AFF/TERRORISM/AGROTERRORISM

AGROTERRORIST ATTACK CAN EASILY BE CARRIED OUT

IT IS EASY TO GAIN THE CAPABILITIES TO CARRY OUT AN AGROTERRORIST ATTACK

Peter Chalk is an expert on transnational terrorism at the RAND Corporation, February 1, 2001 Jane's Intelligence Review HEADLINE: The US agricultural sector: a new target for terrorism? //VT2002acsln

The capability requirements for carrying out a foodborne attack are rudimentary, and certainly more so than those necessary for an airborne assault. There are a myriad of possible agents and vectors that could be used, most of which areIT IS EASY TO GAIN THE CAPABILITIES TO CARRY OUT AN AGROTERRORIST ATTACKPeter Chalk is an expert on transnational terrorism at the RAND Corporation, February 1, 2001 Jane's Intelligence Review HEADLINE: The US agricultural sector: a new target for terrorism? //VT2002acsln The capability requirements for carrying out a foodborne attack are rudimentary, and certainly more so than those necessary for an airborne assault. There are a myriad of possible agents and vectors that could be used, most of which areg plants throughout the USA.

U�S�A� �H�A�S� �N�E�G�L�E�C�T�E�D� �D�E�F�E�N�S�E� �A�G�A�I�N�S�g plants throughout the USA. U�S�A� �H�A�S� N�E�G�L�E�C�T�E�D� �D�E�F�E�N�S�E� �A�G�A�I�N�S� WARFARE: AN OVERVIEW Number 9 http://www.cbaci.org/arenaban.pdf //VT2002acsln

Given the tremendous economic, political, and strategic value of U.S. agricultural resources, the Washington policy community has been slow to realize their vulnerability to attack by an antagonistic state, economic or agricultural competitor, or terrorist, especially with biological weapons. With the myriad of activities currently taking place to bolster counterterrorism and strengthen critical infrastructure protection, it would be a shame to underestimate the value of, or the need to, secure better the nation's agricultural resources.

AGROTERRORIST ATTACKS ARE MUCH EASIER TO EXECUTE THAN HUMAN ATTACKS

Weaponising biological pathogens to destroy agricultural livestock is a far easier process than creating munitions designed to kill people. Several factors account for this:

- there are many more agents that are lethal and highly contagious to animals than is the case with humans, many of which are not routinely vaccinated against. At least 22 such diseases are known to exist. Most are also environmentally resilient - being able to exist for long periods of time in and on organic matter - and are reasonably easy to acquire and produce;

- US livestock has become progressively more disease prone in recent years as a result of intensive antibiotic and steroid programmes and husbandry changes designed to elevate the volume, quality and quantity of meat production, as well as satisfy the specific requirements of potential vendors. These biotechnic modifications, which can include anything from branding and disinfectant sterilisation treatments to dehorning, castration and hormone injections, have combined to dramatically elevate the stress levels of exposed livestock. This has lowered the natural tolerance of farm animals to diseases and increased the volume of bacteria that would normally be shed in the event of infection; and

- problems of pathogenic dissemination have been largely circumvented due to the intensive way in which US farm animals are currently reared, bred and transported. Most US dairies can be expected to contain at least 1,500 lactating cows at any one time; some of the largest premises housing up to 10,000 animals. The outbreak of a contagious disease at one of these facilities would be very difficult to control and could necessitate the destruction of all the livestock, a formidable and expensive task.

AGROTERRORISM IS USEFUL FOR TERRORISTS BECAUSE IT AVOIDS HARSH BACKLASH

Should an epidemic of any one of these diseases occur in the USA, it could have severe repercussions in terms of creating a mass public scare, particularly if human deaths occurred. Terrorists could use this to their advantage, allowing them to create a general atmosphere of fear and anxiety without actually having to carry out indiscriminate civilian-oriented attacks. As terrorist expert Dr Bruce Hoffman observes: "It gets the terrorists' coercive point across but doesn't necessarily cross the threshold of killing people, and thus doesn't create the same kind of backlash."

AGROTERRORIST ATTACKS CAN BE USED TO BLACKMAIL AND RAISE HUGE SUMS OF MONEY

It should also be noted that the low probability of detecting intentional biological assaults against agriculture makes this modus operandi an ideal and largely risk-free way for terrorists (and other criminals) to raise money. The USDA believes that one particularly effective way of achieving this would be to manipulate "the US agricultural future commodity markets through pathogen and pest introductions". An attack that severely crippled the US cattle industry, for instance, would be sure to result in a major increase in demand, and corresponding price rise, for the products of the country's major beef and milk competitors. An astute terrorist could take advantage of this by simply investing in appropriate stock before carrying out an assault.

AGROTERRORISM IS A POTENT BLACKMAIL AND EXTORTION TOOL

The potential impact and mechanics of agroterrorism also gives this form of aggression a high payoff in terms of more basic extortion and coercive blackmail. Unlike human-directed biological threats, terrorists would have the advantage of establishing the credibility of their resolve by actually carrying out a large-scale livestock or foodborne attack without attracting retaliation from governing entities that no longer feel they have anything left to lose. Also, given the enormous direct and latent damage that could be inflicted by repeat attacks, state and federal governments would have a strong incentive to negotiate, a central consideration in any blackmail attempt.

AGROTERRORISM IS SAFER FOR THE TERRORISTS THAN OTHER FORMS

In terms of personal risk, biological agroterrorism is also more attractive than experimenting with human viral or bacterial agents as virulent non-zoonotic diseases, such as hog cholera, rinderpest, African swine fever and foot and mouth disease (FMD), can always be used. While all of these infections are lethal to ruminant animal populations, they cannot be passed on to people and, therefore, pose no risk in the form of accidental or latent contamination.

According to the Gilmore Commission: "[A] concerted biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success." This is important as one of the main factors that appears to have limited terrorist experimentation with WMD is a lack of predictability: the perceived ability to carry out the operation in question with minimal risk to the terrorists themselves.

AGROTERRORISM CERTAINLY MEETS THE DEFINITOION OF TERRORISM

The absence of direct physical violence against human targets has prompted certain commentators to exclude any agricultural attacks from the terrorism lexicon. However, if terrorism is defined as a psychological act of criminal violence designed to destabilise society and influence government policies, then attacks against agriculture could be considered terrorist in nature.