AFF/NUCLEAR: NUCLEAR STAND-DOWN

NUCLEAR STAND-DOWN DECREASES THE RISK OF USE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON

NUCLEAR STAND DOWN DECREASES NUCLEAR RISK IN THREE WAYS: CONFIDENCE, REDUCE OVERREACTION, DECREASE UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCH

By standing down their nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia can:

• increase mutual confidence that neither will launch a suicidal surprise attack;
• reduce the chance of an overreaction to a false alarm; and
• reduce the possibility of unauthorized launch.

The extended time required to prepare an attack and, in many cases, the number of people involved in physical preparations, would provide a safety buffer, allowing decisions to be reversed or conflicts resolved before nuclear weapons are launched.  Standing down nuclear weapons would only change the time required for launching warheads and, taken alone, would have no effect on the size of the nuclear arsenal, the vulnerability of individual weapons, or the U.S. capability for responding to an attack. In fact, an arsenal more than adequate for devastating retaliation could be kept entirely on submarines, the most invulnerable weapons system available.

NUCLEAR STAND DOWN IS AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE

The first steps could be unilateral and might only lengthen firing times by several hours or days. As verification measures come into effect and both sides grow more confident that a surprise attack won't occur, the time required to launch nuclear weapons could be lengthened even further.

USA SHOULD WORK WITH RUSSIA TO STAND DOWN AS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS POSSIBLE

Now President Bush has his chance to address this problem. The Bush administration is completing a review of the alert status of U.S. nuclear missiles as part of an examination of nuclear policy in general, including the purpose, target, and size of U.S. nuclear forces. The review should result in the removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert. Working with Russia to stand down as many as possible would be a solid beginning. This would set the stage for verifiably reducing and eliminating the vast majority of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, as well as establishing a new policy that remaining U.S. nuclear weapons are solely intended for deterrence.