PRODUCE AN INEFFECTIVE SYSTEM -- A RUSH TO FAILURE

James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution. The New York Times November 26, 1999, SECTION: Section A; Page 43; HEADLINE: A Missile Shield Could Backfire //acs-ln-12-22-99

Despite its political appeal, a spring 2000 decision to build such a shield makes little sense technologically. Earlier this fall, the Pentagon successfully maneuvered a missile to strike and destroy a target warhead. But only 3 of a planned 19 tests are to be complete by next spring. Some technology for the system has yet to be developed, requiring tests to use jury-rigged rockets, and the program is short of parts. In 1998, a panel of defense experts headed by Larry D. Welch, a former Air Force chief of staff, described the compressed development schedule as a technological "rush to failure." It reiterated that conclusion several weeks ago.

EARLY DEPLOYMENT DECISION WILL BE A "RUSH TO FAILURE"

ANN ROOSEVELT BMD Monitor November 26, 1999 HEADLINE: NMD Review Offers Concerns, Praises //acs-ln-12-22-99

A reexamination of the NMD program completed this fall offers praise for various aspects, such as the Lead System Integrator (LSI) Boeing, and also offers concerns over such things as schedule slippages that could compress an already tightly compressed program further.

The 12 member National Missile Defense Review panel was chaired by retired Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Larry Welch and included retired Army Lt. Gen. Donald Lionetti, former head of Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

Previously, The Panel on Reducing Risk in BMD Flight Test Programs, also chaired by Welch, issued a report in February 1998, warning against a "rush to failure" in programs such as Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Theater Wide and NMD.