ANSWERS: NMD DEPLOYMENT WILL IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

EUROPE CAN SEE NMD AS PART OF A NEW ARMS CONTROL REGIME

JAMES RUBIN, US assistant secretary of state between 1997-2000, now lecturing at the London School of Economics, February 6, 2001, Financial Times (London) SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS;Pg. 23 HEADLINE: COMMENT & ANALYSIS: A deal on missile defence: George Bush can build a consensus that protects the world against weapons of mass destruction, says James Rubin: //VT2002acsln

Europeans should be encouraged to see missile defences as one of a series of tools necessary in the new nuclear age, where the threat comes not from a US-Soviet arms race but from other sources. Missile defences in conjunction with arms control treaties, denial of technology, sanctions, and if necessary the use of military force, are an important component of an effective non-proliferation strategy. Only by participating in NMD can European governments move beyond outdated cold war thinking and help shape an international consensus that provides for defences and controls on arms proliferation.

That said, Europeans are right to worry about the effect of NMD on Russia. The Bush administration should propose a bold package deal. In return for substantial changes in the ABM Treaty that would allow for both sea-based and land-based defences, Washington would cut its strategic nuclear forces to perhaps 1,000 warheads from the current 6,000.

NMD WILL NOT MAKE THE USA A LESS DEPENDABLE ALLY FOR EUROPE

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May, 2001 / June, 2001 Foreign Affairs SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 35 HEADLINE: The False Crisis Over the Atlantic //VT2002acsln

Even more erroneous is the European argument that if an effective NMD is deployed, a more secure United States will become a less dependable ally. In fact, a more secure United States will likely prove an even stronger ally -- because it will be even more willing to counter aggression or end oppression if its troops and territory are shielded from harm.

EUROPEANS WOULD FAVOR A SEA BASED NMD SYSTEM

JAMES RUBIN, US assistant secretary of state between 1997-2000, now lecturing at the London School of Economics, February 6, 2001, Financial Times (London) SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS;Pg. 23 HEADLINE: COMMENT & ANALYSIS: A deal on missile defence: George Bush can build a consensus that protects the world against weapons of mass destruction, says James Rubin: //VT2002acsln

At home, the administration should change the NMD programme to include more promising sea-based technologies that can destroy missiles shortly after launch rather than focusing exclusively on the much more difficult task of land-based defences that must pick a warhead out of the sky in mid-flight. Such technology is available but has been avoided because even its development and testing would violate the ABM Treaty. For European countries, a key advantage of sea-based systems is that they could be deployed near North Korea, Iran and Iraq and provide global protection for both the US and its allies.

USA JUSTIFIABLY FEELS A UNIQUE THREAT FROM MISSILES WHICH EUROPE DOES NOT

JUSTIN BERNIER, Quadrennial Defense Review, Working Group at the National Defense University in Washington February 2, 2001, Los Angeles Times SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 9; Op Ed Desk HEADLINE: COMMENTARY; TAKE THE MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE TO A HIGHER LEVEL //VT2002acsln

Missing from the European's argument, however, will be recognition of a central truth--indeed, the driving force behind the American plan: that the U.S., because of its security commitments abroad, could face more dire consequences than the Europeans if North Korea, Iran or Iraq gain the ability to hit the U.S. homeland with weapons of mass destruction. These rogue states (now officially "states of concern") continue to pursue nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Having undoubtedly drawn lessons from the Gulf War, they understand that the conventionally superior U.S. must be kept out of their future regional conflicts if they are to achieve their aggressor goals. A minimal nuclear deterrent, which could be brandished in a crisis, might make the next Saddam Hussein think, however incorrectly, that he could attack his neighbors, perhaps even U.S. allies, without risking interference by American forces.

Our European allies, on the other hand, do not share this strategic situation and, consequently, have not made national missile defense a priority. They have no commitment on the Korean Peninsula and--except for Britain's contribution to the "no-fly zones" over Iraq--no significant military commitment in the Middle East. Although their contributions to peacekeeping missions are admirable and noteworthy, such missions, for which the European Union is now planning its independent rapid-reaction force, will probably not put the European continent in danger of missile attacks.