AFF/ROGUE STATES/SANCTIONS
SANCTIONS POLICY OF THE STATUS QUO FAILS
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ONLY WORK WHEN MANY NATIONS SUPPORT THEM
RICHARD FOSTER Milwaukee Journal Sentinel February 25, 2001 SECTION: CROSSROADS; Pg. 01J HEADLINE: Past time for a new policy to handle Iraq //VT2002acsln
Even the most superficial review of economic embargoes quickly yields the fact that they work, in the rare times when they work at all, only when many nations support them. And the sad but undeniable fact is that almost nobody, in the Middle East or in Europe, is willing to support U.S. efforts to isolate Iraq. That being the case, there is no way "to make the sanctions work."
SANCTIONS DO NOT DISLODGE DICTATORS
Holger Jensen February 8, 2000, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, SECTION: Local; Ed. Final; Pg. 26A HEADLINE: TYRANTS FATTEN ON SANCTIONS WHILE SUBJECTS SLOWLY STARVE // acs-ln-02-10-2000
Sanctions cannot dislodge dictators.
TRYING TO STOP NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THROUGH SANCTIONS WILL FAIL
Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, October 19, 1999, SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 8 HEADLINE: The missile-defense imperative // ln-10-29-99-acs
Even if the West were more serious about blocking the flow of technical assistance to rogue states - most notably by Russian entities to Iran's missile program - it is a matter of time before non-proliferation efforts are overcome by nations that make development of such weapons a national priority of the highest order.
BUYING TIME WITH ROGUE STATES BASED ON STICKS AND CARROTS (SANCTIONS AND ASSISTANCE) IS PREVENTING MORE EFFECTIVE POLICIES FROM BEING ADOPTED
Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, October 19, 1999, SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 8 HEADLINE: The missile-defense imperative // ln-10-29-99-acs
Concerning Iran, North Korea, and Iraq, the US strategy amounts to buying time with a largely inadequate basket of financial carrots and sticks. In the meantime, a Cold War-induced atrophy still constricts the two most important elements of a potential strategy: democratization and defense.
INDIA PROLIFERATED EVEN IN THE FACE OF SANCTIONS
Naresh Chandra; India's ambassador to the United States, The San Diego Union-Tribune April 04, 1999, Pg. G-5 //lnu-acs
Q: India's decision to test its nuclear weapons and to break the non- proliferation taboo threw a very severe chill on U.S.-Indian relations. There were some economic sanctions that were imposed automatically by American law. What is the state of U.S.-Indian relations today?
A: It's much improved. Much of the reaction actually was anticipated in the sense that we knew the provisions of the nuclear non-proliferation act. And to the extent sanctions were imposed, we knew they had to be imposed.
SANCTIONS REFORM ACT PREVENTS EFFECTIVENES OF LONG-TERM SANCTIONS
Jesse Helms; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Affairs January, 1999 / February, 1999; Pg. 2 HEADLINE: What Sanctions Epidemic?; U.S. Business' Curious Crusade //lnu-acs
The Sanctions Reform Act would also impose a mandatory two-year "sunset" on all new U.S. sanctions. Another bad idea. A two-year sunset writes "sanctions fatigue" into law, sending the target state a clear message: hunker down and wait out the storm since U.S. resolve will collapse on a fixed date. The bill also mandates the "sanctity of contracts." Again, this sounds reasonable, but it is not. What happens if a U.S. company contracts to sell militarily sensitive technology to a country that suddenly tests a nuclear bomb (India, Pakistan), invades a neighbor (Iraq), engages in genocide (Serbia), or commits an act of terrorism (Iran, Libya)? The Sanctions Reform Act would prevent the United States from breaching the contract by stopping those militarily sensitive sales.