Decision Making in Watershed Governance Networks

Simulating Heterogeneous Beliefs and Accountability Ties in Agent Based Models

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Theoretical background

- The wickedness (Rittel and Webber 1973) and the complexity of many governance problems
- Evolution of "novel" public-public, private-private and public-private partnerships at multiple geographical scales
- Characterization of these partnerships as "governance networks"
 - Bogason and Musso 2006; Coen and Thatcher 2008; Ingram et al. 2005; Jones et al. 1997; Kickert et al. 1997; Klijn 1996; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Koliba et al. 2010; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Meyer and Baltes 2004; O'Toole 1997; Park 1996; Provan and Kenis 2007; Skelcher 2005; Sorensen 2002; Sorensen and Torfing 2005; Torfing 2005; White 2001; Zia and Koliba 2009; Koliba et al. 2010)

Governance Networks

- Relatively stable pattern of coordinated action and resource exchanges;
- involving policy actors crossing different social scales, drawn from the public, private or non-profit sectors and across geographic levels;
- who interact through a variety of competitive, command and control, cooperative, and negotiated arrangements;
- for purposes anchored in one or more facets of the policy stream. (Koliba, Meek & Zia, 2010)
- Examples
 - Watershed partnerships
 - Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs)

Management of Complex Governance Networks (CGNs)

- Formation
 - How do CGNs form? Who is represented in CGNs?
 - What are CGN goals?
- Operation
 - How do CGNs operate? What type of activities?
 - What do CGN actors decide and how?
- Performance and Accountability
 - How to manage the performance of network actors in CGNs? Who are these network actors accountable to?

Simulating CGN Operations: What do CGN actors decide and how?

- Rational decision making theories

 Each agent maximizes expected utility (EU)
- Behavioral decision making theories

 How agents deviate from maximizing EU?
- Complexity and network-based decision theories
 - Dynamic mental models: constant updating of belief networks of agents in a given space-time
 - Dynamic cultural models: shared mental models across clusters of agents in a dynamic system

Decision Making in Small World Networks (SWNs) versus Like-Minded Networks (LMNs)

- 1. How do voting outcomes in complex governance networks differ when proposals with low (.25), medium (.5) and high (.75) scores on environment-friendly, market-friendly and local government friendly decision criteria are introduced for discussion and voting?
- 1. How sensitive are voting outcomes to changes in the tolerance of a network members beliefs to other members' beliefs in SWNs versus LMNs?
- 1. How sensitive are voting outcomes to changes in the average number of connections per agent in SWNs versus tolerance of belief difference in connections in LMNs?

Prototype CGN Model: Agent Based Models to Simulate Decision Making Processes

• The model consists of three basic parts

- People and their network
- Groups
- Voting process

Prototype CGN Model: People

- 51 agents
 - From a survey conducted by Paul Hirsch in 2007
 - stakeholders in a Georgia water planning process
 - Primary affiliation used to create groups of "elementary" cultural models
 - Agriculture, Business, Government, Environmentalist, Forestry, Water management
 - Three of the survey questions are used to derive the attitudes (belief networks) of the agents
 - Attitude toward local government involvement
 - Attitude toward market-based solutions
 - Importance of environmental protection
 - Responses originally ordinal -> Scaled from 0 to 1

Prototype CGN Model: Network

- Initially a small-world network is constructed
- New connections are added based on agents' similarities in LMNs and randomly in SWNs
- These connections represent an agent's social group
 - These are the G
 people that an
 agent will "discuss"
 an issue with before
 they cast a final
 vote.



Prototype CGN Model: Groups

- Each of the 6 groups has their own strategy for making connections and voting, which underpins their **accountability ties**
 - For example:
 - Environmental group affiliates are concerned with a proposal's consideration of environmental protection and local government involvement.
 - Business affiliates are concerned with a proposal's inclusion of market-based solutions and the degree of involvement by local government agencies.
- Future work will involve developing more complex and dynamic strategies that evolve with changing accountability ties

Agent decision making



- First decision is to make friends in the group to expand the network [LMNs versus SWNs]
- The second decision an agent makes is in regards to how it will vote on the current proposal prior to the 'discussion' with its connections
- The final decision agents make is how to cast their final vote after the discussion

Simulation Findings: LMN



Simulation Findings: SWN



Experimental Simulation Results on the Tolerance of Belief Patterns



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Experimental Simulation Results on Agent Connectedness





LIKE-MINDED NETWORK - TOLERANCE OF BELIEF DIFFERENCE OF CONNECTED AGENTS

SMALL WORLD NETWORK

Next Steps: Calibration of Agent Based Model to Lake Champlain Watershed Basin

- Recalibrate agent based model to observed patterns in Lake Champlain Watershed Basin decision making
- Add dynamic strategies
 - Individual and group strategies evolve
 - Memory of wins/losses
 - Removal/addition of network connections
- Couple agent based model with a watershed landscape model

Elicitation of observed patterns in LCBP decision making

Method

1.Text Mining of LCBP historical documents: extraction of data based on plan hierarchy:

- Goals
 - Actions
 - Tasks, Actors, Benchmarks
- a) Missing cases coded manually based on implication in task-level description text

2.Systematic coding of policy tools based on Salamon's (2002) framework.

3. Actors classified based on frequency of inclusion.

- Word count; Actors which appear twice or more identified as clear positives.
- Database filtered by clear positive word list and coded into 7 categories:
 - Federal; State; Local; Private; NGO; Citizens; Researchers.
- 4. Statistical Analysis
 - 1. Dependent Variables: Network Goals, Time
 - 2. Independent Variables: Actors Implicated, Policy Tools Utilized

Source: Salamon, L. (2002). The Tools of Government. Oxford: University Press.

Stakeholder Representation in the LCBP

Collaborative Geogovernance

LCBP Steering Committee:



Actor Responsibility as a Percentage of Network Activities



- Power Law Distribution
- Responsibility falls heavily on State/Provincial Government,
 with secondary responsibility
 on Federal Government. (Consistent across goal networks)
- Shifting Responsibility
 •from Local Gov / Research
 •to Citizens / Private sector



Meeting LCBP Network Goals with Policy Tools

Consistent across all goals and years (n=1056):

- Public Info is most common (89.3% of actions/tasks)
- Grants utilized toward all except one goal (11.5% of actions/tasks)

Additional policy tools:

- Environmental Regulation utilized toward 7 goals (13.2% of actions/tasks)
- Corrective Taxes or Tax Incentives utilized toward 5 goals (2.8% of actions/tasks)



Conclusions

- Opportunities for Agent Based Models
 - ABMs are well-suited for the systematic assessment of complex governance networks (CGNs) through alternative theoretical lenses
 - Ability to model complex decision heuristics
 - Governance informatics
 - Experimental Simulations
- Challenges
 - Strategy space of network actors
 - Matching patterns among simulations and observations
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