ANSWERS: NMD REDUCES ARMS RACES AND ENHANCES ARMS CONTROL

NMD CAN HELP END THE ARMS RACE AND PROMOTE LESS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

JAMES RUBIN, US assistant secretary of state between 1997-2000, now lecturing at the London School of Economics, February 6, 2001, Financial Times (London) SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS;Pg. 23 HEADLINE: COMMENT & ANALYSIS: A deal on missile defence: George Bush can build a consensus that protects the world against weapons of mass destruction, says James Rubin: //VT2002acsln

Additional measures may be required to deal with continuing concerns from China. But an approach along these lines would go a long way to building a new nuclear consensus. Instead of relaunching an arms race, NMD could help end that arms race, and more importantly, prepare the world to fight the very real threat of nuclear proliferation.

NMD CAN BE IMPLEMENTED AS PART OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL BARGAIN

On the other hand, with careful diplomacy and the "humility" George W. Bush has promised in foreign affairs, NMD could be made part of a grand bargain to establish a new international consensus that protects the world against the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.

FORECASTS OF AN NMD-INSPIRED ARMS RACE ARE INCORRECT

BAKER SPRING, Research Fellow The Heritage Foundation, July 13, 2000 MYTHS ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ARMS RACE No. 1385 http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1385.html //VT2002acsln

Nevertheless, arms control advocacy groups today are trying to recycle the old argument that building a national missile defense system will set off an "offensive-defensive arms race." They assert that Russia, China, and even Third World countries will expand and modernize their strategic offensive forces to overcome a U.S. missile defense system.

These arguments are as seriously flawed as the ones put forth during the Cold War. They fail to account properly for the nature of the threat and for the future capabilities of America's defenses. Russia's economic circumstances are likely to result in a reduction in its strategic nuclear arsenal regardless of whether the United States has deployed an NMD; Beijing has been modernizing and expanding its forces for years; and boost-phase interceptors that destroy missiles before their warheads and decoys can be released will deter Third World states from upgrading their missiles to fool America's defenses.

NMD WILL GIVE RISE TO DIPLOMATIC OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BAKER SPRING, Research Fellow The Heritage Foundation, July 13, 2000 MYTHS ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ARMS RACE No. 1385 http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1385.html //VT2002acsln

This is not to say that diplomacy and arms control have no role to play. The United States should seek to engage Russia on the missile defense issue by reviving the 1993 Defense and Space Talks. The Clinton Administration terminated these negotiations, which sought a treaty to facilitate a cooperative transition to the deployment of missile defense system. The United States should continue to encourage Russia to ratify START II and participate in the START III negotiations.

If these efforts at arms control prove successful and a robust U.S. missile defense system has been deployed, the result will be an 85 percent reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the United States. Such a development would be welcomed by both sides of the political spectrum.

AS NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS SPREAD MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WILL AS WELL

JEROME SLATER is a professor of political science at Univ Buffalo, .The Buffalo News

May 19, 1999, SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE, Pg. 2B HEADLINE: U.S. MUST STRIVE TO DEVELOP SOUND NUCLEAR-DEFENSE SYSTEM // lnu-acs

The weakest part of Reichert's argument is his insistence that the deployment of defensive systems would end the effort to reduce offensive systems. In fact, the opposite is the case: a properly structured, multilaterally negotiated defensive system would be a key component in any global arms-control system.

MISSILE DEFENSE WILL PROMOTE ARMS CONTROL

BAKER SPRING, Research Fellow The Heritage Foundation, July 13, 2000 MYTHS ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ARMS RACE No. 1385 http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1385.html //VT2002acsln

The fact that mounting a missile defense would help to limit offensive forces should lead arms control advocates to reconsider their opposition to missile defense. Prior to last month's summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia proposed lowering the START III ceiling from between 2,000 and 2,500 deployed warheads to 1,500 warheads each. The media indicated that the U.S. military objected to the Russian proposal because no internal review indicated that U.S. war plans could be executed with fewer than 2,000 warheads. 25 However, if robust missile defenses were in place, it is likely that an internal review would confirm that the U.S. military could indeed execute its strategic war plans with fewer than 1,500 warheads.

THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE MISSILE DEFENSE DURING THE COLD WAR DROVE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

BAKER SPRING, Research Fellow The Heritage Foundation, July 13, 2000 MYTHS ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ARMS RACE No. 1385 http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1385.html //VT2002acsln

Advocates of arms control often contend that America should not deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system because it will inevitably end in a strategic nuclear arms race, a competitive cycle of offensive and defensive missile deployments that will drive the overall level of nuclear armaments ever higher. In 1972, this fear led the United States to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union to prohibit either superpower from deploying territorial defenses.

Instead of deterring an arms buildup, the ABM Treaty encouraged the Soviet Union to increase its offensive nuclear force. The Soviets viewed Washington's decision to forego missile defense as an invitation to seek a first-strike capability. 1 The Soviet arsenal of deliverable strategic warheads grew from roughly 2,000 in 1972 to 12,000 in 1990. 2 The United States was forced to follow suit to ensure the survivability of its retaliatory forces. Thus, the lack of ballistic missile defenses during the Cold War resulted in a strategic nuclear arms race.